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Secure computation is a fundamental problem in modern cryptography in which
multiple parties join to compute a function of their private inputs without revealing any-
thing beyond the output of the function. A series of very strong results in the 1980’s
demonstrated that any polynomial-time function can be computed while guaranteeing
essentially every desired security property. The only exception is the fairness property,
which states that no player should receive their output from the computation unless all
players receive their output. While it was shown that fairness can be achieved whenever
a majority of players are honest, it was also shown that fairness is impossible to achieve
in general when half or more of the players are dishonest. Indeed, it was proven that
even boolean XOR cannot be computed fairly by two parties
The fairness property is both natural and important, and as such it was one of the
first questions addressed in modern cryptography (in the context of signature exchange).
One contribution of this thesis is to survey the many approaches that have been used to
guarantee different notions of partial fairness. We then revisit the topic of fairness within
a modern security framework for secure computation. We demonstrate that, despite the
strong impossibility result mentioned above, certain interesting functions can be com-
puted fairly, even when half (or more) of the parties are malicious. We also provide a
new notion of partial fairness, demonstrate feasibility of achieving this notion for a large
class of functions, and show impossibility for certain functions outside this class. We con-
sider fairness in the presence of rational adversaries, and, finally, we study the difficulty
of achieving fairness by exploring how much external help is necessary for providing fair
secure computation.
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In 1980, two years after Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [71] introduced the first dig-
ital signature scheme, Shimon Even and Yacov Yacobi published a paper titled Relations
Among Public Key Signature Schemes [28]. In this work, they explored the power of dig-
ital signatures, proving, among other results, that it is impossible for two distrusting
parties to fairly exchange signatures on a contract. Their intuition was simple and inter-
esting: as the two parties exchange messages back and forth, there must exist some point
in the protocol at which one party has enough information to produce his opponent’s
signature, while the other party does not. The party that receives a signature first can
terminate the protocol at that point, and violate the fairness of the exchange. It seems an
obvious point, but it sparked a very interesting line of research.
In the summer of 1980, Manuel Blum suggested to Even a way to circumvent this
impossibility result. While it is true that there exists a point in the protocol at which only
one player can recover the other’s signature, it may be that they can do this only at great
computational cost. Blum’s idea (roughly) was to have the players begin by exchanging
an encryption of the signatures.1 Technically, it is still true that the first player to receive
the encryption has an unfair advantage, as they can run away with the ciphertext and
recover the output through “brute-force”. But this is computationally infeasible, and
should not be considered unfair. Once the players have encryptions of the output, they
alternate sending one bit of the decryption key, along with a proof of correctness, until
1Actually, Blum doesn’t use encryption, but rather demonstrates how two players can exchange signing
keys bit by bit. See Section 1.2 for details.
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the entire key has been sent. Of course, the leading player has a continuing advantage
over the other: informally, at any point in the protocol it is twice as easy for him to recover
the output as it is for his opponent. But on an intuitive level, the solution seems fair. Soon
after their discussion, Blum [11] and Even [26] each wrote papers that made use of this
very idea.
So who was right? Even and Yacobi [28], who proved that signature exchange was
impossible, or Blum [11] and Even [26] who demonstrated the first protocols for fair ex-
change? Of course, there is no contradiction — like much of modern cryptography, the
subtleties arise in the definitions, and in this case, the authors were (implicitly) consid-
ering two different notions of fairness. Although the impossibility result was informal,
the intuition can easily be used to formally rule out completely fair protocols for signa-
ture exchange. In contrast, the positive results allow one player a slight advantage, and
therefore do not violate such a proof. We will return to discuss the question of how fair-
ness should be defined, and we will reconsider the above results at that time. Before
doing that, we turn briefly to consider a separate line of research that would merge with
fairness only in 1986.
Secure computation
“Two millionaires wish to know who is richer; however, they do not want to
find out inadvertently any additional information about each other’s wealth.
How can they carry out such a conversation?” [77]
This was the question that opened Andrew Yao’s groundbreaking 1982 paper on secure
computation [77]. While the image of the millionaires is certainly compelling, this par-
ticular problem is only one example of several similar questions already considered by
others, such as how to play poker without cards, or vote without ballot boxes. What
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made Yao’s paper stand out was his presentation of a “unified view of secure computa-
tion.” He generalized the above problems, unifying them with one single question: Alice
and Bob hold private inputs, x and y (respectively), and wish to compute F (x, y) =
(f1(x, y), f2(x, y)), where Alice receives output f1(x, y) and Bob receives f2(x, y). How
can they do this without revealing anything more than their intended outputs? In ad-
dition to presenting the general question, which encompasses all of the problems pre-
viously considered in the field, Yao gave a general solution, demonstrating that any
polynomial-time function of this form can be computed, while guaranteeing the privacy
of the inputs.
Then, in a second paper that was published in 1986, Yao merged the questions of
fairness and secure computation, showing that any two-party secure computation can be
computed fairly. Here, Yao defined a notion of fairness similar to the one intended by
Blum: his protocol ensures that no player has a significant computational advantage in
recovering their output before the other [78]. In the remainder of that decade there was a
flurry of impressive works on secure computation [38, 31, 17, 9, 17, 7, 40],2 demonstrating
very strong feasibility results. However, the definitions of security varied from paper to
paper, and in some cases they were hard to understand and equally hard to use (in the
sense that proofs of security were cumbersome and often were not presented). Most of
the definitions failed to capture all possible attacks (though it should be noted that only
the definitions of security were flawed, and not the protocols themselves). Finally, in the
Crypto 1991 conference, there were two (similar) papers that unified and strengthened
the varying security definitions: one by Micali and Rogaway [63] and another by Beaver
[6]. The definition of security that emerged as the accepted definition, which is presented
2There exist several excellent surveys of secure computation [35, 22], so we do not review these works
here.
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in Section 2.3 (Definition 2.3.1), is based on the definitions presented in these two papers,
and on the works of Canetti [15] and Goldreich [35]. Collectively, after a decade of re-
search, these works resulted in a single, beautiful framework for defining and proving
security in interactive computation. Furthermore, they provided strong feasibility results
enabling the secure computation of any polynomial-time function, and even guarantee-
ing complete fairness whenever a strict majority of players are honest.
Fairness in Secure Two-Party Computation: Unfortunately, when we revisit the impos-
sibility result of Even and Yacobi [28] in the context of this framework, we find that it still
applies. Their work rules out completely fair protocols for two-party signature exchange,
and our preferred security definition (Definition 2.3.1) requires complete fairness in the
protocol. More technically, although it was never stated explicitly, the assumption made
by Even and Yacobi was that the protocol must always specify well defined output for
the honest player, even when the dishonest player aborts. The same assumption is also
implicitly demanded by Definition 2.3.1. Under this assumption, at some point during a
fair signature exchange, the protocol must specify correct output (i.e., a valid signature)
for one player while not yet specifying it for the other, and in this sense any protocol
must be unfair.3 Furthermore, in 1986, Richard Cleve proved that two players cannot
even agree on an unbiased random bit [20], assuming, again, that the players always
have well defined output. His result implies that it is impossible for two parties to fairly
exchange two bits while satisfying Definition 2.3.1 (since the XOR of two random bits
yields an unbiased coin flip).
As we will soon see, there is a rich body of work achieving various notions of
3It is interesting to think about how the protocols of Blum [11] and Even [26] violate this assumption.
Notice that the protocol cannot specify whether one player should choose to recover the output through
brute-force if the other aborts in the middle of the protocol. If it did specify this, the aborting player can
always choose to abort one round earlier and violate fairness. It follows that the player’s output is not well
defined when the other player aborts.
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partial fairness. We have already briefly described one approach suggested by Blum
in 1980. However, most of this work appeared before the preferred security definition
had emerged. Now that we have adopted this notion of security, some very interesting
questions about fairness resurface. We address the following questions in this thesis.
1.1 Contributions
What functions can be computed with complete fairness, without an honest
majority, satisfying Definition 2.3.1?
As mentioned above, we already know we cannot compute boolean XOR without a strict
honest majority. This is most likely why nobody asked this question after the definition of
secure computation first appeared in 1991. Surprisingly, we show that certain interesting
functions can be computed in this setting, including Yao’s millionaire problem.4 These
results appear in Chapters 3 and 4.
What alternative security definitions can we use that will allow some mean-
ingful notion of partial fairness?
The works on fair exchange clearly achieve some notion of partial fairness, even if the
protocols do not satisfy the strong definition that we would prefer. But there are very
compelling reasons for sticking to the general framework presented in Chapter 2. Recall
that Definition 2.3.1 guarantees complete security, including fairness, while Definition
2.4.1 guarantees complete security excluding fairness. In Chapter 5 we present a new
definition in the same framework that allows for a meaningful middle ground.
4Recall that Yao showed how to compute any two-party function fairly, but only according to a notion of
partial fairness we call gradual release.
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Fairness is impossible to achieve in general when half (or more) of the players
are malicious. Can we do better by considering weaker adversaries?
Our discussion until now has revolved around malicious adversaries that may act in
a worst-case manner to ruin our protocols. Most cryptographic tasks can be achieved
even in this setting, which is why we typically design protocols with such adversaries in
mind. However, fairness cannot in general be achieved in this setting, so this may be one
case where it pays to consider weaker adversaries. In particular, we consider achieving
fairness when the players are rational in the standard game-theoretic sense. Our work in
this direction is presented in Chapter 6.
Fairness is easily achieved with the help of a third party. How much help is
necessary?
In Chapter 7 we present a work that quantifies how much help is necessary for achieving
fairness. Ideally, we would like to use a third party that is stateless, oblivious even to
the particular function being computed. We demonstrate that this is possible. We also
quantify the help provided by the size of the input given to the third party, and we give
upper and lower bounds on feasibility.
1.2 A Survey of Fairness in Secure Computation
There is a long history of work on the topic of fair exchange, most of it predating
the now-standard definitions of security that are presented in Chapter 2. Consequently,
each work introduced its own notion of security, or simply did not define security at
all, making it relatively hard to formally state what was achieved. Nevertheless, it is
worth surveying the techniques used and, when possible, the notions of security that
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were considered. We try to do that here. We have divided the works mainly by the
definition of fairness they achieve, hoping to make it easier to read.
Impossibility of Complete Fairness
Even and Yacobi, 1980: Even and Yacobi [28] introduced the question of fair exchange
just a few years after digital signature schemes had been introduced [24, 71, 67]. The
authors were interested in exploring the possible applications of digital signatures, and
their relationship to other cryptographic primitives. Specifically, they study the rela-
tionship between signature schemes and identification schemes, the round complexity
of signature schemes, and, finally, the application of exchanging signatures (which they
call a “public key agreement scheme”). As described in the previous section, they prove
impossibility of the latter through a simple informal argument, claiming that one party
must have enough information to efficiently produce a verifiable signature before the
other party can do the same. As we will see below, this is not technically true (if we ap-
ply the standard asymptotic definition of “efficient”), but the intuition is correct. Under
the assumption that both players always have well defined output, even when their op-
ponent aborts, we can prove that no protocol offers completely fair signature exchange.
Cleve, 1986: Under the same assumption that players always have well defined output,
Cleve strengthens the earlier impossibility result [20], proving that even completely fair
bit exchange is impossible. Actually, framing his result in this light skews his motivation,
which stemmed from two recent results on distributed coin flipping [4, 14], and not from
recent work on fair exchange. Technically, his theorem states that there does not exist
an efficient protocol enabling two players to agree on an unbiased coin. Nevertheless,
his result has the implications suggested above: if two players could fairly exchange two
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bits, they could choose random bits, exchange them, and output their XOR to produce an
unbiased coin. Even though this was not his motivation, he certainly recognized the
implication. Indeed, Beaver and Goldwasser’s 1989 paper [7] (discussed below) will
cite Cleve’s result as proof that “perfect fairness is not achievable” for general secure
computation, and, citing a personal communication with Cleve, they state that:
If p and q are the maximal a priori probabilities of the players to know the
value of f(x1, x2), given x1 or x2 respectively, then for any two-party protocol
running for κ rounds there exists a quitting strategy of one player enabling
him to predict f with probability at least min(1−p,1−q)2κ better than the other
player.
It is likely that Cleve’s result is what prevented people from asking whether anything of
interest could be computed with complete fairness; the results we present in Chapters 3
and 4 are surprising in light of this earlier work.
Cleve’s impossibility result is remarkably simple to read and understand. For any
κ round protocol, he demonstrates that there exist 4κ different adversaries such that at
least one adversary inflicts a polynomial bias on the outcome of the coin. The adversaries
are easily described: A(i)b runs honestly for i rounds, and then tests internally what his
own output would now be if the honest player were to abort. (Here we are using the
assumption described earlier that both players always have well defined output in case
the other player aborts.) If his output is b, he continues honestly for one more round
and then aborts; if it is 1 − b, he aborts immediately. The intuition for why one of these
adversaries is successful is as follows. Take any coin-flipping protocol, and consider an
execution that results in output b. At the very start of the protocol, Pr[OUT = b] = 12 , while
at the end of the protocol, Pr[OUT = b] = 1; since there are only a polynomial number
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of rounds, somewhere in the middle of the protocol, there must be a “gap” where this
probability makes a polynomial jump towards 1. Cleve proves very cleanly that this gap
exists, and demonstrates that one of these adversaries exploits that gap and biases the
outcome.
Gradual Release
Despite the above impossibility results, as we have already discussed, it is possi-
ble to achieve various notions of partial fairness. Gradual release is the technique used
in most of the feasibility results that we present below. As we have already briefly de-
scribed, the idea used in all of these works is that in each round of interaction, it becomes
progressively easier (cryptographically) to recover the output.
Blum, 1983: Although Blum’s 1983 work [11] was not the first result using gradual re-
lease, it is cited in nearly every work on fair exchange after Even and Yacobi’s 1980 result
[28]. It seems that this paper sparked the long line of feasibility results.5 Blum provided
a way for two players to fairly exchange secret keys using gradual release. He then sug-
gests several applications that this might be used for, including signature exchange. In
his work, the two public keys are composite numbers of the form NA = pA · qA, and
NB = pB · qB , where pA, qA, pB, qB are all large primes, and the users wish to exchange
(pA, qA) and (pB, qB). The protocol relies on the following facts from number theory. Any
a relatively prime to NA has 4 square roots mod NA, and knowing its roots (for any such
a) is sufficient for efficiently factoring NA. (Actually, only two square roots are necessary,
if they are they are paired appropriately, but four certainly suffices.) Furthermore, given
5There are also several later references to a 1981 technical report by Blum titled “Three Applications of
the Oblivious Transfer”, which we could not find. This title refers to Rabin’s work [68] which we describe
below.
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pA and qA, it is easy to find square roots mod NA.
The protocol proceeds as follows. The player that wishes to factor NA chooses a
random element a ∈ ZNA and sends a2 mod NA to his opponent. The player learning the
factors of NB acts similarly sending some b2 mod NB . Note that each player knows two
roots of the number they sent:±a for the first player, and±b for the second. Furthermore,
they can each compute the four square roots of the number they received. They then
alternate sending messages for i rounds, where in round i, each player sends the ith bit
of all four square roots. Because neither player knows which two roots the other holds,
they cannot send incorrect bits without getting caught! This suffices for soundness 1/2: to
further reduce the probability of cheating, the players instead start by each sending κ
squares, and then alternate sending one bit of all 4κ roots in each round. At Crypto in
1983 and 1984, Tedrick [74, 75] demonstrated how to slow down the advantage of the
leading player in Blum’s protocol. Instead of sending a bit of the secret key, the user can
cut the search space by a lesser amount by sending a statement like “the last 3 bits are
not 001”.
Unfortunately, Blum’s result relied on several strong assumptions (all very pre-
cisely stated in his paper). One of these assumptions was proven false by Håsted and
Shamir a few years after his paper appeared [47]. Blum had assumed that having a few
bits from many square roots is no more useful (with respect to factoring NA or NB) than
having the same number of bits from only a single square root. Put more formally, given
the k most (or least) significant bits from the roots of y1 = a21, . . . , yκ = a
2
κ, he assumed
that it is no easier to find the remaining bits of any root ai than it would be if given only
k bits of ai. Håstad and Shamir demonstrate how to factor in polynomial time given only
O(logNA/κ) bits of each of the O(κ) unknown variables. As κ grows, then, we require
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fewer and fewer bits before we can factor.
Even, 1981: This work by Even [26] was done concurrently with Blum’s work on secret
exchange. Even refers to his earlier impossibility result saying “it was shown by Even
and Yacobi [28] that no deterministic protocol exists [for fairly committing two players to
a contract]... During the summer of 1980, in a conversation, M. Blum suggested the use
of randomization for such protocols.” It is not clear why Even focuses on whether the
protocol is randomized, since the prior impossibility result rules out even randomized
protocols, as long as they meet the assumption described above. (We cannot easily say
anything about the impossibility result for protocols that do not meet this assumption.)
Nevertheless, regardless of how he reconciled it with the prior impossibility result, he
gives the first published work on gradual release (chronologically).
Even’s result relies on Merkle puzzles [62], which are (informally) defined as follows.
Given (M,Fk(M)) whereM is chosen at random and Fk is a keyed one way function, the
puzzle is to find the key k. It is assumed that given t bits of k, the only way to find k
is to try all |k| − t bits6; this allows the issuer of the puzzle to control its exact difficulty
by publicizing an appropriate fraction of k. Even assumes that the value of the contract
to both players is some fixed value V , and defines the contract to be valid only if they
have each signed it κ + 1 times (where κ, here and throughout, is a security parameter).
His protocol proceeds by having both players encrypt 2κ signatures on the contract using
encryption keys k1, . . . , k2κ, and then generate a Merkle puzzle for each encryption key,
where each puzzle has difficulty 2V/κ. The players exchange the encrypted signatures
and the Merkle puzzles: at this point, either player could brute-force κ + 1 puzzles at a
cost of more than 2V , but by assumption, neither player would care to spend the com-
6This is a worrisome assumption, which we discuss more below.
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putational resources. Now the players take turns sending encryption keys, one at a time;
each player chooses at random which key he would next like to receive. If a player ever
aborts, they only have a small computational advantage (2V/κ) in recovering the other’s
signature. Because there are 2κ encrypted signatures, if a player cheats by forming bad
puzzles, they will either be caught with high probability (if many of them are bad), or
it will not greatly hinder the signature reconstruction (if only a few are bad). This pro-
vides a tradeoff: if a player cheats, then either we catch him with high probability, or his
cheating will not significantly slow us down when we try to brute-force a signature.
Goldreich, 1983: Goldreich published a short note at Crypto 1983 [34] that simplifies
Even’s scheme [26]. He instructs the two parties to each generate κ Merkle puzzles, and
then sign a statement saying they are committed to the contract if the other can either
solve all κ puzzles, or prove that they’re not all solvable. They then exchange the solutions,
one at a time. The point is that it is not necessary to catch a party that cheats: instead we
can define a signature on a bad puzzle as a commitment to the contract.
Rabin, 1981: This early work on fairness [68] does not use the technique of gradual re-
lease. In fact, although its subject is the fair exchange of two bits, it is not typically re-
membered for dealing with the topic of fairness at all. Rabin’s seminal paper introduced
a new tool called oblivious transfer (OT), which has since become an essential crypto-
graphic primitive. It would later be proven both necessary and sufficient for performing
general secure computation (without fairness) [54, 49]. However, even before that, OT
would be used in several works on gradual release, which is why we present the result
here.
Oblivious transfer, as defined by Rabin, is a protocol involving two players, a
sender and a receiver. The sender holds input N = p · q, where p and q are large primes,
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and at the end of the protocol, with probability 1/2 the receiver learns p and q and with
the remaining probability he learns nothing; the sender remains oblivious as to whether
the receiver learns p and q. Rabin constructs this scheme using the same number theoretic
properties that appeared in Blum’s protocol. The receiver begins by choosing a value a
and sending a2 mod N to the sender. The sender responds with one of the square-roots
of a2. If he happens to respond with â = ±a, then the receiver learns nothing. However,
if he responds with either of the other two roots, the receiver can easily recover p and q.
The definition of fairness that Rabin considers for bit exchange (left implicit) is that
neither player should have complete confidence in their output bit before the other. He
assumes that the players are honest, except that they may abort once they have complete
confidence in the answer. (In order to enforce honest behavior, he suggests signing all
messages so that they can be shown to a judge later. However, he is not willing to rely
on the judge for the fairness property.) He also assumes that if either player learns their
output, the other player will know that they learned it. This is a strange assumption,
but can perhaps be motivated when the outcome of the protocol leads to an observable
action in the real world. Finally, he allows the protocol to have a polynomial probability
of failure, in which case it terminates with neither party learning the bit (and cannot be
restarted).
This is a long list of assumptions, which certainly seem to weaken the importance
of the result, but the technique that he uses is very interesting. It turns out to be very sim-
ilar to the one we use in Chapter 3 to compute Yao’s millionaire problem with complete
fairness and, surprisingly, it is unlike any other approach used in the 30 years between
those two works. The key idea is to design the protocol such that the very act of abort-
ing reveals some crucial information. To exchange two input bits, bA and bB , Alice and
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Bob each begin by choosing (and announcing) a public key, NA and NB respectively.
They each take a turn playing the role of the sender in an execution of an OT. We let bOTA
denote the outcome of the execution when Alice is the receiver, namely bOTA = 1 if she
learned the factors of NB , and bOTA = 0 otherwise. We define b
OT
B analogously. Then,
Alice sends bA ⊕ bOTA and Bob sends bB ⊕ bOTB . Finally, Alice sends an encryption of her
input bit using her public key NA (without knowing whether Bob has learned its factors
as a result of the OT), and Bob responds in kind. If Bob neglects to send his final message,
and instead goes to use his learned bit, Alice will know that he learned the factors of NA;
she will deduce that the value of bOTB = 1, and thus recover Bob’s input bit, reinstating
fairness. Similarly, if Bob sends his encryption and Alice recovers bB , Bob will know
when she uses the bit that the value of bOTA = 1, and will thus recover bA. With probabil-
ity 3/4, the protocol ends with both players recovering the other’s input bit in the above
manner. With the remaining probability, neither player learns anything.7 The motivation
is forced, and this is hardly a satisfying protocol for bit exchange, but the techniques are
very interesting.
Even, Goldreich and Lempel, 1982: In Crypto 1982, Even et al. [27] published another
paper that made use of the gradual release technique. (A more complete version with a
slightly different protocol would appear in Communications of the ACM in 1985.) It is
essentially a hybrid of the works by Blum [11] and Even [26] described above, through the
use of Rabin’s new oblivious transfer primitive. In the 1982 version, they present a new,
more general construction of OT from a public key encryption scheme (of a particular
form), where the value learned by the receiver (with probability half) is some messageM
7It seems Rabin could have further assumed that players always use their output within some known
time period. Then the players can each deduce their output from the fact that the other player did not learn
anything. The protocol would guarantee output in this case.
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rather than the prime factors of a public key.
Similar to Even’s approach, they define a contract to be signed if the party can
produce the solutions to κ Merkle puzzles. Similar to Blum’s approach, they catch a
cheating player by using OT to send (an expected) half of the solutions up front. The
players then alternate sending one bit of every solution. A cheater is caught if they send
the wrong bit in a solution that was already learned through OT.
In the version that appeared in 1985, they define and implement a 1-out-of-2 OT,
which is the notion used today in reference to OT. In this cryptographic primitive, the
sender has two values, rather than one, and the receiver always learns exactly one value.
The sender is oblivious to which value was learned. The players begin the protocol with
κ pairs of unsolved Merkle puzzles, and they define a signature to be a pair of solutions to
any pair of puzzles. The players first receive exactly one solution to each pair through OT,
and then exchange the bits of all 2κ solutions, one at a time. They use the solution they
learned through OT in order to prevent the sender from cheating as they send the bits
of the solutions. This approach removes any advantage that might arise from statistical
deviation in the number of puzzle solutions received through OT in the 1982 version of
the protocol.
Yao, 1986: As we mention in the previous section, Yao’s 1986 paper played a crucial step
in developing the formal study of fairness [78]. Just as he was the first to generalize the
notion of secure computation in his 1982 paper [77], this work is the first to generalize
fairness. Whereas previous work studied a few select problems, like signature exchange,
certified mail and bit exchange, Yao extended the notion of fairness, arguing that it should
be a property of any secure computation. If Alice and Bob are computing some function
F (x, y), we should guarantee that neither player receives output before the other.
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Yao gives a formal definition of three security properties: validity, privacy, and
fairness. We focus here only on the last property, for which he requires that if one player
can recover the output, the other player should have some “recovery” protocol, R, that
allows him to do the same. The specification of R may be dependent on the adversarial
code A. It takes as input the honest player’s input and the honest player’s view in the
protocol execution. With significant probability, it outputs the correct output whenever
the adversary recovers the correct output. Formally (but modified to make the exposition
clearer):







fixed constant c, any probabilistic, polynomial time adversaryA, there exists a probabilistic, poly-














G(1κ, y) = f2κ(x, y)
]
+O(κ−c)
where OUTAπ = OUTAπ (1κ, x, y; rA, rH) is the output of the adversary when interacting with H,
each having inputs (1κ, y) and (1κ, x) (respectively) and random coins rA and rH (respectively),
and VIEWHπ = VIEWHπ (1κ, x, y; rA, rH) is the view of the honest player in the same interaction.
The role of G in the above definition is to capture the fact that the adversary may
be able to guess the output just by looking at his input. We note that this definition does
not address the fact that the malicious player may substitute his input for another value.
We refer the reader to the original paper to see how this is addressed.
The fact that R is dependent on the particular adversary is a drawback to this def-
16
inition, and unfortunately it is unavoidable in the gradual release approach. Intuitively,
Rmust know whether A has recovered the output (using brute-force) in order to decide
whether it must do the same. Otherwise, suppose R were fixed and the code of A were
allowed to depend on R; A could simply choose to abort the protocol and recover the
output just before the point at which R would choose to do the same. A would still be
polynomial time, and the fairness definition would be violated.
Although he does not provide the protocol, Yao also claims to have a solution that
achieves this definition while enabling the computation of any polynomial-time function.
The basic approach is to jointly compute an encryption of the output under public key
N = p · q while revealing p to one player and q to the other. Then the players can run an
exchange protocol for p and q.
Brickell, Chaum, Damgård, and van de Graaf, 1987: This Crypto 1987 paper [13] by
Brickell et al. gives a new Blum-style approach to exchanging secret keys. They work
in a large prime order group, Z∗p, under the (well accepted) assumption that it is hard
to find discrete logarithms. They demonstrate a protocol for proving that the discrete
logarithm of some group element lies in a particular interval. By repeatedly narrowing
this interval, one can gradually release a secret. One obvious advantage over Blum’s
protocol [11], of course, is that their assumptions still stand up to cryptanalysis. Another
advantage stressed by the authors is that this more easily enables broadcasting the release
of the secret to a group, rather than releasing it to only one other party. This is because the
receiver’s part in the protocol is only to send random challenge bits (rather than squares
for which only he knows the roots).
The authors do not define fairness. In fact, they barely discuss the application of
exchange, focusing instead on the one-sided release of a secret. However, one could in-
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terleave the role of several senders to achieve secret exchange. In line with contemporary
results on zero-knowledge proofs [41, 39], they do prove that the protocol reveals nothing
other than the intended interval containing the logarithm.
Imagliazzo and Yung, 1987: The focus of this paper is not the topic of fairness, but zero
knowledge. Impagliazzo and Yung [48] demonstrate a protocol for proving that you
have correctly computed a circuit. However, they point out that their result can be used
to prove correctness of the computation one bit at a time, even adaptively choosing which
bit to reveal next. If the output is a decryption key, this becomes the same approach to
gradual release that Yao proposed [78]. It could also be used to reveal bits of the output
directly (instead of to reveal a secret key that allows decryption of the encrypted output).
Whether this is fair may depend heavily on the function being computed, since some
output bits may be much more valuable than others.
It is interesting that the preceding breakthroughs in the area of zero-knowledge
[41, 39], which lead to breakthroughs in secure computation [38, 31], also enable gradual
release of verifiable secrets (in a very general form). Specifically, suppose the secret is
verifiable via some string w, known only to the holder of the secret. Consider the state-
ment: “the ith bit of the secret is b.” This is an instance of an NP language for which w is
the witness. Furthermore, as the authors of this paper show, if the secret is the result of
computing some circuit (e.g., the circuit that multiplies large prime numbers), then the
inputs and randomness used in the computation of that circuit suffice as a witness w.
Damgård, 1993: The main focus of this paper [23] is to enable efficient fair secret exchange
for a wider variety of secrets. Prior schemes employing gradual release only enabled the
exchange of a very particular type of secret: Blum [11], and Yao [78] suggest ways to
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exchange factors, and Brickell et al. [13] demonstrate how to exchange discrete logs.8
In this work, Damgård introduces a new unconditionally hiding bit commitment, with
length that is independent of the underlying value, along with a simple way of correctly
revealing the committed value one bit at a time. Of course, for the protocol to be useful
in some application, the players still need to prove that the committed value is relevant
to the application, and not just some random string. Damgård demonstrates how to do
this when the secret is a particular type of signature (such as RSA or El Gamal).
Damgård only defines security for a one-sided gradual release scheme. He requires
a proof through simulation that nothing other than the last i bits of s is learned after i
rounds. More formally, he includes the following requirement in his definition of security
(rewritten in our own notation).
Definition 1.2.2 Let π be a secure release protocol in which an adversary A gradually receives
a secret s from player H. Let A hold inputs (1κ, z, w), where z is some auxiliary input and w
is a public value enabling the verification of s. Let H hold inputs (1κ, w). We denote by VIEWiπ
the view of A in this interaction after i rounds, and we denote by s|i the last i bits of s. π is fair
if for every such adversary and for every round i there exists a simulator S(z, w, s|i) outputting




Boneh and Naor, 2000: Boneh and Naor [12] give a result that is similar to Damgård’s,
building a commitment scheme that can be opened gradually. However, there are a few
strong advantages to the newer scheme. For one, the commitments are designed to hold
up against parallel algorithms: assuming some particular number theoretic assumption,
the commitments are no easier to open with multiple processors than they are with a
8Merkle puzzles allow players to exchange a secret, but not in a provable fashion. Even et al. [27] did use
Merkle puzzles to exchange secrets in a provable fashion, but only when the secrets were of a very specific
form. The work of Impagliazzo and Yung [48] is actually very general, but it uses generic zero-knowledge
proofs for NP, which involve a Karp reduction and are quite impractical.
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single processor. A second advantage is that a committed player can make it gradually
easier to open the commitment without revealing any bits of the committed value. In
contrast, in Damgård’s commitment scheme, the committed player actually reveals a bit
of the committed value in order to gradually open the commitment. When using such a
scheme for releasing signatures, one would have to assume that a single bit of the signa-
ture only makes it twice as easy to produce a valid signature. Here, this assumption is not
necessary (though it is replaced with other number theoretic assumptions). In fact, the
authors demonstrate that their protocol is zero knowledge, as long as the distinguisher
runs in less time than is necessary to recover the committed value using brute-force.
As before, the commitment is only useful when we can prove something about the
committed value. The authors demonstrate how to prove that the underlying committed
value is an RSA signature. (They also demonstrate applications to other spheres of cryp-
tography that are of lesser interest to our work.) They define fairness for the application
of signature exchange in a way similar to that of Yao:
Definition 1.2.3 A protocol is (c, ε)-fair if the following holds: for any adversary A running in
time runtimeA < κ, let A choose a contract C and run the contract signing protocol with party
H. At some point,A aborts the protocol and attempts to recover a valid signature σH(C). Denote
A’s probability of success by successA. Suppose now that party H runs the recovery algorithm
R for time c · runtimeA and let successH be the probability he recovers a signature σA(C). Then
successA − successH ≤ ε.
The authors also give the first lower bound on the round complexity of a gradual release
protocol. Letting γA = runtimeAsuccessA and γH =
runtimeH
successH
, they define an unfairness measure: γAγH .
Then, given a signature scheme, they define its security gap, ∆, as the ratio between the
time needed to forge a signature, and the time required to legitimately sign and verify.
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They prove that any κ-round gradual release protocol for exchanging signatures with
security gap ∆ has unfairness ∆1/κ.
Garay and Pomerance, 2003: Garay and Pomerance [33] improve on the scheme of Boneh
and Naor [12] in several ways. First, when using the timed commitments of Boneh and
Noar for signature exchange, the signatures and commitments have to have the same
public modulus, which limits the types of signatures that can be exchanged. The protocol
in this paper allows for the exchange of several types of digital signatures. Another
benefit that they introduce, building on prior work by Garay and Jakobsson from the
previous year [32], is to allow for the reuse of public keys for the commitments. This
enables them to push the overhead required in Boneh and Naor’s commitments to a
single one-time setup. They can then recommit to new values using a very short, efficient
protocol.
Pinkas, 2003: The three prior works on time-released commitments [23, 12, 33] all demon-
strate ways of proving that the underlying committed value is of a particular form, such
as, say, an RSA signature. Pinkas generalized the preceding works, providing a method
for using timed commitments in general secure two-party computation [66]. Specifically,
he takes Yao’s approach for general secure computation [77], in which P1 creates a “gar-
bled circuit” for P2 to evaluate. At the end of the protocol, each player has a commitment
to the value of each output wire belonging to the other player.9 They then gradually open
their commitments. Pinkas uses a mix of “cut and choose” and blind signatures to enable
the players to prove that the underlying committed values are the actual outputs from
9Actually, this is a slightly inaccurate simplification. At the end of Yao’s protocol, for every output wire
i, P2 learns a random key ki representing the output bit on that wire, and only P1 knows the mapping
ki → {0, 1}. P2 is supposed to send the random values corresponding to P1’s output wires, while P1
simultaneously sends the mapping of ki → {0, 1} for P2’s output wires. Pinkas demonstrates a way to
compute Yao’s circuits such that in the end, P2 holds commitments to P1’s output bits, rather than just a
random value associated with each output bit, and similarly that P1 has a commitment to the mapping of
ki → {0, 1}.
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the computation. We refer the reader to the paper for details. His definition of fairness is
very similar to the one in Boneh and Noar’s work [12], so we do not present it here.
Garay, MacKenzie, Prabhakaran and Yang, 2006: This paper is the first work to place
the gradual release approach into the formal security setting described in Chapter 2. The
fairness of the protocol presented in the paper uses the same timed commitments pre-
sented in Garay and Pomerance’s prior work in order to gradually release the output of
any general secure computation [33]. The bigger contribution, though, is a new security
framework, extending the framework of Chapter 2, in order to include a notion they call
resource fairness.10 Garay et al. compare the real world protocol to an ideal world proto-
col, as we will do in Chapter 2, but they modify the ideal world to model recovery of
committed messages by the adversary through the use of brute-force. Specifically, they
allow the ideal world adversary early access to these messages by “investing” resources,
and then allow the honest party to request similar resources in order to recover fairness.
They then prove that an execution by the simulator in this ideal model is indistinguish-
able from their real world protocol.
Probabilistic Fairness
There are several drawbacks to gradual release, which were very nicely described
by Ben-Or et al. [8] (their own approach is described later):
1. It requires both parties to have the same resources.
2. There are no explicit instructions of what to do when a player aborts prematurely.
3. It relies on the “ideal” OWF assumption: given f(x), even after revealing some bits
10Actually, they extend the more general Universal Composability framework introduced by Canetti [16],
which models security in an interactive environment involving other protocols. For simplicity we do not
describe that framework in this thesis.
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of x, f(x) is hard to invert.
In this section we present several works that took a second approach. As opposed
to the technique of gradual release, where the solution becomes cryptographically easier
to find after each round, they suggest using a probabilistic method in which the players’
confidence in the solution increases over time. This has the advantage of addressing the
first and third concerns described above, though as we will see it does not always handle
the second concern.
Luby, Micali and Rackoff, 1983: Luby, Micali and Rackoff published a paper at FOCS
in 1983 on the fair exchange of a bit [60].11 Informally, each player creates a “coin” that
is biased towards the value of their input bit by a factor of 1/κ. They then take turns
flipping each other’s biased coin, each time gaining more confidence in the value of the
other player’s input. Actually, implementing it this way with two independent coins is
insecure, because two independent random walks will likely diverge, creating a point in
the protocol where one player will have a constant advantage in confidence, independent
of κ. Instead, the authors present a way to create correlated biased coins, such that they
either both land on the favored side, or neither does.
Vazirani and Vazirani, 1983: Concurrently, Vazirani and Vazirani demonstrated a way
for Bob to send Alice a bit, while fairly receiving a “receipt” that proves that he did so.
The approach is very similar to that of Luby et al.12 The intuition is to have Alice and
Bob create two biased coins in each round. For the first coin, Alice chooses at random
whether it should be biased towards the value of Bob’s bit or towards the opposite value.
(We stress that she does not know the value of Bob’s bit, so she does not know whether
11Occasionally cited under the title “The MiRackoLus Exchange of a Secret Bit”.
12By the previous discussion about random walks, it is not clear that this result can be made into a fair bit
exchange protocol by interleaving two executions. On the other hand, the authors do state that the protocol
of Luby et al. could be made into a one bit disclosure scheme, albeit with poorer efficiency.
23
the coin is biased towards 0 or 1. But she does know whether it is biased towards the
value of Bob’s bit.) The second coin is biased towards a value of Alice’s choice, and has
a further property that allows Alice to predict its outcome. Bob cannot distinguish the
two coins from one another. He flips the two coins simultaneously, and reports both
outcomes to Alice. She checks for cheating by watching the coin she can predict, and she
learns something about Bob’s bit from the other coin. After each flip, she signs a receipt
for Bob. These coins are built on the quadratic residuosity assumption, and we leave the
reader to find the details in the paper.
Beaver and Goldwasser, 1989 Just as Yao formalized the notion of fairness implied by
gradual release, Beaver and Goldwasser [7] formalize the fairness provided by Luby et
al. [60]. They demonstrate a protocol for n parties to compute any boolean function,
regardless of the number of corruptions, achieving privacy, validity, and the notion of
fairness defined below. To ease the exposition, we only define fairness for two parties,







. Let VIEWH,iπ (x, y) denote the view of honest playerHwith input
(1κ, x) after i rounds of interacting with A who holds input (1κ, y) in protocol π; we
define VIEWA,iπ (x, y) similarly. Let CorrectH|i(1κ, x) denote the probability (taken over the
random tapes, and the input distribution) that the honest playerH, holding input (1κ, x),
outputs the correct output, f1κ(x, y) after i rounds of interaction with A(1κ, y) in protocol
π. In other words, Pr[CorrectH|i] = Pr[OUTHπ = f1κ(x, y) | VIEW
H,i
π (x, y)]. We define
CorrectA|i similarly as the probability that the adversary, holding input (1κ, y) outputs
the correct value f2κ(x, y) after i rounds of interacting with H(x, y) in π. Below, to make
the notation more succinct, we leave the inputs implicit.
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A protocol is fair if it is d-fair for all d > 0.
Intuitively, the idea behind the definition is to require that the partial view of the
players in the protocol never helps one player to guess the output much more than it
helps the other (even though the adversarial player may be one round “ahead”). Because
one player may begin the protocol with a greater advantage than the other (depending
on the function and the input distribution), Beaver and Goldwasser compare the ratio
of the probabilities of guessing the correct output before the protocol begins to the same
ratio part-way through the protocol. (Technically, the above requirement only guarantees
security when the first player is corrupt. We omit a similar definition for the case where
the second player to act is corrupt.)
As mentioned, the authors present a protocol that achieves this definition for any
polynomial-time computable boolean function. The intuition is similar to that used by
Luby et al. [60] and Vazirani et al. [76] for bit exchange. In each round, the players receive
the output, XORed with a random bit that is biased slightly towards 0. Over many such
rounds, their confidence in the output approaches 1. Technically, while the earlier works
had to build such a scheme from scratch from the quadratic residuosity assumption, here
the authors make use of the strong general results for secure computation that were de-
veloped only after 1983. Specifically, by 1989 it was known that the players can unfairly
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compute any function, including the function that outputs F(x, y)⊕ b, where b is slightly
biased towards 0.
With respect to the criticism of gradual release by Ben-or et al. [8], this approach,
like [60, 76] before it, addresses two out of three problems. It removes the constraint that
players have to have similar computational ability (concern 1). It also removes the strong
assumptions about the impact of revealing part of a secret key (concern 3). On the surface,
it seems to also address concern 2, that the decision of whether to recover the output is
left external to the protocol. In fact this is only partially addressed by this approach. It is
true that brute-force cannot help here, and that the output is always well defined; these
properties seem beneficial. However, the output now comes with an associated measure
of confidence, and the decision of whether to trust the output is external to the protocol.
Cleve, 1989: Cleve presents here a new approach to probabilistically revealing (or ex-
changing) a secret bit [21]. In the three protocols described above [60, 76, 7], at each
round we could only describe the expected confidence of the receiving player. Here, Cleve
presents a protocol such that at round i, the probability of guessing the sender’s bit is al-
ways exactly pi, where p1, . . . , pr are specified as parameters. The protocol is much more
efficient in terms of round complexity, requiring r rounds to achieve the same level of
confidence that the prior “biased-coin” protocols achieve in r2 log2(r) rounds (and even
then, only in expectation). He also points out that through the now existing general
techniques for secure computation, this scheme can be swapped in for Beaver and Gold-
wasser’s fair release of the output of a computation, giving a more efficient protocol for
any polynomial-time boolean function.
The definition of fairness he gives is quite informal, and only applies to the release
of a single bit. He assumes that there is no prior knowledge, and that the input bit is
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uniformly distributed (though he says something informal about what happens when
this is not true).
Goldwasser and Levin, 1990: The next year, Goldwasser and Levin [40] published a
paper in which they refined the notion of fairness presented in [7], and introduced a
new protocol. The protocol satisfies their definition of partially fair computation for any
polynomial time function, whereas the four works above only allow for boolean output.
Their notion of fairness is very similar to the definition by Beaver and Goldwasser. It
is more technically involved, presumably addressing some issues that were left out of
the previous definition. For example, it also requires a bound on the standard deviation
of the ratio CorrectH|i1−CorrectH|i (as defined previously). Unfortunately, the authors do not spend
time motivating the definition, or comparing it to the previous definition. It is hard to
infer from the definition exactly what notion of fairness it achieves, and we do not present
it here as the details do not greatly add to the bigger picture.
The bigger contribution of the work is to extend the approach to more general
functions. Assume for the moment that the players receive the same output value OUT.
The authors achieve fairness by having the players first compute OUT ⊕ ω mod 2, where
ω is a random bit string of length l = |OUT|. Then, one round at a time, the players help
each other to learn ω. They do this in l phases, each having κ steps. In the ith phase, the
players slowly learn the dot product vi · ω, for random vi ∈ Z|OUT|2 , gaining confidence
in the value over κ steps. They repeat this for l such strings, v1, . . . ,vl ∈ Zl2, revealing
vi · ω in phase i. The idea is to ensure that after every κ steps the search space for ω
(information theoretically) is cut in half. Certainly this seems true if nothing is known
about the output. However, notice that if an adversary has some auxiliary input, which
reveals, say, some bits of the output, it is possible that a single dot product, vi · ω, cuts
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his search space by much more than half. This issue of auxiliary input is another concern
that we will address when we define partial fairness in Chapter 5.
Rabin, 1981: The works above all use the same basic approach. They obscure the true
answer with noise, and then reduce the noise over the course of the protocol, increasing
the players’ confidence in the output. In his earlier work on fair exchange, Rabin suggests
a different, probabilistic approach to signature exchange [69]. He introduces a trusted
third party, but tries to minimize it’s involvement. Specifically, he suggests using a beacon
that broadcasts signed, time-stamped random numbers from the interval {1, . . . , κ} at
fixed time periods, but which has no other interaction with the players. The protocol
works as follows. Alice and Bob begin by choosing a random value 1 ≤ i ≤ κ. Alice signs
and sends the following message: “I’m committed to the following contract as long as Bob
can produce a signature from the beacon on time-stamp t and integer i.” Bob responds
with the symmetric message. If the beacon happens to sign i during time interval t, the
protocol ends. Otherwise they choose a new random number and repeat the process. If
Bob ever chooses to abort early, his advantage is exactly 1/κ.
By changing the beacon slightly, Rabin also introduces a protocol for releasing pri-
vate information in exchange for a receipt. (It seems this could be generalized to enable
the fair exchange of two secrets, though Rabin does not address this.) The beacon broad-
casts κ fresh encryption keys, pk1, . . . , pkκ, at each interval t. In interval t+ ∆, he broad-
casts a single corresponding decryption key, chosen at random. He then repeats these
steps in a cycle. Alice and Bob again agree on a random value 1 ≤ i ≤ κ. Alice encrypts
the secret information using the ith public key that was broadcast at time t. As in the
protocol for signature exchange, Bob’s produces a signature on the statement: “I admit I
have received the expected information, if and only if the beacon broadcasts the decryp-
28
tion key for pki at time-step t + ∆.” (Technically, we have to deal with a bad encryption
by Alice, but Bob can stipulate this in his “admission”. We omit these details.)
Ben-Or, Goldreich, Micali and Rivest: The ideas contained in this paper were first men-
tioned in a rump session talk by Rivest in 1981, though the paper was not published until
1985 [8]. As mentioned at the start of this section, one of the contributions of the work
was to highlight the drawbacks of gradual release.13 While the results of Luby et al. [60]
and Vazirani et al. [76], which preceded this work, address some of the concerns, they
only apply to bit exchange. The solution offered here is of a similar nature, and instead
applies only to signature exchange. They redefine a signature such that it only verifies
with some specified probability. Specifically, when signing a contract, the signer writes
“The court should only accept this as a valid signature with probability p.” The players
alternate sending signatures of this form, increasing the value of p at each round until
eventually p is overwhelmingly close to 1. If a player ever terminates early, the other
brings the last contract he received to a judge. The judge flips a coin (having appropriate
bias) and with probability p he rules the contract binding. With the remaining probability
he rules that it is not binding.
Although this notion of a signature is unappealing, a major contribution of this
paper is to point out the problems with prior approaches. More importantly, it is also
the earliest work (chronologically) to formally define what is meant by fairness! In all
earlier works, authors proved security of the protocols by showing that players would
be caught if they deviated from the instructions. However, they do not prove anything
about what the protocols actually achieve – this is left to the reader to evaluate. Ben-Or
et al. begin by (informally) considering the following two definitions for fairness:
13The authors did not appreciate the drawbacks of gradual release in 1981, which was why they did not
bother to publish this paper until several years later.
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1. The probability that A is committed is large and the probability that B is not com-
mitted is small.
2. Conditioned on A being committed, the probability that B is not committed is small.
Certainly the second suggestion implies the first, so it is at least as strong. However,
the authors point out that it is possible to satisfy the first without satisfying the second.
They consider Rabin’s protocol with beacons [69], where, using the beacon described
previously for contract signing, after every message that Alice sends, and before Bob re-
sponds, the probability that Alice is committed and Bob is not is at most 1/κ, satisfying
definition 1. On the other hand, after Alice sends a message, and before Bob responds,
conditioned on Alice now being committed, the probability that Bob is not committed is 1.
The problem is that Bob is never committed before he responds! Under the first defini-
tion, this is okay because Alice is only committed with probability 1/κ anyway. But a
protocol with this property cannot satisfy the second definition. They accordingly define
the following notion of fairness. Let a player be privileged if they are capable of recovering
a valid signature (perhaps with the help of a judge).
Definition 1.2.5 A contract signing protocol is (v, ε)-fair for A if the following holds, for any
contract C, when A follows the protocol properly. At any step of the protocol in which the prob-
ability that B is privileged is greater than v, the conditional probability that A is not privileged,
given that B is privileged, is at most ε. A protocol is (v, ε)-fair if it is (v, ε)-fair for both A and B.
Then, using the approach described above, they simply instruct the players to use prob-
ability values for their signatures that are designed to meet this definition.
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Fairness For an Honest Majority
At FOCS 1985, Chor et al. [18] introduced a primitive called verifiable secret sharing
(VSS) which would have a huge impact on the field of secure computation. In standard
t-out-of-n secret sharing schemes (as defined by Shamir [73]), a user can share a secret
among n other players, with the guarantee that nothing is learned about the secret unless
at least t of them cooperate to reconstruct it. VSS adds an additional security guarantee
that enables the players (together with the owner of the secret) to verify that the shares
provided are legitimate: i.e. that they reconstruct some unique, valid secret.
This was first used to guarantee fairness in general secure computation by Gold-
wasser, Micali and Wigderson [38], and then in a long line of following work [31, 17, 9,
70, 5]. The observation is that when t > n/2 players are honest, the players can safely be-
gin the protocol by first verifiably sharing their inputs and their random tapes. Then, if a
player later aborts the protocol, the honest players can cooperate to recover these values,
and continue the protocol on his behalf. It follows from these results that complete fair-
ness can be achieved as long as a strict majority of players are honest. (We are assuming
here, and throughout this work, that the players have access to a broadcast channel. This
can be simulated using a public key infrastructure. In an information theoretic setting,
and without a broadcast channel, the above results apply as long as more than 2/3 of the
players are honest.)
It is interesting that the goal of Chor et al. was to implement a simultaneous broad-
cast channel (which they also introduced). This is a communication network in which all
players can speak simultaneously, with the guarantee that a) if a message is broadcast,
then all players receive the same message, and b) if multiple messages are broadcast si-
multaneously, then the messages are independent. This second property does not hold
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in standard communication networks like the Internet, where it is quite easy to claim to
have spoken simultaneously while actually delaying the sent message, reading the re-
ceived messages, and then responding only afterwards. The authors make strong claims
about what such a network would enable us to do:
Simultaneous broadcast networks are a fundamental primitive as simultane-
ity lies at the heart of many protocols: coin flipping, fair voting, contract sign-
ing, exchanging secrets etc... All these protocols are in fact extremely easy to
implement in an simultaneous broadcast network.
In fact, this is not true – the only application among the list that is easy to implement
using a simultaneous broadcast channel is coin flipping. (To implement this, players can
all broadcast a random bit simultaneously, and output the XOR of all received bits, using
default values for any players that abort.) The difficulty with performing, say, two-party
signature exchange in the same manner is that you have no way of ensuring that the other
player will send the correct value. We prove in Chapter 7 that simultaneous broadcast is
not complete for fairness (i.e., it does not allow us to compute all functions fairly). Indeed,
we demonstrate this by proving that a particular function, which is similar to signature
exchange, cannot be fairly computed even when players have access to a simultaneous
broadcast channel. It is an excellent open question to figure out exactly which functions
this primitive allows us to fairly compute. Informally, our own conjecture is that it does




In this chapter we provide some basic definitions and notations that are used through-
out the thesis. In Sections 2.1 through 2.7 we define standard notation and the conven-
tional notions of security in secure computation [53, 35]. The reader familiar with this
material may choose to skip those subsections, or return to them as needed. In Section
2.8 we present a canonical form for secure computation that almost all of the protocols
in this thesis will follow. We note that some additional definitions that are used only in
Chapters 6 and 7 appear in those chapters rather than here.
2.1 Basic Notation
We let κ denote the security parameter. A function µ(·) is negligible if for every pos-
itive polynomial p(·) and all sufficiently large κ it holds that µ(κ) < 1/p(κ). A distribution
ensemble X = {X(a, κ)}a∈Dκ, κ∈N is an infinite sequence of random variables indexed by
a ∈ Dκ and κ ∈ N, where Dκ is a set that may depend on κ. (Looking ahead, κ will be
the security parameter and Dκ will denote the domain of the parties’ inputs.) Two distri-
bution ensembles X = {X(a, κ)}a∈Dκ, κ∈N and Y = {Y (a, κ)}a∈Dκ, κ∈N are computationally
indistinguishable, denoted X
c≡ Y , if for every non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm D
there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for every κ and every a ∈ Dκ
∣∣Pr[D(X(a, κ)) = 1]− Pr[D(Y (a, κ)) = 1]∣∣ ≤ µ(κ).
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The statistical difference between two distributions X(a, κ) and Y (a, κ) is defined as
SD
(








∣∣Pr[X(a, κ) = s]− Pr[Y (a, κ) = s]∣∣ ,
where the sum ranges over s in the support of either X(a, κ) or Y (a, κ). Two distribution
ensembles X = {X(a, κ)}a∈Dκ, κ∈N and Y = {Y (a, κ)}a∈Dκ, κ∈N are statistically close, de-
noted X
s≡ Y , if there is a negligible function µ(·) such that for every κ and every a ∈ Dκ,
it holds that SD
(
X(a, κ), Y (a, κ)
)
≤ µ(κ).
Functionalities. In the two-party setting, a functionality F = {fκ}κ∈N is a sequence of
randomized processes, where each fκ maps pairs of inputs to pairs of outputs (one for
each party). We write fκ = (f1κ , f2κ) if we wish to emphasize the two outputs of fκ,
but stress that if f1κ and f2κ are randomized then the outputs of f1κ and f2κ are correlated
random variables. The domain of fκ isXκ×Yκ, whereXκ (resp., Yκ) denotes the possible
inputs of the first (resp., second) party. If |Xκ| and |Yκ| are polynomial in κ, then we say
that F is defined over polynomial-size domains.
The above definition extends naturally to the multi-party setting. In this thesis, the
only multi-party functions we will consider have the form f : {0, 1}×· · ·×{0, 1} → {0, 1},
where the input of player Pi is xi, and all n players receive the same output bit.
2.2 Basic Cryptographic Primitives
Message authentication codes. We briefly review the standard definition for information-
theoretically secure message authentication codes (MACs). A message authentication code
consists of three polynomial-time algorithms (Gen,Mac,Vrfy). The key-generation algo-
rithm Gen takes as input the security parameter 1κ in unary and outputs a key k. The
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message authentication algorithm Mac takes as input a key k and a message M ∈ {0, 1}≤n,
and outputs a tag t; we write this as t = Mack(M). The verification algorithm Vrfy takes as
input a key k, a message M ∈ {0, 1}≤n, and a tag t, and outputs a bit b; we write this as
b = Vrfyk(M, t). We regard b = 1 as acceptance and b = 0 as rejection, and require that for
all κ, all k output by Gen(1κ), and all M ∈ {0, 1}≤κ, it holds that Vrfyk(M,Mack(M)) = 1.
We say (Gen,Mac,Vrfy) is a secure m-time MAC, where m may be a function of κ,
if no computationally unbounded adversary can output a valid tag on a new message,
with high probability, after seeing valid tags on m other messages. For our purposes, we
do not require security against an adversary who adaptively chooses its m messages for
which to obtain a valid tag; it suffices to consider a non-adaptive definition where the m
messages are fixed in advance. (Nevertheless, known constructions satisfy the stronger
requirement.) Formally:
Definition 2.2.1 Message authentication code (Gen,Mac,Vrfy) is an information-theoretically
secure m-time MAC if for any sequence of messages M1, . . . ,Mm and any adversary A, the
following is negligible in the security parameter κ:
Pr
 k ← Gen(1κ); ∀i : ti = Mack(Mi);
(M ′, t′)← A(M1, t1, . . . ,Mm, tm)
: Vrfyk(M
′, t′) = 1
∧
M ′ 6∈ {M1, . . . ,Mm}
 .
Digital signatures. In some cases where we consider multi-party computation it will
not suffice for us to rely on message authentication codes. (With MACs, the ability to
verify implies the ability to tag, and this causes problems when there is a possibility of
collusion.) We therefore review the notion of a digital signature, which is the public-key
counter-part of MACs. Digital signatures are known to exist assuming one way functions
exist [72].
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A digital signature scheme consists of three polynomial-time algorithms (Gen,Sign,Vrfy).
The key-generation algorithm, Gen, takes as input the security parameter 1κ in unary and
outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk). The signing algorithm, Sign, takes as input a key sk and
a message M ∈ {0, 1}≤n, and outputs a signature σ; we write this as σ = Signsk(M).
The verification algorithm, Vrfy, takes as input a key pk, a message M ∈ {0, 1}≤n, and a
signature σ, and outputs a bit b; we write this as b = Vrfypk(M,σ). We regard b = 1 as
acceptance and b = 0 as rejection, and require that for all κ, all (pk, sk) output by Gen(1κ),
all M ∈ {0, 1}≤n, it holds that Vrfypk(M,Signsk(M)) = 1.
As with the case of MACs, it suffices for us to have signature schemes that are
m-time secure against a non-adaptive adversary.
Definition 2.2.2 Signature scheme (Gen,Mac,Vrfy) is an m-time signature scheme if for
any sequence of messages M1, . . . ,Mm and any probabilistic, polynomial-time adversary A, the
following is negligible in the security parameter κ:
Pr
 (pk, sk)← Gen(1κ); ∀i : σi = Signsk(Mi);
(M ′, σ′)← A(M1, σ1, . . . ,Mm, σm)
: Vrfypk(M
′, σ′) = 1
∧
M ′ 6∈ {M1, . . . ,Mm}
 .
Secret sharing schemes. A secret sharing scheme allows a dealer to split some secret
s ∈ F, where F is some publicly known field, into shares, such that reconstruction of s is
possible only if enough shares are known.
Definition 2.2.3 A t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme is a pair of polynomial-time algorithms,
(Share,Rec). On input t, n ∈ N and s ∈ F, Share(t, n, s) outputs shares {s1, . . . , sn} ∈ F with
the following properties:
• For any S ⊂ {s1, . . . , sn} such that |S| < t, S reveals nothing about s information theo-
36
retically.
• For any S ⊂ {s1, . . . , sn} such that |S| ≥ t, Rec(S) = s.
Non-malleable secret sharing schemes. A non-malleable secret sharing scheme is a se-
cret sharing scheme with an additional property, guaranteeing that if any party manipu-
lates their share in any way, the reconstruction protocol outputs a special failure symbol.
For our purposes, a 2-out-of-2 scheme will suffice, so we define that.
Definition 2.2.4 A 2-out-of-2 non-malleable secret sharing scheme (NMSS scheme) is defined
by a pair of polynomial-time algorithms (Share,Rec) with the following properties:
• Share(s, r) returns 2 shares, (s0, s1) (where si is the share of the i-th party) such that a
single share reveals no information about s.
• Rec(Share(s, r)) = (s, 0) for every s, r. The second output of Rec serves as a flag which is
set to 0 if the secret has been successfully reconstructed.
• Any attempt by a player to modify their share (independently of the remaining share) is
detected with overwhelming probability. Formally, we say that (Share,Rec) is ε-non-
malleable if for every secret s, every (computationally unbounded) adversary A can win
the following game with probability at most ε:
– A corrupts one of the parties.
– Random shares (s0, s1) from Share(s, r) are given to the 2 parties.
– Based on the share sA it observed, A computes a new share s∗A.
– Awins if s∗A 6= sA and Rec(s∗A, sH) = (s′, 0) for some secret s′, where sH is the share
received by the uncorrupted party.
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2.3 Secure Two-Party Computation with Complete Fairness
In what follows, we define what we mean by a secure protocol. This definition fol-
lows the definition of [35], which is today the “accepted” notion of security1. The basic
underlying idea of the definition is to compare the result of the interaction to an ideal
world that is secure by definition. Specifically, we prove a protocol is secure by comparing
it to an ideal world where the players submit their inputs to a trusted party that computes
the functionality on their behalf, and simultaneously returns appropriate output to each
participant. Of course, on the surface, our real world protocol and this ideal world are
very different, so it is not immediately obvious what it means to compare them. Let us be-
gin by considering our privacy requirement: the players should not learn anything more
from the interaction than is revealed from their own inputs and outputs. The earliest se-
curity definitions formalized this requirement in the following way: for any probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary A interacting in a protocol π for computing functionality F ,
there must exist a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S acting in the ideal world,
where there is trusted access to functionality F , such that
{
VIEWπ,A(x,κ)(x, y, κ)
} c≡ {VIEWF ,S(x,κ)(x, y, κ)}
Here, VIEWπ,A(x,κ)(x, y, κ) is a random variable representing the view of the adversary
when acting in the real world protocol π, where both he and the honest player are given
security parameter κ, A is given input x ∈ Xκ, and the honest player is given input y ∈
Yκ. The random variable VIEWF ,S(x,κ)(x, y, κ) is some transcript created by the simulator
1Actually, this definition of security only applies in the stand-alone setting, where the function being
computed is isolated from other computations. The work of Canetti [15] demonstrates an even stronger
notion of security that allows us to prove protocols secure even when they are executed simultaneously
with arbitrary other protocols. For the purposes of our work, we are satisfied with the stand-alone setting.
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in the ideal world, after being given the same input as the adversary, along with the
adversary’s output from F(x, y). We know by definition that the simulator cannot have
learned anything inappropriate in the ideal world. We can conclude that if the simulator
can create the same view that Awould see while interacting in protocol π, then the view
of A is harmless as well.
This definition works very well for the privacy requirement, but what about our
other security concerns? The above security notion ensures that the view of the adver-
sary is harmless; our only other concern can be with the output of the honest player.
Our worry here is that the adversary could somehow influence the view of the honest
player in a way that results in “bad” output. For example, if the functionality is random-
ized, the adversary should not be able to skew the output distribution. So how exactly
should we define “bad” output? One thing to note is that there is no way we can prevent
the adversary from changing his own input: even if he is given input x, he can always
choose to interact honestly as though he were given input x′. However, putting this issue
aside, we can demand strong security properties by again comparing to an ideal world.
Letting OUTπ,A(x,κ)(x, y, κ) be a random variable representing the output of the honest
player on inputs y and κ while interacting with A(x, κ) in π, and OUTF ,S(x,κ)(x, y, κ) be a




} c≡ {OUTF ,S(x,κ)(x, y, κ)}
This guarantees that regardless of how A behaves in the protocol π, the output distri-
bution of the honest player is indistinguishable from his output distribution in the ideal
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world. However, we do not restrict the simulator S in terms of what values it may sub-
mit to the functionality F in the ideal world. In particular, it may choose to submit any
x′ ∈ Xκ, and, therefore, so may the adversary A in the real world.
We note that it does not suffice to consider these two security properties indepen-
dently, but rather we are concerned with the joint distribution over the above random
variables. This captures the requirement that the protocol not only protect the privacy
of the inputs, but that it also guarantee that the adversary cannot correlate his choice
of input with the input of the other party. This will be made explicit in the formal def-
inition of security, which appears next. In this definition, we give the adversary some
auxiliary information z. This models the possibility that each player will have some ex-
ternal information about the other player’s input. It also allows us to model non-uniform
computation. Technically, we should also prove that the protocol is secure against eaves-
droppers. However, in the two-party case this property is easily achieved by using a
secure channel (which can be assumed, or can be implemented using cryptography.) Fi-
nally, we note that the definition implies a very strong notion of fairness. This is inherited
from the property of the ideal functionality that gives output to both players at exactly
the same time. We are now ready for the complete definition.
Execution in the ideal model. The parties are P1 and P2, and there is an adversaryAwho
has corrupted one of them. An ideal execution for the computation of F = {(f1κ , f2κ)}
proceeds as follows:
Inputs: P1 and P2 hold the same value 1κ, and their inputs x ∈ Xκ and y ∈ Yκ, respec-
tively; the adversary S receives an auxiliary input z.
Send inputs to trusted party: The honest party sends its input to the trusted party. The
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corrupted party controlled by S may send any value of its choice. Denote the pair
of inputs sent to the trusted party by (x′, y′).
Trusted party sends outputs: If x′ 6∈ Xκ the trusted party sets x′ to some default input
in Xκ; likewise if y′ 6∈ Yκ the trusted party sets y′ equal to some default input in Yκ.
Then the trusted party chooses r uniformly at random and sends f1κ(x′, y′; r) to
party P1 and f2κ(x′, y′; r) to party P2.
Outputs: The honest party outputs whatever it was sent by the trusted party. S outputs
an arbitrary (probabilistic polynomial-time computable) function of its view.
We let
IDEALF ,S(z)(x, y, κ) =
(
VIEWF ,S(x,κ,z)(x, y, κ), OUTF ,S(x,κ,z)(x, y, κ)
)
be the random variable consisting of the output of the adversary and the output of the
honest party following an execution in the ideal model as described above.
Execution in the real model. We next consider the real model in which a two-party
protocol π is executed by P1 and P2 (and there is no trusted party). In this case, the
adversary A gets the inputs of the corrupted party and sends all messages on behalf
of this party, using an arbitrary polynomial-time strategy. The honest party follows the
instructions of π.
Let F be as above and let π be a two-party protocol computing F . Let A be a
non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine with auxiliary input z. We let
REALπ,A(z)(x, y, κ) =
(
VIEWπ,A(x,κ,z)(x, y, κ), OUTπ,A(x,κ,z)(x, y, κ)
)
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be the random variable consisting of the view of the adversary and the output of the
honest party, following an execution of π where P1 begins by holding 1κ and input x and
P2 begins by holding 1κ and y.
Security as emulation of an ideal execution in the real model. Having defined the
ideal and real models, we can now define security of a protocol. Loosely speaking, the
definition asserts that a secure protocol (in the real model) emulates the ideal model (in
which a trusted party exists). This is formulated as follows:
Definition 2.3.1 Protocol π is said to securely compute F with complete fairness if for every
non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A in the real model, there exists a non-
uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S in the ideal model such that
{








Relationship to Fairness: The above definition requires that the fairness achieved in the
real world protocol is indistinguishable from the complete fairness achieved (by defini-
tion) in the ideal world. This is much stronger than any of the definitions that are given
in Section 1.2, and indeed, it turns out to be impossible to achieve in general when at
least half of the players are malicious. However, as we shall see, it can be achieved for
some interesting functions.
One interesting observation which we made in Section 1.2 is that this definition
does still allow for one player to have an advantage with respect to confidence in the
value of F(x, y). At first glance, this might not be obvious, since the definition requires
that a secure protocol is indistinguishable from an ideal execution where both players
simultaneously receive output, and learn nothing else. Consider, however, an ideal world
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adversary A that has input x but submits x′ to the trusted party. It is quite possible
that from the result F(x′, y), A gains confidence in the “correct” output F(x, y). At the
same time, the honest player outputs F(x′, y) which may in fact be incorrect. Since this
behavior is impossible to prevent, we see this as evidence that confidence in the output
is not an appropriate measure for fairness.
2.4 Secure Two-Party Computation With Abort
As discussed in the previous chapter, we already know that certain functions of in-
terest, such as bit exchange and signature exchange, cannot be achieved in the two-party
setting according to Definition 2.3.1. As such, the following relaxation of the previous
definition has become the conventional definition in the two-party setting [35]. It differs
only in the definition of the ideal world, where it allows the malicious player to abort
early. Specifically, the adversary will receive its own output from the functionality first,
and then choose whether or not the functionality should give output to the honest party
as well. By relaxing the ideal world model in this way, we are making it easier to prove
security of real world protocols when we have aborting adversaries. We note that with
the exception of fairness, all other security properties are still preserved by this definition.
The benefit of this definition is that there are general results showing how to compute
any polynomial-time computable function securely according to this definition [35].
We again let P1 and P2 denote the two parties, and consider an adversary A who
has corrupted one of them. The only change from the definition in Section 2.3 is with
regard to the ideal model for computing F = {fκ}, which is now defined as follows:
Inputs: As previously.
Send inputs to trusted party: As previously.
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Trusted party sends output to corrupted party: If x′ 6∈ Xκ the trusted party sets x′ to
some default input in Xκ; likewise if y′ 6∈ Yκ the trusted party sets y′ equal to some
default input in Yκ. Then the trusted party chooses r uniformly at random, com-
putes z1 = f1κ(x′, y′; r) and z2 = f2κ(x′, y′; r), and sends zi to the corrupted party Pi
(i.e., to the adversary S).
Adversary decides whether to abort: After receiving its output (as described above), the
adversary either sends abort or continue to the trusted party. In the former case the
trusted party sends⊥ to the honest party Pj , and in the latter case the trusted party
sends zj to Pj .
Outputs: As previously.
We let IDEALabortF ,A(z)(x, y, κ) be the random variable consisting of the output of the adver-
sary and the output of the honest party following an execution in the ideal model as
described above.
Definition 2.4.1 Protocol π is said to securely compute F with abort if for every non-uniform
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A in the real model, there exists a non-uniform proba-
bilistic polynomial-time adversary S in the ideal model such that
{








2.5 Secure Multi-Party Computation with Complete Fairness
Execution in the ideal model. The parties areP = {P1, . . . , Pn}, and there is an adversary
S who has corrupted some subset I ⊂ P of them. An ideal execution for the computation
of F proceeds as follows:
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Inputs: Each party Pi holds its input xi and the security parameter κ. The adversary S
also receives an auxiliary input z.
Send inputs to trusted party: The honest parties send their inputs to the trusted party. S
may substitute any values it likes on behalf of the corrupted parties. We denote by
x′i the value sent to the trusted party on behalf of Pi.
Trusted party sends outputs: If any x′i is not in the correct domain, the trusted party sets
x′i = x̂i for some default value x̂i. Then, the trusted party chooses r uniformly at
random and sends fi(x′1, . . . , x
′
n; r) to each Pi.
Outputs: The honest parties output whatever they were sent by the trusted party, the
corrupted parties output nothing, and S outputs an arbitrary function of its view.
We let IDEALF ,S(z)(x1, . . . , xn, κ) be the random variable consisting of the output of the
adversary and the output of the honest parties following an execution in the ideal model
as described above.
Execution in the real model. Here a multi-party protocol π is executed by P , and there
is no trusted party. In this case, the adversary A gets the inputs of the corrupted parties
(as well as an auxiliary input z) and sends all messages on behalf of these parties, using
an arbitrary polynomial-time strategy. The honest parties follow the instructions of π.
Let F be as above and let π be a multi-party protocol computing F . Let A be
a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine with auxiliary input z. We let
REALπ,A(z)(x1, . . . , xn, κ) be the random variable consisting of the view of the adversary
and the output of the honest parties, following an execution of π where Pi begins holding
its input xi and the security parameter κ.
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Security as emulation of an ideal execution. Having defined the ideal and real models,
we can now define security of a protocol. Loosely speaking, the definition says that a
secure protocol (in the real model) emulates the ideal model (in which a trusted party
exists).
Definition 2.5.1 Let F be as above. Protocol π is said to t-securely compute F with complete
fairness if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryA in the real model that
corrupts at most t players, there exists a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S










Technically, we should also consider security against an external eavesdropper,
even in the case when all players are considered honest. We assume for simplicity that
there is a secure broadcast channel between the players, which immediately guarantees
this security property2.
2.6 Secure Multi-Party Computation With Designated Abort
This definition is standard for secure multi-party computation without an honest
majority [35], and is a direct parallel to Definition 2.4.1. It allows early abort (i.e., the
adversary may receive its own outputs even though the honest parties do not), but only
if P1 is corrupted.
We again let P = {P1, . . . Pn} denote the parties, and consider an adversary S who
2To actually implement such a channel, players could (for example) encrypt each message n − 1 times,
once under each of the other player’s public keys, and broadcast all n − 1 messages. They then follow this
with a zero-knowledge proof that each ciphertext is an encryption of the same message. In fact, it suffices to
do this only once in order to establish a single shared symmetric key that can be used to encrypt all broadcast
messages in the remainder of the protocol.
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has corrupted a subset I ⊂ P of them. The only change from the definition in Section 2.5
is with regard to the ideal model for computing F , which is now defined as follows:
Inputs: As previously.
Send inputs to trusted party: As previously.
If any x′i is not in the correct domain, the trusted party sets x
′
i = x̂i for some default
value x̂i. Then, the trusted party chooses r uniformly at random and sets zi =
fi(x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n; r).
Trusted party sends outputs, P1 honest: The trusted party sends zi to each Pi.
Trusted party sends outputs, P1 corrupt: The trusted party sends {zi}i:Pi∈I to S. Then S
sends either abort or continue to the trusted party. In the former case the trusted
party sends ⊥ to all honest parties, and in the latter case the trusted party sends zi
to each honest Pi.
Note that an adversary corrupting P1 can always abort the protocol, even if |I| <
n/2.
Outputs: As previously.
We let IDEALabortF ,S(z)(~x, κ) be the random variable consisting of the output of the adver-
sary and the output of the honest parties following an execution in the ideal model as
described above.
Definition 2.6.1 Let f be a functionality, and let π be a protocol computing F . Protocol π is
said to t-securely compute F with designated abort if for every non-uniform probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary A in the real model that corrupts at most t players, there exists a
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2.7 The Hybrid Model
The hybrid model combines both the real and ideal models. Specifically, an ex-
ecution of a protocol π in the G-hybrid model, for some functionality G, involves the
parties sending normal messages to each other (as in the real model) but, in addition,
the parties have access to a trusted party computing G. The parties communicate with
this trusted party in exactly the same way as in the ideal models described above; the
question of which ideal model is taken (that with or without abort) must be specified. In
this manuscript, we will always considered a hybrid model where the functionality G is
computed according to the ideal model with abort.
For our purposes here, we will require that any protocol in the G-hybrid model
makes only sequential calls to G; i.e., there is at most a single call to G per round, and no
other messages are sent during any round in which G is called.
Let G be a functionality and let π be a two-party protocol for computing some func-
tionality F , where π includes real messages between the parties as well as calls to G. Let
A be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine with auxiliary input z. We let
HYBRIDGπ,A(z)(x, y, κ) be the random variable consisting of the view of the adversary and
the output of the honest party, following an execution of π (with ideal calls to G) where
P1 begins by holding 1κ and input x and P2 begins by holding 1κ and input y. Both
security with complete fairness and security with abort can be defined via the natural
modifications of Definitions 2.3.1 and 2.4.1.
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The hybrid model gives a powerful tool for proving the security of protocols. Specif-
ically, we may design a real-world protocol for securely computing some functionality F
by first constructing a protocol for computing F in the G-hybrid model. Letting π denote
the protocol thus constructed (in the G-hybrid model), we denote by πρ the real-world
protocol in which calls to G are replaced by sequential execution of a real-world protocol
ρ that computes G. (“Sequential” here implies that only one execution of ρ is carried out
at any time, and no other π-protocol messages are sent during execution of ρ.) The results
of [15] then imply that if π securely computes F in the G-hybrid model, and ρ securely
computes G with abort, we can conclude that the composed protocol πρ securely com-
putes F (in the real world). For completeness, we state this formally in the form we will
use in this work:
Proposition 2.7.1 Let ρ be a protocol that securely computes G with abort, and let π be a protocol
that securely computes F with complete fairness in the G-hybrid model (where G is computed
according to the ideal world with abort). Then protocol πρ securely computes F with complete
fairness.
In Section 2.8 we will describe a functionality that we call ShareGen. This function-
ality will be very useful in the results presented in later chapters, as almost all of our
protocols will begin by having the players perform some known, general protocol for the
secure computation of ShareGen. In our proofs of security, we will make use of the pre-
ceding proposition, and rather than proving that the execution of ShareGen was secure,
we will compare the ideal world to the hybrid world where the parties have ideal access
to ShareGen.
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2.8 A Canonical Form for Fair Two-Party Computation
We present here a general format that will be used in many of the results presented
in this thesis. It is general enough that any protocol for two-party computation can be
compiled to fit this format, and, in addition to simplifying the description of our proto-
cols, it also makes it far easier to analyze their fairness properties. The protocol format
first formally appeared in our work on complete fairness [42] which is described in Chap-
ter 3, however a very similar idea was used even in our earlier work on rational secret
sharing [44], presented in Chapter 6.
The basic format is as follows. To compute F(x, y), the players begin by using their
inputs to F to compute a different functionality we call ShareGen. This will be done un-
fairly (i.e., using a protocol that achieves security with abort, as defined in Section 2.4)
using known results for secure two-party computation [77, 38, 35]. Instead of returning
F(x, y), ShareGen(x, y) returns to each player two sequences of secret shares, where the se-
ShareGen
Inputs: Let the inputs to ShareGen be x and y. If one of the received inputs is not in the
correct domain, it is replaced with a default value. The security parameter is κ.
Computation:
1. Choose the values a1, . . . , am and b1, . . . , bm.
(Exact instructions for how to do this depend on the function F being computed.)
2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, choose (a(1)i , a
(2)




i ) as random secret sharings of ai and
bi, respectively. (I.e., a
(1)





3. Compute ka, kb ← Gen(1κ). For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let tai = Macka(i‖a
(2)







1. P1 receives the values a
(1)






1), . . . , (b
(1)
m , tbm), and the MAC-
key ka.




1), . . . , (a
(2)
m , tam) and b
(2)
1 , . . . , b
(2)
m , and the MAC-
key kb.
Figure 2.1: Functionality ShareGen with parameter m = m(κ).
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ΠF
Inputs: Party P1 has input x and party P2 has input y. The security parameter is κ.
The protocol:
1. Preliminary phase:
(a) Let ŷ be some default input value for P2 and x̂ some default input for P1. We
define a0 = f1(x, ŷ) and b0 = f2(x̂, y).
(b) Parties P1 and P2 run some (unfair) protocol π for computing ShareGen, using
their respective inputs x, y, and security parameter κ.
(c) If P1 receives ⊥ from the above computation (because P2 aborts the compu-
tation or uses an invalid input in π) she outputs a0 and halts. Likewise, if P2
receives ⊥, he outputs b0 and halts. Otherwise, the parties proceed.
(d) Denote the output of P1 from π by a
(1)






1), . . . , (b
(1)
m , tbm), and
ka.




1), . . . , (a
(2)
m , tam), b
(2)




2. For i = 1, . . . ,m do:
P2 sends the next share to P1:




i ) to P1.








i ) = 0 (or if P1 received an










continues running the protocol.
P1 sends the next share to P2:




i ) to P2.








i ) = 0 (or if P2 received an










continues running the protocol.
Outputs: P1 outputs am and P2 outputs bm.
Figure 2.2: Protocol for computing F , using ShareGen.
crets are related to F(x, y) in some way. Exactly how the secrets are related to F(x, y) will
depend on the particular function F , and will have to be specified each time we present
a new protocol. However, we will only need to redefine a small (isolated) component,
and the remainder of the protocol will remain according to the template presented here.
For now, it suffices to think of the output of ShareGen as secret shares of sequences of
plausible outputs from F . The description of ShareGen appears in Figure 2.1. We note that
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although the computation of ShareGen will be unfair, the output of ShareGen does not
reveal anything about the output F(x, y) (due to the randomness of the secret sharings).
Once the players have each obtained their two sequences of secret shares, they
alternate exchanging them for r rounds. Player two begins round i by sending a(2)i , en-




i . Player one then responds by sending b
(1)
i ,




i . We note that the way the values
(a1, . . . , ar) and (b1, . . . , br) are chosen will depend on the particular function F being
computed. If some player aborts in round i, the other player simply outputs the value
they computed in the prior round: e.g., if player two fails to send a(2)i , then player one
outputs ai−1 and halts. The formal description of how this is done is presented in Figure
2.2. We also use message authentication codes (MACs) to prevent a player from sending
an incorrect share; if a player sends a share that does not correctly verify, this is treated
as an abort. Effectively, then, the only option for a malicious player is to play honestly, or
choose to abort.
Note that the format is quite general. Although we will not prove this formally, it is
not too hard to see that any two-party protocol π for computing F can be compiled into
a protocol with the above format. Intuitively, we simply view ShareGen as simulating the
protocol “in its head”, determining the outputs of each player at each round should their
opponent abort, and setting the values of ai and bi to be exactly these output values.
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Chapter 3
Complete Fairness in Secure Two-Party Computation
As we have discussed in Chapter 1, it has been known since the early 1980’s that
fairly computing certain functions is impossible, including the natural example of signa-
ture exchange, and even the far simpler function of bit exchange. Although the security
model at that time was not yet standardized, it is easy to see that the impossibility results
extend to the definition of fairness implied by Defintion 2.3.1. In this chapter, we demon-
strate several surprising results that show how to compute certain interesting functions
with complete fairness according to Definition 2.3.1. We begin with a fairly simple proto-
col for the Millionaire’s problem, and then proceed to give a slightly more involved pro-
tocol that computes a wider class of functions. The work in this Chapter first appeared
at STOC 2008 [42].
3.1 Fair Computation of the Millionaires’ Problem (and More)
In this section, we describe a protocol for securely computing the millionaires’
problem (and related functionalities) with complete fairness. Specifically, we look at
functions defined by a lower-triangular matrix, as in the following table:
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y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6
x1 0 0 0 0 0 0
x2 1 0 0 0 0 0
x3 1 1 0 0 0 0
x4 1 1 1 0 0 0
x5 1 1 1 1 0 0
x6 1 1 1 1 1 0
Let F = {fm(κ)}κ∈N denote a function of the above form, where m = m(κ) denotes
the size of the domain of each input which we assume have the same size. (Handling
the case where they are unequal involves a trivial technical change to the protocol. The
details are described in the original work [42].) Let Xm = {x1, . . . , xm} denote the valid
inputs for the first party and let Ym = {y1, . . . , ym} denote the valid inputs for the second
party. By suitably ordering these elements, we may write fm as follows:
fm(xi, yj) =

1 if i > j
0 if i ≤ j
. (3.1)
Viewed in this way, fm is exactly the millionaires’ problem or, equivalently, the “greater
than” function. The remainder of this section is devoted to a proof of the following theo-
rem:
Theorem Let m = poly(κ). Assuming the existence of constant-round general secure two-party
computation with abort, there exists an Θ(m)-round protocol that securely computes F = {fm}
with complete fairness.
Constant-round protocols for general secure two-party computation with abort can
be constructed based on enhanced trapdoor permutations or any constant-round pro-
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tocol for oblivious transfer [59]. (The assumption of a constant-round protocol is only
needed for the claim regarding round complexity.) The fact that our protocol requires
(at least) Θ(m) rounds explains why we require m = poly(κ). When m = 2, we obtain
a constant-round protocol for computing boolean AND with complete fairness and, by
symmetry, we also obtain a protocol for boolean OR. We remark further that our results
extend to variants of fm such as the “greater than or equal to” function, or the “greater
than” function where the sizes of the domains X and Y are unequal, and most generally,
to any function without an “embedded XOR” (defined in Section 3.2); see [42] for a full
discussion.
3.1.1 The Protocol
In this section, we write f in place of fm, and X and Y in place of Xm and Ym.
Intuition. At a high level, our protocol works as follows. Say the input of P1 is xi, and
the input of P2 is yj . Following a constant-round “pre-processing” phase, the protocol
proceeds in a series of m iterations, where P1 learns the output — namely, the value
f(xi, yj) — in iteration i, and P2 learns the output in iteration j. (That is, in contrast to
standard protocols, the iteration in which a party learns the output depends on the value of
its own input.) If one party (say, P1) aborts after receiving its iteration-k message, and the
second party (say, P2) has not yet received its output, then P2 “assumes” that P1 learned
its output in iteration k, and computes f on its own using input xk for P1. (In this case,
that means that P2 would output f(xk, yj).) We stress that a malicious P1 may, of course,
abort in any iteration it likes (and not necessarily in the iteration in which it learns its
output); the foregoing is only an intuitive explanation.
The key observation for why this yields a fair protocol is as follows. If P1 aborts
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before he learns anything then the protocol is still fair. On the other hand, if he aborts
after he has learned the output, then he has also revealed an upper bound on his input!
We therefore assume that he has learned something, and use the information that this
provides to ensure fairness. More specifically, say P1 is malicious and uses xi as its effec-
tive input. Let yj denote the input of P2. There are two possibilities: P1 either aborts in
iteration k < i, or iteration k ≥ i. (If P1 never aborts then fairness is trivially achieved.) In
the first case, P1 never learns the correct output and so fairness is achieved. In the second
case, P1 does obtain the output f(xi, yj) (in iteration i) and then aborts in some iteration
k ≥ i. Here we consider two sub-cases depending on the value of P2’s input yj :
• If j < k then P2 has already received its output in a previous iteration and fairness
is achieved.
• If j ≥ k then P2 has not yet received its output. Since P1 aborts in iteration k,
the protocol directs P2 to output f(xk, yj). However, since j ≥ k ≥ i, we have
f(xk, yj) = 0 = f(xi, yj) (relying on the specifics of f ), and so the output of P2 is
equal to the output obtained by P1 (and thus fairness is achieved). This is the key
observation that enables us to obtain fairness for this function.
We formalize the above intuition in our proof, where we demonstrate an ideal-world
simulator corresponding to the actions of any malicious P1. Of course, we also consider
the case of a malicious P2.
Formal description of the protocol. Technically, the protocol proceeds according to
the template described in Section 2.8. All we need to do is to specify how the values
(a1, . . . , am) and (b1, . . . , bm) are set within ShareGen. (Recall, this is the only component
of the canonical form that is function specific.) To aid the reader, however, we also in-
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clude an outline of the complete protocol here, ignoring some of the details that were
elaborated in Section 2.8 (such as the message authentication). Recall that the parties
first execute ShareGen(xi, yj) in order to receive secret shares of the values a1, . . . , am and
b1, . . . , bm. We set:
ak =

f(xi, yk) if k < i
f(xi, yj) if k ≥ i
bk =

f(xk+1, yj) if k < j
f(xi, yj) if k ≥ j
The players then exchange their secret shares one-by-one in a sequence of m iterations.
Specifically, in iteration i party P2 will send a
(2)







i , and then P1 will send b
(1)









Inputs: Let the inputs to ShareGen be xi and yj . If one of the received inputs is not in the
correct domain, then both parties are given output ⊥. The security parameter is κ.
Computation:
1. Define values a1, . . . , am and b1, . . . , bm in the following way:
ak =
{
f(xi, yk) if i > k
f(xi, yj) if i ≤ k
bk =
{
f(xk+1, yj) if j > k
f(xi, yj) if j ≤ k
2. For 1 ≤ k ≤ m, choose (a(1)k , a
(2)




k ) as random secret sharings of ak
and bk, respectively. (I.e., a
(1)






1. P1 receives the values a
(1)




1 , . . . , b
(1)
m .
2. P2 receives the values a
(2)




1 , . . . , b
(2)
m .
Figure 3.1: Functionality ShareGen.
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Πmill
Inputs: Party P1 has input xi and party P2 has input yj . The security parameter is κ.
The protocol:
1. Preliminary phase:
(a) We define a0 = f(xi, y0) and b0 = f(x1, yj).
(b) Parties P1 and P2 run some (unfair) protocol π for computing ShareGen, using
their respective inputs xi, yj , and security parameter κ.
(c) If P1 receives ⊥ from the above computation she outputs a0 and halts. Like-
wise, if P2 receives⊥, he outputs b0 and halts. Otherwise, the parties proceed.
(d) Denote the output of P1 from π by a
(1)




1 , . . . , b
(1)
m .
(e) Denote the output of P2 from π by a
(2)




1 , . . . , b
(2)
m .
2. For i = 1, . . . ,m do:
P2 sends the next share to P1:
(a) P2 sends a
(2)
i to P1.
(b) If P1 received an invalid message, or no message, then P1 outputs ai−1 and
halts.
P1 sends the next share to P2:
(a) P1 sends b
(1)
i to P2.
(b) If P2 received an invalid message, or no message, then P2 outputs bi−1 and
halts.
Outputs: P1 outputs am and P2 outputs bm.
Figure 3.2: Protocol for computing the Millionaire problem, using ShareGen.
Theorem 3.1.1 If (Gen,Mac,Vrfy) is an information-theoretically secure m-time MAC, and π
securely computes ShareGen with abort, then the protocol in Figure 3.2 securely computes {fm}
with complete fairness.
Proof: Let Πmill denote the protocol in Figure 3.2. We analyze Πmill in a hybrid model
where there is a trusted party computing ShareGen. (Note: since π is only guaranteed to
securely compute ShareGen with abort, the adversary in the hybrid model is allowed to
abort the trusted party computing ShareGen before output is sent to the honest party.) We
prove that an execution of Πmill in this hybrid model is statistically close to an evaluation
of f in the ideal model (with complete fairness), where the only difference occurs due to
MAC forgeries. Applying Proposition 2.7.1 then implies the theorem.
We separately analyze corruption of P1 and P2, beginning with P1:
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Claim 3.1.2 For every non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary A corrupting P1 and running
Πmill in a hybrid model with access to an ideal functionality computing ShareGen (with abort),
there exists a non-uniform, probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S corrupting P1 and running











Proof: Let P1 be corrupted by A. We construct a simulator S given black-box access
to A:
1. S invokes A on the input x, the auxiliary input z, and the security parameter κ.
2. S receives the input x′ of A to the computation of the functionality ShareGen.
(a) If x′ /∈ X (this includes the case when x′ = ⊥ since A aborts), then S hands ⊥
to A as its output from the computation of ShareGen, sends x1 to the trusted
party computing f , outputs whatever A outputs, and halts.
(b) Otherwise, if the input is some x′ ∈ X , then S chooses uniformly-distributed




1 , . . . , b
(1)
m . In addition, it generates keys ka, kb ←
Gen(1κ) and computes tbi = Mackb(i‖b
(1)
i ) for every i. Finally, it hands A the






1), . . . , (b
(1)
m , tbm), and ka as its output from the com-
putation of ShareGen.
3. If A sends abort to the trusted party computing ShareGen (signalling that P2 should
receive ⊥ as output from ShareGen), then S sends x1 to the trusted party comput-
ing f , outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. Otherwise (i.e., if A sends continue),
S proceeds as below.
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4. Let i (with 1 ≤ i ≤ m) be the index such that x′ = xi (such an i exists since x′ ∈ X).
5. To simulate iteration j, for j < i, simulator S works as follows:




j = f(xi, yj) = 1, and computes the tag
taj = Macka(j‖a
(2)










j) = 0 (or the message is invalid, or A aborts), then S






j) = 1, then S proceeds to the next iteration.
6. To simulate iteration i, simulator S works as follows:
(a) S sends xi to the trusted party computing f , and receives back the output
z = f(xi, y).









Then S gives A the message (a(2)i , tai ).




i) = 0 (or the message is in-





1, then S proceeds to the next iteration.
7. To simulate iteration j, for i < j ≤ m, simulator S works as follows:









Then S gives A the message (a(2)j , taj ).




j) = 0 (or the message





j) = 1, then S proceeds to the next iteration.
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8. If S has not halted yet, at this point it halts and outputs whatever A outputs.









j (meaning thatA sent the same share that it received).
Under this assumption, we show that the distribution generated by S is identical to
the distribution in a hybrid execution betweenA and an honest P2. Since this assumption
holds with all but negligible probability (by security of the information-theoretic MAC),
this proves statistical closeness as stated in the claim.
Let y denote the input of P2. It is clear that the view of A in an execution with S
is identical to the view of A in a hybrid execution with P2; the only difference is that the
initial shares given to A are generated by S without knowledge of z = f(x′, y), but since
these shares are uniformly distributed the view ofA is unaffected. Therefore, what is left
to demonstrate is that the joint distribution of A’s view and P2’s output is identical in
the hybrid world and the ideal world. We show this now by separately considering three
different cases:
1. Case 1: S sends x1 to the trusted party because x′ 6∈ X , or because A aborted the compu-
tation of ShareGen: In the hybrid world, P2 would have received ⊥ from ShareGen,
and would have then output f(x1, y) as instructed by protocol Πmill. This is exactly
what P2 outputs in the ideal execution with S because, in this case, S sends x1 to
the trusted party computing f .
If Case 1 does not occur, let xi be defined as in the description of the simulator.
2. Case 2: S sends xj to the trusted party, for some j < i: This case occurs when A
aborts the protocol in some iteration j < i (either by refusing to send a message,
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sending an invalid message, or sending an incorrect share). There are two sub-cases
depending on the value of P2’s input y. Let ` be the index such that y = y`. Then:
(a) If ` ≥ j then, in the hybrid world, P2 would not yet have determined its output
(since it only determines its output once it receives a valid message from P1
in iteration `). Thus, as instructed by the protocol, P2 would output f(xj , y).
This is exactly what P2 outputs in the ideal world, because S sends xj to the
trusted party in this case.
(b) If ` < j then, in the hybrid world, P2 would have already determined its
output f(x′, y) = f(xi, y`) in the `th iteration. In the ideal world, P2 will output
f(xj , y`) since S sends xj to the trusted party. Since j < i we have ` < j < i
and so f(xj , y`) = f(xi, y`) = 1. Thus, P2’s output f(xi, y) in the hybrid world
is equal to its output f(xj , y) in the ideal execution with S.
3. Case 3: S sends xi to the trusted party: Here, P2 outputs f(xi, y) in the ideal execution.
We show that this is identical to what P2 would have output in the hybrid world.
There are two sub-cases depending on P2’s input y. Let ` be the index such that
y = y`. Then:
(a) If ` < i, then P2 would have already determined its output f(x′, y) = f(xi, y)
in the `th iteration. (The fact that we are in Case 3 means thatA could not have
sent an incorrect share prior to iteration i.)
(b) If ` ≥ i, then P2 would not yet have determined its output. There are two
sub-cases:
i. A sends correct shares in iterations j = i, . . . , ` (inclusive). Then P2 would
determine its output as b(1)` ⊕ b
(2)
` = f(x
′, y) = f(xi, y), exactly as in the
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ideal world.
ii. A sends an incorrect share in iteration ζ, where i ≤ ζ ≤ `. In this case,
by the specification of the protocol, party P2 would output f(xζ , y) =
f(xζ , y`). However, since i ≤ ζ ≤ ` we have f(xζ , y`) = 0 = f(xi, y`).
Thus, P2 outputs the same value in the hybrid and ideal executions.
This concludes the proof of the claim.
The following claim, dealing with a corrupted P2, completes the proof of the theo-
rem:
Claim 3.1.3 For every non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary A corrupting P2 and running
Πmill in a hybrid model with access to an ideal functionality computing ShareGen (with abort),
there exists a non-uniform, probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S corrupting P2 and running












Proof: Say P2 is corrupted byA. We construct a simulator S given black-box access toA:
1. S invokes A on the input y, the auxiliary input z, and the security parameter κ.
2. S receives the input y′ of A to the computation of the functionality ShareGen.
(a) If y′ /∈ Y (this includes the case when y′ = ⊥ since A aborts), then S hands ⊥
to A as its output from the computation of ShareGen, sends y1 to the trusted
party computing f , outputs whatever A outputs, and halts.
(b) Otherwise, if the input is some y′ ∈ Y , then S chooses uniformly-distributed
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1 , . . . , b
(2)
m . In addition, it generates keys ka, kb ←
Gen(1κ) and computes tai = Macka(i‖a
(2)
i ) for every i. Finally, it hands A the






1), . . . , (a
(2)
m , tam), and kb as its output from the com-
putation of ShareGen.
3. If A sends abort to the trusted party computing ShareGen, then S sends y1 to the
trusted party computing f , outputs whateverA outputs, and halts. Otherwise (i.e.,
if A sends continue), S proceeds as below.
4. Let i (with 1 ≤ i ≤ m) be the index such that y′ = yi (such an i exists since y′ ∈ Y ).
5. To simulate iteration j, for j < i, simulator S works as follows:





j ) = 0 (or the message is invalid, or A aborts), then S
sends yj−1 to the trusted party computing f (if j = 1, then S sends y1),





j ) = 1, then S proceeds.














6. To simulate iteration i, simulator S works as follows:





i ) = 0 (or the message is invalid, or A aborts), then S
sends yi−1 to the trusted party computing f (if i = 1 then S sends y1),






i ) = 1, then S sends yi to the trusted party computing f ,
receives the output z = f(x, yi), and proceeds.









Then give to A the message (b(1)i , tbi).
7. To simulate iteration j, for i < j ≤ m, simulator S works as follows:




j ) = 0 (or the message





j ) = 1, then S proceeds.









Then give to A the message (b(1)j , tbj).
8. If S has not halted yet, at this point it halts and outputs whatever A outputs.









j (meaning that A sent P1 the same share that it re-
ceived). Under this assumption, we show that the distribution generated by S is identical
to the distribution in a hybrid execution between A and an honest P1. Since this as-
sumptions holds with all but negligible probability (by security of the MAC), this proves
statistical closeness as stated in the claim.
Let x denote the input of P1. Again, it is clear that the view of A in an execution
with S is identical to the view of A in a hybrid execution with P1. What is left to demon-
strate is that the joint distribution of A’s view and P1’s output is identical. We show this
by considering four different cases:
1. Case 1: S sends y1 to the trusted party because y′ 6∈ Y , or because A aborted the computa-
tion of ShareGen: In such a case, the protocol instructs P1 to output f(x, y1), exactly
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what P1 outputs in the ideal world.
2. Case 2: S sends y1 to the trusted party because A sends an incorrect share in the first
iteration: In this case, the simulator sends y1 to the trusted party computing f , and
so the output of P1 in the ideal world is f(x, y1). In the hybrid world, P1 will also
output f(x, y1) as instructed by the protocol.
If Cases 1 and 2 do not occur, let yi be defined as in the description of the simulator.
3. Case 3: S sends yj−1 to the trusted party, for some 1 ≤ j − 1 < i, because A sends an
incorrect share in the jth iteration:
The output of P1 in the ideal world is f(x, yj−1). There are two sub-cases here,
depending on the value of P1’s input x. Let ` be the index such that x = x`. Then:
(a) If ` < j then, in the hybrid world, P1 would have already determined its
output f(x, y′) = f(x`, yi). But since ` ≤ j − 1 < i we have f(x`, yi) = 0 =
f(x`, yj−1), and so P1’s output is identical in both the hybrid and ideal worlds.
(b) If ` ≥ j then, in the hybrid world, P1 would not yet have determined its out-
put. Therefore, as instructed by the protocol, P1 will output f(x, yj−1) in the
hybrid world, which is exactly what it outputs in the ideal execution with S.
4. Case 4: S sends yi to the trusted party: This case occurs when A sends correct shares
up through and including iteration i. The output of P1 in the ideal world is f(x, yi).
There are again two sub-cases here, depending on the value of P1’s input x. Let `
be the index such that x = x`. Then:
(a) If ` ≤ i, then P1 would have already determined its output f(x, y′) = f(x`, yi)
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in the `th iteration. This matches what P1 outputs in the ideal execution
with S.
(b) If ` > i, then P1 would not have yet have determined its output. There are two
sub-cases:
i. A sends correct shares in iterations j = i+1, . . . , ` (inclusive). This implies





f(x, y′) = f(x, yi), exactly as in the ideal execution.
ii. A sends an incorrect share in iteration ζ, where i < ζ ≤ `. In this case,
by the specification of the protocol, party P1 would output f(x, yζ−1) =
f(x`, yζ−1) in the hybrid world. But since i ≤ ζ−1 < `we have f(x`, yζ−1) =
1 = f(x`, yi), and so P1’s output is identical in both the hybrid and ideal
worlds.
This completes the proof of the claim.
The preceding claims along with Proposition 2.7.1 imply the theorem.
3.2 Fair Computation of Functions with an Embedded XOR
We say that a function F has an embedded XOR if there exist inputs x0, x1, y0, y1
such that f(xi, yj) = i ⊕ j. We prove in [42] that the protocol presented in the preced-
ing section can be used to compute any boolean function without an embedded XOR,
providing complete security and fairness. Essentially, it is not hard to see that any such
function can be “rearranged” to fit the description of the greater than function given in
Section 3.1.
Recall that Cleve’s result showing impossibility of completely-fair coin tossing im-
67
plies the impossibility of completely-fair computation of boolean XOR. More generally,
it implies the impossibility of completely-fair computation of any function f that enables
coin tossing. Furthermore, note that the protocol from the previous section relies heav-
ily on the property that function does not contain an embedded XOR; specifically, we
require that for j ≥ k ≥ i, we have f(xk, yj) = f(xi, yj) and this property does not
hold if yj is part of an embedded XOR with xk and xi, regardless of how we order the
inputs. It is tempting to conclude, therefore, that no function containing an embedded
XOR can be computed with complete fairness. In this section, we show that this is not
the case — that there exist functions with an embedded XOR that can be computed with
complete fairness. Interestingly, however, such functions appear to be “more difficult” to
compute with complete fairness; specifically, we refer the reader to Section 3.3 where we
prove a lower bound of ω(log κ) on the round complexity of any protocol for completely-
fair computation of any function having an embedded XOR. (Note that, in general, this
bound is incomparable to the result of the previous section, where the round complexity
was linear in the domain size.)
It will be instructive to see why Cleve’s impossibility result does not immediately
rule out complete fairness for all functions containing an embedded XOR. Consider the





If the parties could be forced to choose their inputs from {x1, x2} and {y1, y2}, re-
spectively, then it would be easy to generate a fair coin toss from any secure computation
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of f (with complete fairness) by simply instructing both parties to choose their inputs
uniformly from the stated domains. (This results in a fair coin toss since the output is
uniform as long as either party chooses their input at random.) Unfortunately, a pro-
tocol for securely computing f does not restrict the first party to choosing its input in
{x1, x2}, and cannot prevent that party from choosing input x3 and thus biasing the re-
sult toward 1 with certainty. (Naive solutions, such as modifying the protocol to require
the first party to provide a zero-knowledge proof that it chose its input in {x1, x2}, do
not work. The reason is that we still need a way for the second party to decide on their
output in case the zero-knowledge proof of the first party fails. The original fair protocol
for computing f may specify (and rely upon the fact) that P2 with input y should default
to outputting f(x3, y) when P1 cheats.)
Of course, this only shows that Cleve’s impossibility result does not apply, but it
does not prove that a completely-fair protocol for computing f exists. In this section we
present a generic protocol for computing a boolean functionF = {fκ : Xκ×Yκ → {0, 1}}.
(For convenience, we write X and Y and drop the explicit dependence on κ in what
follows.) The protocol is parameterized by a function α = α(κ), and the number of
rounds is set to m = ω(α−1 log κ) in order for correctness to hold with all but negligible
probability. (We thus must have α noticeable to ensure that the number of rounds is
polynomial in κ.)
We do not claim that the protocol is completely-fair for arbitrary functions F and
arbitrary settings of α. Rather, we claim that for some functions F there exists a corre-
sponding α for which the protocol is completely fair. In Section 3.2.1, we prove this for
one specific function that contains an embedded XOR. In Section 3.2.2 we generalize the
proof and show that the protocol can be used for completely-fair computation of a wider
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class of functions. We categorize the class of functions there.
Overview and intuition. As before, the parties begin by executing an unfair computation
of ShareGen (cf. Figure 3.3) and receive as output secret shares of a1, b1, . . . , am, bm. As
always, these values are generated based on the parties’ respective inputs x and y, and it
remains only to describe how these values are fixed.
In contrast to our earlier protocol, however, the values a1, b1, . . . , am, bm are now
generated probabilistically in the following way: first, a value i∗ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is chosen
according to a geometric distribution with parameter α (see below). For i < i∗, the value
ai (resp., bi) is chosen in a manner that is independent of P2’s (resp., P1’s) input; specifically,
we set ai = f(x, ŷ) for randomly-chosen ŷ ∈ Y (and analogously for bi). For all i ≥ i∗, the
values ai and bi are set equal to f(x, y). More formally,
ai =

f(x, ŷ) if i < i∗ |where ŷ r← Y
f(x, y) if i ≥ i∗
bi =

f(x̂, y) if i < i∗ |where x̂ r← X
f(x, y) if i ≥ i∗
We note that fresh randomness is used in selecting x̂ and ŷ each time. Note that
if m = ω(log κ), we have am = bm = f(x, y) with all but negligible probability and
so correctness holds. (The protocol could also be modified so that am = bm = f(x, y)
with probability 1, thus giving perfect correctness. But the analysis is easier without this
modification.)
Fairness is more difficult to see and, of course, cannot hold for all functions f , since
some functions cannot be computed fairly. But as intuition for why the protocol achieves
fairness for certain functions, we observe that: (1) if a malicious party (say, P1) aborts in
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some iteration i < i∗, then P1 has not yet obtained any information about P2’s input and
so fairness is trivially achieved. On the other hand, (2) if P1 aborts in some iteration i > i∗
then both P1 and P2 have received the correct output f(x, y) and fairness is obtained. The
worst case, then, occurs when P1 aborts exactly in iteration i∗, as it has then learned the
correct value of f(x, y) while P2 has not (since P2 has only seen values b1, . . . bi∗−1, which
are independent of P1’s input). However, P1 cannot identify iteration i∗ with certainty
(this holds even if it knows the other party’s input y) and, even though it may guess i∗
correctly with noticeable probability, the fact that it can never be sure whether its guess
is correct will suffice to ensure fairness. Recall that fairness is defined only through an
indistinguishability requirement; if P1 outputs the correct output while P2 does not, this
fact by itself does not violate fairness.1 This point will play a key role when we prove
security: the simulator will rely on the fact that any malicious P1 that aborts in round i∗
must also, with noticeable probability, abort in some round i < i∗. Furthermore, we will
use the fact that one case is indistinguishable from the other.
Formal description of the protocol. The protocol is parameterized by a value α = α(κ)
which is assumed to be noticeable. Let m = ω(α−1 log κ). As usual, we use an m-time
MAC with information-theoretic security, however to ease the reading we ignore these
details and refer the reader to Section 2.8 for technical details.
As described above, ShareGen generates a value i∗ according to a geometric distri-
bution with parameter α. This is the probability distribution on N = {1, 2, . . .} given by
repeating a Bernoulli trial (with parameter α) until the first success. In other words, i∗
is determined by tossing a biased coin (that is heads with probability α) until the first
1If this is unsettling, consider a different adversary that aborts the protocol before it begins, and attempts
to guess the output. This adversary may also output the correct value alone, but intuitively, there is nothing
unfair in his action.
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ShareGen
Inputs: Let the inputs to ShareGen be x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . (If one of the received inputs is
not in the correct domain, then both parties are given output ⊥.)
Computation:
1. Define values a1, . . . , am and b1, . . . , bm in the following way:
• Choose i∗ according to a geometric distribution with parameter α (see text).
• For i = 1 to i∗ − 1 do:
– Choose ŷ ← Y and set ai = f(x, ŷ).
– Choose x̂← X and set bi = f(x̂, y).
• For i = i∗ to m, set ai = bi = f(x, y).
2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, choose (a(1)i , a
(2)




i ) as random secret sharings of ai and
bi, respectively. (E.g., a
(1)






1. Send to P1 the values (a
(1)




1 , . . . , b
(1)
m )
2. Send to P2 the values (a
(2)




1 , . . . , b
(2)
m )
Figure 3.3: Functionality ShareGen for functions with embedded XOR.
head appears, and letting i∗ be the number of tosses performed. We remark that, as far
as ShareGen is concerned, if i∗ > m then the exact value of i∗ is unimportant, and so
ShareGen can be implemented in strict (rather than expected) polynomial time. In any
case, our choice of m ensures that i∗ ≤ m with all but negligible probability.
Again, as before, the protocol for computing f begins by calling ShareGen as a sub-
routine and then has the parties exchange their shares. A formal description of the pro-
tocol is given in Figure 3.4. Note that the players do not know the value of i∗, as this was
selected inside the (secure) randomized protocol for ShareGen.
3.2.1 Proof of Security for a Particular Function
Protocol ΠEXOR cannot guarantee complete fairness for all functions f . Rather,
what we claim is that for certain functions f and particular associated values of α, the
protocol provides complete fairness. In this section, we prove security for the following
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ΠEXOR
Inputs: Party P1 has input x and party P2 has input y. The security parameter is κ.
The protocol:
1. Preliminary phase:
(a) P1 chooses ŷ ∈ Y uniformly at random, and sets a0 = f(x, ŷ). Similarly, P2
chooses x ∈ X uniformly at random, and sets b0 = f(x̂, y).
(b) Parties P1 and P2 run protocol π for computing ShareGen, using their respec-
tive inputs x and y, and security parameter κ.
(c) If P1 receives ⊥ from the above computation, it outputs a0 and halts. Like-
wise, if P2 receives ⊥ then it outputs b0 and halts. Otherwise, the parties
proceed to the next step.
(d) Denote the output of P1 from π by a
(1)




1 , . . . , b
(1)
m .
(e) Denote the output of P2 from π by a
(2)




1 , . . . , b
(2)
m .
2. For i = 1, . . . ,m do:
P2 sends the next share to P1:
(a) P2 sends a
(2)
i to P1.
(b) P1 receives a
(2)
i from P2. If P1 received an invalid message, or no message,
then P1 outputs ai−1 and halts.
P1 sends the next share to P2:
(a) P1 sends b
(1)
i to P2.
(b) P2 receives b
(1)
i from P1. If P2 received an invalid message, or no message),
then P2 outputs bi−1 and halts.
Outputs: P1 outputs am and P2 outputs bm.






This function has an embedded XOR, and is defined over a finite domain so that Xκ =
X = {x1, x2, x3} and Yκ = Y = {y1, y2}. For this f , we set α = 1/5 in Protocol ΠEXOR.
Theorem 3.2.1 If (Gen,Mac,Vrfy) is an information-theoretically secure m-time MAC, and π
securely computes ShareGen with abort, then the protocol in Figure 3.4, with α = 1/5, securely
computes f with complete fairness.
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Proof: Let Π denote the protocol in Figure 3.4 with α = 1/5. We analyze Π in a hybrid
model where there is a trusted party computing ShareGen. (One again, we stress that since
π is only guaranteed to securely compute ShareGen with abort, the adversary is allowed
to abort the trusted party computing ShareGen before it sends output to the honest party.)
We will prove that an execution of Protocol ΠEXOR in this hybrid model is statistically
close to an evaluation of f in the ideal model with complete fairness, where the only
differences can occur due to MAC forgeries. Applying Proposition 2.7.1 then implies the
theorem.
In the two claims that follow, we separately analyze corruption of P2 and P1. The
case of a corrupted P2 is relatively easy to analyze since P1 always “gets the output first”
(because, in every iteration — and iteration i∗ in particular — P2 sends its share first). The
proof of security when P1 is corrupted is much more challenging, and is given second.
Claim 3.2.2 For every non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary A corrupting P2 and running
Π in a hybrid model with access to an ideal functionality computing ShareGen (with abort), there
exists a non-uniform, probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S corrupting P2 and running in














Proof: Let P2 be corrupted byA. We construct a simulator S given black-box access toA:
1. S invokesA on the input y, the auxiliary input z, and the security parameter κ. The
simulator also chooses ŷ ∈ Y uniformly at random. (It will send ŷ to the trusted
party, if needed.)
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2. S receives the input y′ of A to the computation of the functionality ShareGen.
(a) If y′ /∈ Y (this includes the case when y′ = ⊥ since A aborts), then S hands ⊥
toA as its output from the computation of ShareGen and sends ŷ to the trusted
party computing f . It then halts and outputs whatever A outputs.
(b) Otherwise, if the input is some y′ ∈ Y , then S chooses uniformly-distributed




1 , . . . , b
(2)
m . In addition, it generates keys ka, kb ←
Gen(1κ) and computes tai = Macka(i‖a
(2)
i ) for every i. Finally, it hands A the






1), . . . , (a
(2)
m , tam), and kb as its output from the com-
putation of ShareGen.
3. If A sends abort to the trusted party computing ShareGen, then S sends ŷ to the
trusted party computing f . It then halts and outputs whatever A outputs. Other-
wise (i.e., if A sends continue), S proceeds as below.
4. S chooses i∗ according to a geometric distribution with parameter α.
5. For i = 1 to i∗ − 1:




i ) = 0
(or the message is invalid, or A aborts), then S sends ŷ to the trusted party
computing f , outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. Otherwise, S proceeds.
(b) S chooses x̂ ∈ X uniformly at random, computes bi = f(x̂, y′), sets b(1)i =
b
(2)
i ⊕ bi, and computes tbi = Mackb(i‖b
(1)





(Note that a fresh x̂ is chosen in every iteration.)
6. For i = i∗:
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(a) S receives A’s message (â(2)i∗ , t̂ai∗). If Vrfyka(i
∗‖â(2)i∗ , t̂ai∗) = 0 (or the message is
invalid, orA aborts), then S sends ŷ to the trusted party computing f , outputs
whatever A outputs, and halts. Otherwise, S sends y′ to the trusted party
computing f , receives the output z = f(x, y′), and proceeds.
(b) S sets b(1)i∗ = b
(2)
i∗ ⊕z, and computes tbi∗ = Mackb(i∗‖b
(1)






7. For i = i∗ + 1 to m:




i ) = 0 (or
the message is invalid, or A aborts), then S outputs whatever A outputs, and
halts.
(b) S sets b(1)i = b
(2)
i ⊕ z, and computes tbi = Mackb(i‖b
(1)






8. If S has not halted yet, at this point it outputs whatever A outputs and halts.








i (meaning that A sent the
same share that it received). It is straightforward to prove that this is the case with all but
negligible probability based on the information-theoretic security of the MAC. Under this
assumption, the distribution generated by S in an ideal-world execution with a trusted
party computing f is identical to the distribution in a hybrid execution betweenA and an
honest P1. To see this, first note that the view of A is identical in both worlds. As for the
output of P1, if A aborts (or sends an invalid message) before sending its first-iteration
message, then P1 outputs f(x, ŷ) for a random ŷ ∈ Y in both the hybrid and ideal worlds.
IfA aborts after sending a valid iteration-imessage then, conditioned onA’s view at that
point, the distribution of i∗ is identical in the hybrid and ideal worlds. Moreover, in both
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worlds, P1 outputs f(x, ŷ) (for a random ŷ ∈ Y ) if i < i∗ and outputs f(x, y′) if i ≥ i∗.
This concludes the proof of this case.
We remark that the proof of the preceding claim did not depend on the value of α
or the particular function f . The value of α and the specific nature of f will become
important when we deal with a malicious P1 in the proof of the following claim.
Claim 3.2.3 For every non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary A corrupting P1 and running
Π in a hybrid model with access to an ideal functionality computing ShareGen (with abort), there
exists a non-uniform, probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S corrupting P1 and running in














Proof Sketch: The proof of the above claim is the most technical part of this section. We
begin by giving some intuition before proceeding with the proof. Consider first the sim-
ulator from the proof of Claim 3.2.2 (adapted in the natural way for P1). The simulation
succeeds as long as the adversary aborts before or after round i∗. However, if the adver-
sary aborts exactly in round i∗, the simulation fails. As before, the simulator will have
to send x′ to the trusted party at the beginning of this round in order to learn the correct
output value. Then, because the ideal world is fair, P2 also receives correct output. In
contrast, in the real world protocol, if P1 aborts in round i∗, P2 outputs bi∗−1, which is a
random output value, and is not necessarily correct.
The key to fixing this problem comes from the following crucial observation: the
adversary does not know for certain that he aborted in round i∗! In particular, the exact
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same view that caused P1 to abort in round i∗ is nearly as likely to occur when i∗ happens
to be set to some larger value. Since P1’s view is identical when this occurs, his actions
must also be identical, leading him to abort now in some round prior to i∗. When the
adversary aborts prior to i∗, the simulator in the proof of Claim 3.2.2 submits a random
value x̂ ∈ X to the trusted party, resulting in random output for P2, just as in the real
world. However, in the following proof, we will not submit a uniformly chosen value
on behalf of P1 in this case. As we have just described, if P1 aborts exactly in round i∗,
our simulation fails because it yields correct output for P2 too often. When P1 aborts the
protocol in some round prior to i∗, we will compensate for the above fact by choosing x̂
from a distribution that yields correct output for P2 with smaller probability than does the
uniform distribution. By choosing x̂ from just the right distribution, we can guarantee
that the overall probability that P2 outputs the correct value (conditioned on the view
of P1) is the same in both the ideal and real worlds. Of course, the probabilities are
split differently when we condition on whether P1 aborts in round i∗, but this fact is
unrecognizable when observing only the transcript. The technical proof follows.
Proof: Say P1 is corrupted by an adversary A. We construct a simulator S that is given
black-box access to A. For readability in what follows, we ignore the presence of the MAC-tags
and keys. That is, we do not mention the fact that S computes MAC-tags for messages it
gives to A, nor do we mention the fact that S must verify the MAC-tags on the messages
sent by A. When we say that A “aborts”, we include in this the event that A sends an
invalid message, or a message whose tag does not pass verification.
1. S invokes A on the input2 x′, auxiliary input z, and the security parameter κ. The
simulator also chooses x̂ ∈ X uniformly at random (it will send x̂ to the trusted
2To simplify readability later, we reserve x for the value input by A to the computation of ShareGen.
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party, if needed).
2. S receives the input x of A to the computation of the functionality ShareGen.
(a) If x /∈ X (this includes the case when x = ⊥ sinceA aborts), then S hands⊥ to
A as its output from the computation of ShareGen, sends x̂ to the trusted party
computing f , outputs whatever A outputs, and halts.
(b) Otherwise, if the input is some x ∈ X , then S chooses uniformly-distributed




1 , . . . , b
(1)
m . Then, S gives these shares to A as its
output from the computation of ShareGen.
3. If A sends abort to the trusted party computing ShareGen, then S sends x̂ to the
trusted party computing f , outputs whateverA outputs, and halts. Otherwise (i.e.,
if A sends continue), S proceeds as below.
4. Choose i∗ according to a geometric distribution with parameter α. We now branch
depending on the value of x.
If x = x3:
5. For i = 1 to m:
(a) S sets a(2)i = a
(1)
i ⊕ 1 and gives a
(2)
i to A. (Recall that f(x3, y) = 1 for any y.)
(b) If A aborts and i ≤ i∗, then S sends x̂ to the trusted party computing f . If A
aborts and i > i∗ then S sends x = x3 to the trusted party computing f . In
either case, S then outputs whatever A outputs, and halts.
If A does not abort, then S proceeds to the next iteration.
6. If S has not halted yet, then if i∗ ≤ m it sends x3 to the trusted party computing f
while if i∗ > m it sends x̂. Finally, S outputs whatever A outputs and halts.
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If x ∈ {x1, x2}:
7. Let x̄ be the “other” value in {x1, x2}; i.e., if x = xc then x̄ = x3−c.
8. For i = 1 to i∗ − 1:
(a) S chooses ŷ ∈ Y uniformly at random, computes ai = f(x, ŷ), and sets a(2)i =
a
(1)
i ⊕ ai. It gives a
(2)
i to A. (Note that a fresh ŷ is chosen in every iteration.)
(b) If A aborts:
i. If ai = 0, then with probability 1/3 send x̄ to the trusted party comput-
ing f , and with probability 2/3 send x3.
ii. If ai = 1, then with probability 1/3 send x to the trusted party comput-
ing f ; with probability 1/2 send x̄; and with probability 1/6 send x3.
In either case, S then outputs whatever A outputs, and halts.
If A does not abort, then S proceeds.
9. For i = i∗ to m:
(a) If i = i∗ then S sends x to the trusted party computing f and receives z =
f(x, y).
(b) S sets a(2)i = a
(1)
i ⊕ z and gives a
(2)
i to A.
(c) If A aborts, then S then outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. If A does not
abort, then S proceeds.
10. If S has not yet halted, and has not yet sent anything to the trusted party computing
f (this can only happen if i∗ > m and A has never aborted), then it sends x̂ to the
trusted party. Then S outputs whatever A outputs and halts.
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We will show that the distribution generated by S in an ideal-world execution with
a trusted party computing f is identical to the distribution in a hybrid execution between
A and an honest P2. (As always, we are ignoring here the possibility that A can forge
a valid MAC-tag; once again, this introduces only a negligible statistical difference.) We
first observe that the case of x = x3 is straightforward since in this case S does not need
to send anything to the trusted party until after A aborts. (This is because ai = 1 for all i
since f(x3, y) = 1 for all y ∈ Y ; note that this is the first time in the proof we rely on
specific properties of f .) For the remainder of the proof, we therefore focus our attention
on the case when x ∈ {x1, x2}.
Let VIEWhyb(x, y) be the random variable denoting the view of A in the hybrid
world (i.e., running Π with a trusted party computing ShareGen) when P2 holds input y
and A uses input x in the computation of ShareGen. Let VIEWideal(x, y) be the random
variable denoting the view of A in the ideal world (i.e., where S runs A as a black-box
and interacts with a trusted party computing f ) with x, y similarly defined. Finally, let
OUThyb(x, y), OUTideal(x, y) be random variables denoting the output of the honest player
P2 in the hybrid and ideal worlds, respectively, for the given x and y. We will show that
for any x ∈ {x1, x2} and y ∈ Y ,
(




VIEWideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)
)
. (3.2)
(We stress that the above assumes A never forges a valid MAC-tag, and therefore the se-
curity parameter κ can be ignored and perfect equivalence obtained. Taking into account
this possibility, the above distributions would then have statistical difference negligible in
the security parameter κ.) It is immediate from the description of S that VIEWhyb(x, y) ≡
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VIEWideal(x, y) for any x, y; the difficulty lies in arguing about the joint distribution ofA’s
view and P2’s output, as above.















Clearly, if v represents a view that does not correspond to the actions ofA (e.g., v contains
ai, but given view v the adversary would have aborted prior to iteration i; or v does not
contain ai, but given view v the adversary would not have aborted prior to iteration i),
then both probabilities in Eq. (3.3) are identically 0 (regardless of b). Going forward, we
therefore only consider views that correspond to actions of A.
A’s view consists of its initial inputs, the values a(1)1 , b
(1)




m that A re-
ceives from computation of ShareGen, and — if A does not abort before the first iteration
— a sequence of values a1, . . . , ai where i is the iteration in which A aborts (if any).
(Technically A receives a(2)1 , . . . , a
(2)
i but we equivalently consider the reconstructed val-
ues a1, . . . , ai instead.) Looking at the description of S, it is easy to see that if v represents
a view in which A aborts before the first iteration, or in which A never aborts (i.e., A
runs the protocol to completion), then Eq. (3.3) holds for either choice of b. Thus, the
“difficult” cases to analyze are exactly those in which A aborts in some iteration i.
Let v be a view in which A aborts in iteration i (i.e., after receiving its iteration-i
message). We will let A’s initial inputs and its outputs from ShareGen be implicit, and
focus on the vector of values ~ai = (a1, . . . , ai) that A sees before it aborts in iteration i,
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We will show that for any x, y as above, any ~ai, and any bit b it holds that
Pr
[(











We stress that we are considering exactly those views ~ai = (a1, . . . , ai) in which A aborts
after receiving its iteration-imessage; there is thus no possibility thatAmight abort given
the sequence of values a1, . . . , aj (with j < i).
Toward proving Eq. (3.4), we first prove:
Claim 3.2.4 For any x ∈ {x1, x2} and y ∈ Y ,
Pr
[(















Proof: A proof of this claim follows easily from the observation that, conditioned on i∗ <
i, the “true” input of P1 is used to compute P2’s output in both the hybrid and ideal
worlds.



























































Furthermore, conditioned on i∗ < i the output of P2 is the correct output f(x, y) in both
the hybrid and ideal worlds. We conclude that Eq. (3.5) holds.
To complete the proof of Eq. (3.4), we prove that for any x ∈ {x1, x2} and y ∈ Y ,
any ~ai ∈ {0, 1}i, and all b ∈ {0, 1} it holds that
Pr
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ideal). (In what follows, we also often leave x and y implicit






























































Moreover, conditioned on the event that i∗ ≥ i, the random variables of VIEWihyb and
















= (a, b) | i∗ ≥ i
]
(3.7)
for all x, y, a, b as above. We prove this via case-by-case analysis. For convenience, we





Case 1: x = x1 and y = y1. We analyze the hybrid world first, followed by the ideal
world.
Hybrid world. We first consider the hybrid world where the parties are running proto-
col Π. If A aborts after receiving its iteration-i message, P2 will output OUThyb = bi−1.
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Since i∗ ≥ i, we have bi−1 = f(x̂, y1) where x̂ is chosen uniformly fromX . So Pr[OUThyb =
0] = Prx̂←X [f(x̂, y1) = 0] = 1/3 and Pr[OUThyb = 1] = 2/3.
Since i∗ ≥ i, the value of VIEWihyb = ai is independent of the value of bi−1. Condi-
tioned on the event that i∗ ≥ i, we have Pr[i∗ = i] = α = 1/5 and Pr[i∗ > i] = 4/5. If
i∗ = i, then ai = f(x, y) = f(x1, y1) = 0. If i∗ > i, then ai = f(x1, ŷ) where ŷ is chosen
uniformly from Y . So Pr[ai = 1] = Prŷ←Y [f(x1, ŷ) = 1] = 1/2 and Pr[ai = 0] = 1/2.
Overall, then, we have













Putting everything together gives
Pr
[(
VIEWihyb(x1, y1), OUThyb(x1, y1)
)



























15 (a, b) = (1, 1)
(3.8)
Ideal world. We now turn our attention to the ideal world. Since we are conditioning on
i∗ ≥ i, here it is also the case that Pr[i∗ = i] = α = 1/5 and Pr[i∗ > i] = 4/5. Furthermore,
if i∗ = i then VIEWiideal = ai = f(x1, y1) = 0. Now, however, if i
∗ = i then S has already
sent x1 to the trusted party computing f (in order to learn the value f(x1, y1)) and so P2
will also output f(x1, y1) = 0, rather than some independent value bi−1.
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When i∗ > i, then (by construction of S) we have Pr[ai = 0] = Prŷ←Y [f(x1, ŷ) =
0] = 1/2 and Pr[ai = 1] = 1/2. Now, however, the output of P2 depends on the value sent
to the trusted party following an abort by A, which in turn depends on ai (cf. step 8(b)
of S). In particular, we have:
Pr[OUTideal(x1, y1) = 0 | ai = 0
∧
i∗ > i]
= Pr[S sends x1 to the trusted party | ai = 0
∧
i∗ > i] = 0,
and
Pr[OUTideal(x1, y1) = 0 | ai = 1
∧
i∗ > i]
= Pr[S sends x1 to the trusted party | ai = 1
∧
i∗ > i] = 1/3
(in calculating the above, recall that x = x1). Putting everything together, we obtain
Pr
[(
VIEWiideal(x1, y1), OUTideal(x1, y1)
)
= (0, 0) | i∗ ≥ i
]
= α · Pr
[(
VIEWiideal(x1, y1), OUTideal(x1, y1)
)
= (0, 0) | i∗ = i
]
+ (1− α) · Pr
[(
VIEWiideal(x1, y1), OUTideal(x1, y1)
)
= (0, 0) | i∗ > i
]






VIEWiideal(x1, y1), OUTideal(x1, y1)
)
= (0, 1) | i∗ ≥ i
]
= (1− α) · 1
2





VIEWiideal(x1, y1), OUTideal(x1, y1)
)
= (1, 0) | i∗ ≥ i
]










VIEWiideal(x1, y1), OUTideal(x1, y1)
)
= (1, 1) | i∗ ≥ i
]









in exact agreement with Eq. (3.8).
Case 2: x = x2 and y = y1. In all the remaining cases, the arguments are the same as
before; just the numbers differ. Therefore, we will allow ourselves to be more laconic.
In the hybrid world, conditioned on i∗ ≥ i, the values of OUThyb = bi−1 and
VIEWihyb = ai are again independent. The distribution of bi−1 is given by: Pr[bi−1 =
0] = Prx̂←X [f(x̂, y1) = 0] = 1/3 and Pr[bi−1 = 1] = 2/3. As for the distribution of ai, we
have
Pr[ai = 1 | i∗ ≥ i] = α · Pr[ai = 1 | i∗ = i] + (1− α) · Pr[ai = 1 | i∗ > i]













and so Pr[ai = 0 | i∗ ≥ i] = 2/5. Putting everything together gives
Pr
[(
VIEWihyb(x2, y1), OUThyb(x2, y1)
)



























5 (a, b) = (1, 1)
(3.13)
In the ideal world, if i∗ = i then OUTideal = VIEWiideal = f(x2, y1) = 1. If i
∗ > i, then
the distribution of VIEWiideal = ai is given by Pr[ai = 1] = Prŷ←Y [f(x1, ŷ) = 1] = 1/2 and
Pr[ai = 0] = 1/2. The value of OUTideal is now dependent on the value of ai (cf. step 8(b)
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of S); specifically:
Pr[OUTideal(x2, y1) = 0 | ai = 0
∧
i∗ > i]
= Pr[S sends x1 to the trusted party | ai = 0
∧
i∗ > i] = 1/3,
and
Pr[OUTideal(x2, y1) = 0 | ai = 1
∧
i∗ > i]
= Pr[S sends x1 to the trusted party | ai = 1
∧
i∗ > i] = 1/2
(using the fact that x = x2). Putting everything together, we obtain
Pr
[(
VIEWiideal(x2, y1), OUTideal(x2, y1)
)
= (0, 0) | i∗ ≥ i
]










VIEWiideal(x2, y1), OUTideal(x2, y1)
)
= (0, 1) | i∗ ≥ i
]










VIEWiideal(x2, y1), OUTideal(x2, y1)
)
= (1, 0) | i∗ ≥ i
]










VIEWiideal(x2, y1), OUTideal(x2, y1)
)
= (1, 1) | i∗ ≥ i
]








in exact agreement with Eq. (3.13).
Case 3: x = x1 and y = y2. In the hybrid world, this case is exactly symmetric to the
case when x = x2 and y = y1. Thus we obtain the same distribution as in Eq. (3.13).
In the ideal world, if i∗ = i then OUTideal = VIEWiideal = f(x1, y2) = 1. If i
∗ > i, then
the distribution of VIEWiideal = ai is given by Pr[ai = 1] = Prŷ←Y [f(x2, ŷ) = 1] = 1/2 and
Pr[ai = 0] = 1/2. The value of OUTideal is dependent on the value of ai (cf. step 8(b) of S);
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specifically:
Pr[OUTideal(x1, y2) = 0 | ai = 0
∧
i∗ > i]
= Pr[S sends x2 to the trusted party | ai = 0
∧
i∗ > i] = 1/3,
and
Pr[OUTideal(x1, y2) = 0 | ai = 1
∧
i∗ > i]
= Pr[S sends x2 to the trusted party | ai = 1
∧
i∗ > i] = 1/2
(using the fact that x = x1). Putting everything together, we obtain the same distribution
as in Eqs. (3.14)–(3.17). The distributions in the hybrid and ideal worlds are, once again,
in exact agreement.
Case 4: x = x2 and y = y2. In the hybrid world, this case is exactly symmetric to the
case when x = x1 and y = y1. Thus we obtain the same distribution as in Eq. (3.8).
In the ideal world, if i∗ = i then OUTideal = VIEWiideal = f(x2, y2) = 0. If i
∗ > i, then
the distribution of VIEWiideal = ai is given by Pr[ai = 1] = Prŷ←Y [f(x2, ŷ) = 1] = 1/2 and
Pr[ai = 0] = 1/2. The value of OUTideal is dependent on the value of ai (cf. step 8(b) of S);
specifically:
Pr[OUTideal(x2, y2) = 0 | ai = 0
∧
i∗ > i]
= Pr[S sends x2 to the trusted party | ai = 0
∧
i∗ > i] = 0,
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and
Pr[OUTideal(x2, y2) = 0 | ai = 1
∧
i∗ > i]
= Pr[S sends x2 to the trusted party | ai = 1
∧
i∗ > i] = 1/3
(using the fact that x = x2). Putting everything together, we obtain the same distribution
as in Eqs. (3.9)–(3.12). The distributions in the hybrid and ideal worlds are, once again,
in exact agreement. This completes the proof of Claim 3.2.3.
The preceding claims along with Proposition 2.7.1 conclude the proof of Theo-
rem 3.2.1.
3.2.2 Extending the Protocol to Other Functions
Before specifying the more general functions for which Protocol ΠEXOR (cf. Fig-
ure 3.4) can be applied, we briefly discuss how we chose the value α = 1/5 for the spe-
cific f of Section 3.2.1. This will provide some intuition that will be helpful in the section
that follows. It should be clear that our entire discussion in this subsection assumes the
specific simulation strategy described in the proof of Theorem 3.2.1. It may be the case
that a different simulation strategy would allow for other values of α, or there may exist
a different protocol altogether for computing f .
Consider the case of a malicious P1 who aborts after receiving its iteration-i mes-
sage, and let the parties’ inputs be x = x1, y = y1 (note f(x1, y1) = 0). We use the notation
as in the proof of Claim 3.2.3, so that VIEWihyb denotes the value ai that P1 reconstructs in
iteration i and OUThyb denote the output of the honest P2. The protocol itself ensures that
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in the hybrid world we have
Pr[
(
VIEWihyb(x1, y1), OUThyb(x1, y1)
)
= (0, 0) | i∗ ≥ i]
= Pr[VIEWihyb(x1, y1) = 0 | i∗ ≥ i] · Pr[OUThyb(x1, y1) = 0 | i∗ ≥ i],
since OUThyb = bi−1 is independent of VIEWihyb = ai when i
∗ ≥ i. We have
Pr[OUThyb(x1, y1) = 0 | i∗ ≥ i] = Pr
x̂←X
[f(x̂, y1) = 0] = 1/3
and
Pr[VIEWihyb(x1, y1) = 0 | i∗ ≥ i]
= α · Pr[VIEWihyb(x1, y1) = 0 | i∗ = i] + (1− α) · Pr[VIEWihyb(x1, y1) = 0 | i∗ > i]
= α+ (1− α) · Prŷ←Y [f(x1, ŷ) = 0]
= α+ (1− α) · 1
2
,




VIEWihyb(x1, y1), OUThyb(x1, y1)
)








In the ideal world, our simulation strategy ensures that, conditioned on i∗ ≥ i, the
simulator S sends x = x1 to the trusted party with probability α; when this occurs, the
simulator will then set VIEWiideal = ai = f(x1, y1) = 0, and the honest party P2 will output
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f(x1, y1) = 0. Therefore, regardless of anything else the simulator might do,
Pr[
(
VIEWiideal(x1, y1), OUTideal(x1, y1)
)
= (0, 0) | i∗ ≥ i] ≥ α.
If we want the ideal-world and hybrid-world distributions to be equal, then this requires
α ≤
(






which is equivalent to requiring α ≤ 1/5. A similar argument applied to the other possi-
ble values for x, y shows that α ≤ 1/5 suffices for all of them. Setting α = 1/5 minimizes
the number of rounds of the protocol.
Having fixed the value of α, we now explain how we determined the simulator’s
actions (for a malicious P1) in step 8(b). We begin by introducing some notation that we
will also use in the following section.
Define pxi
def
= Prŷ←Y [f(xi, ŷ) = 1] and, similarly, define pyi
def
= Prx̂←X [f(x̂, yi) = 1].
Let x′ be as in the description of S in the proof of Claim 3.2.3. If A aborts in round
i < i∗ after receiving the bit ai, then we denote the event that S sends xi to the ideal












Consider once again the case x = x1 and y = y1. In the hybrid world, by construction of
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Protocol ΠEXOR, we have
Pr[
(
VIEWihyb(x1, y1), OUThyb(x1, y1)
)
= (1, 1) | i∗ ≥ i]
= Pr[VIEWihyb(x1, y1) = 1 | i∗ ≥ i] · Pr[OUThyb(x1, y1) = 1 | i∗ ≥ i]
= (1− α) · px1 · py1 .
(Note that if i∗ = i, which occurs with probability α, then ai = f(x1, y1) = 0.) Because of
the way S is defined, in the ideal world we have
Pr[
(
VIEWiideal(x1, y1), OUTideal(x1, y1)
)
= (1, 1) | i∗ ≥ i]
= Pr[VIEWiideal(x1, y1) = 1 | i∗ ≥ i] · Pr[OUTideal(x1, y1) = 1 | VIEWiideal(x1, y1) = 1
∧
i∗ ≥ i]
= (1− α) · px1 ·
(





If we want these to be equal, this requires Pr[X(1)x1→x2 ] + Pr[X
(1)
x1→x3 ] = py1 =
2
3 .
Proceeding similarly for the case when x = x1 and y = y2 and looking at the
probability that ai = 0 and the output of P2 is 1, we derive
Pr[X(1)x1→x1 ] + Pr[X
(1)
x1→x3 ] =






Combining the above with the constraint that Pr[X(1)x1→x1 ] + Pr[X
(1)
x1→x2 ] + Pr[X
(1)
x1→x3 ] = 1
we obtain the unique feasible values used in step 8(b) of S (for the case x = x1). The case
of x = x2 follows via a similar analysis.
Looking at the problem more generally, we observe that for certain functions f
(e.g., the boolean XOR function), the problem is over-constrained and no feasible solution
exists (regardless of the choice of α). In the following section we will argue that our
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protocol can be applied to any function f for which the above constraints can be satisfied
for all possible inputs x, y.
3.2.3 A Characterization of When Protocol ΠEXOR is Secure
In this section we characterize a class of functions that can be securely computed
with complete fairness using Protocol ΠEXOR. The proof is a generalization of the proof
from Section 3.2.1.
Notation. We assume a single-output, boolean function f : X × Y → {0, 1} defined over
a finite domain, where X = {x1, . . . x`} and Y = {y1, . . . , ym}. We let Mf denote the
` × m matrix whose entry at position (i, j) is f(xi, yj), and let vy denote the column of
Mf corresponding to the input y of P2. For every input x ∈ X of player P1 we define
px
def
= Prŷ←Y [f(x, ŷ) = 1],




We define py, for y ∈ Y , symmetrically. In addition, let p̄x
def
= 1− px and p̄y
def
= 1− py.





{ ∣∣1− f(xi, yj)− pxi∣∣ · ∣∣1− f(xi, yj)− pyj ∣∣∣∣1− f(xi, yj)− pxi∣∣ · ∣∣1− f(xi, yj)− pyj ∣∣+ ∣∣f(xi, yj)− pyj ∣∣
}
, (3.18)
where the minimum is taken over 1 ≤ i ≤ ` and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. By simple calculation, one
can show that 0 < α ≤ 1 and, in fact, α < 1 unless f is a constant function (in which case
completely-fair computation of f is trivial). Using this value of α we define, for x ∈ X ,
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py if f(x, y) = 1
α·py
(1−α)·p̄x + py if f(x, y) = 0
.






(1−α)·px + py if f(x, y) = 1
py if f(x, y) = 0
(The denominators, above, are never 0.)
A row vector (p1, . . . , p`) of real numbers is a probability vector if 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 for all i,
and
∑
i pi = 1. We are now ready to prove the following:
Theorem 3.2.5 Let f be a single-output, boolean function, and let Mf and ~C
(b)
xi be as defined
above. If for all b ∈ {0, 1} and x ∈ X there exists a probability vector ~X(b)x = (p1, . . . , p`) such
that
~X(b)x ·Mf = ~C(b)x ,
then there exists a protocol that securely computes f with complete fairness.
Proof: We take Protocol ΠEXOR with α computed as in Eq. (3.18). Simulation for a
corrupted P2 follows exactly along the lines of the proof of Claim 3.2.2; recall that the
simulator in that case did not rely on any specific properties of the function f or the value
of α. We therefore focus our attention on the case when the adversary A corrupts P1. In
this case, our simulator S is almost identical to the simulator described in the proof of
Claim 3.2.3 (except, of course, that it uses the appropriate value of α); the only significant
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change is how we deal with an abort in iteration i < i∗ (this corresponds to step 8(b) in
the simulator from the proof of Claim 3.2.3). For completeness, we describe the modified
simulator in its entirety, although we once again ignore the presence of the MAC-tags
and keys for simplicity.
1. S invokes A on the input x′, the auxiliary input, and the security parameter n. The
simulator also chooses x̂ ∈ X uniformly at random.
2. S receives the input x of A to the computation of the functionality ShareGen′.
(a) If x /∈ X , then S hands⊥ toA as its output from the computation of ShareGen′,
sends x̂ to the trusted party computing f , outputs whatever A outputs, and
halts.
(b) Otherwise, if the input is some x ∈ X , then S chooses uniformly-distributed




1 , . . . , b
(1)
m . Then, S gives these shares to A as its
output from the computation of ShareGen′.
3. If A sends abort to the trusted party computing ShareGen′, then S sends x̂ to the
trusted party computing f , outputs whateverA outputs, and halts. Otherwise (i.e.,
if A sends continue), S proceeds as below.
4. Choose i∗ according to a geometric distribution with parameter α.
5. For i = 1 to i∗ − 1:
(a) S chooses ŷ ∈ Y uniformly at random, computes ai = f(x, ŷ), and sets a(2)i =
a
(1)
i ⊕ ai. It gives a
(2)
i to A.
(b) If A aborts, then S chooses x′ according to the distribution defined by3 ~X(ai)x ,




and sends x′ to the trusted party computing f . It then outputs whatever A
outputs, and halts.
If A does not abort, then S proceeds.
6. For i = i∗ to m:
(a) If i = i∗ then S sends x to the trusted party computing f and receives z =
f(x, y).
(b) S sets a(2)i = a
(1)
i ⊕ z and gives a
(2)
i to A.
(c) If A aborts, then S then outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. If A does not
abort, then S proceeds.
7. If S has not yet halted, and has not yet sent anything to the trusted party computing
f (this can only happen if i∗ > m and A has not aborted), then it sends x̂ to the
trusted party. Then S outputs whatever A outputs and halts.
(The simulator constructed in Claim 3.2.3 branched depending on the value of x, but this
was only a simplification due to the fact that the input x3, there, completely determined
the output. In general there need not be any such input.)
We borrow the same notation as in our proof of Claim 3.2.3. Examining that proof,
we see that the proof here will proceed identically up to the point where we need to show











= (a, b) | i∗ ≥ i
]
(3.19)
(This is Eq. (3.7) there. As was done there, we suppress explicit mention of the inputs
when the notation becomes cumbersome.) We now fix arbitrary x, y and show that the
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above holds. We consider two sub-cases depending on the value of f(x, y).
Case 1: x and y are such that f(x, y) = 0. In the hybrid world, when A aborts af-
ter receiving its iteration-i message, then P2 outputs OUThyb = bi−1 and the value of
VIEWihyb = ai is independent of the value of bi−1. By definition of the protocol, we have
Pr[bi−1 = 0 | i∗ ≥ i] = p̄y and Pr[bi−1 = 1 | i∗ ≥ i] = py,
since bi−1 = f(x̂, y) for x̂ chosen uniformly from X . As for ai, we have
Pr
[
ai = 0 | i∗ ≥ i
]
= α+ (1− α) · p̄x and Pr
[
ai = 1 | i∗ ≥ i
]
= (1− α) · px .
Since bi−1 and ai are independent, we conclude that
Pr
[(
VIEWihyb(x, y), OUThyb(x, y)
)




(α+ (1− α) · p̄x) · p̄y (a, b) = (0, 0)
(α+ (1− α) · p̄x) · py (a, b) = (0, 1)
(1− α) · px · p̄y (a, b) = (1, 0)
(1− α) · px · py (a, b) = (1, 1)
In the ideal world, if i∗ = i then OUTideal = VIEWiideal = f(x, y) = 0. If i
∗ > i, then
the distribution of VIEWiideal = ai is given by Pr[ai = 0] = p̄x. The value of OUTideal is
now dependent on the value of ai (cf. step 5(b) of the simulator described in this section);
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specifically, we have:
Pr[OUTideal(x, y) = 0 | ai = 0
∧
i∗ > i]









and, in the general case,
Pr[OUTideal(x, y) = b | ai = a
∧






We therefore have, for example,
Pr
[(
VIEWiideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (0, 0) | i∗ ≥ i
]






= α+ (1− α) · p̄x ·
(
1− ~X(0)x · vy
)




= α+ (1− α) · p̄x ·
(
1− α · py
(1− α) · p̄x
− py
)
= (α+ (1− α) · p̄x) · p̄y, = Pr
[(
VIEWihyb(x, y), OUThyb(x, y)
)
= (0, 0) | i∗ ≥ i
]
.
(The second equality uses the definitions of ~X(0)x and vy; the third equality uses the as-
sumption, from the theorem, that ~X(0)x ·vy = ~C(0)x (y). We then use the definition of ~C(0)x (y)
and re-arrange using algebra.) This is equal to the associated probability in the hybrid
world, as computed above.
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For completeness, we include the calculations for the remaining cases:
Pr
[(
VIEWiideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (0, 1) | i∗ ≥ i
]










= (1− α) · p̄x · ~C(0)x (y)
= (1− α) · p̄x ·
(
α · py
(1− α) · p̄x
+ py
)
= (α+ (1− α) · p̄x) · py = Pr
[(
VIEWihyb(x, y), OUThyb(x, y)
)





VIEWiideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (1, 0) | i∗ ≥ i
]






= (1− α) · px ·
(
1− ~X(1)x · vy
)




= (1− α) · px · (1− py)
= (1− α) · px · p̄y = Pr
[(
VIEWihyb(x, y), OUThyb(x, y)
)





VIEWiideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (1, 1) | i∗ ≥ i
]










= (1− α) · px · ~C(1)x (y)
= (1− α) · px · py = Pr
[(
VIEWihyb(x, y), OUThyb(x, y)
)




Equality holds, in all cases, between the corresponding probabilities in the ideal and
hybrid worlds. We thus conclude that Eq. (3.19) holds for all x, y with f(x, y) = 0.
Case 2: x and y are such that f(x, y) = 1. We provide the calculations with limited
discussion. In the hybrid world, we have
Pr
[(
VIEWihyb(x, y), OUThyb(x, y)
)




((1− α) · p̄x) · p̄y (a, b) = (0, 0)
((1− α) · p̄x) · py (a, b) = (0, 1)
(α+ (1− α) · px) · p̄y (a, b) = (1, 0)
(α+ (1− α) · px) · py (a, b) = (1, 1)
In the ideal world, if i∗ = i then OUTideal = VIEWiideal = f(x, y) = 1. If i
∗ > i, then the
distribution of VIEWiideal = ai is given by Pr[ai = 0] = p̄x, and the value of OUTideal is now
dependent on the value of ai. Working out the details, we have:
Pr
[(
VIEWiideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (0, 0) | i∗ ≥ i
]






= (1− α) · p̄x ·
(
1− ~X(0)x · vy
)








VIEWiideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (0, 1) | i∗ ≥ i
]














= (1− α) · p̄x · py.
Pr
[(
VIEWiideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (1, 0) | i∗ ≥ i
]






= (1− α) · px ·
(
1− ~X(1)x · vy
)




= (1− α) · px ·
(
1− α · (py − 1)
(1− α) · px
− py
)
= (α+ (1− α) · px) · p̄y.
Pr
[(
VIEWiideal(x, y), OUTideal(x, y)
)
= (1, 1) | i∗ ≥ i
]














= α+ (1− α) · px ·
(
α · (py − 1)
(1− α) · px
+ py
)
= (α+ (1− α) · px) · py.
Once again, equality holds between the corresponding probabilities in the ideal and hy-
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brid worlds in all cases. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
3.3 A Lower Bound for Functions Containing an Embedded XOR
In the previous section we have shown a protocol that enables completely fair com-
putation of certain functions that contain an embedded XOR. That protocol, however, has
round complexity ω(log κ). (The round complexity may be worse, depending on α, but
if α is constant then the round complexity is m = ω(log κ).) In this section we prove that
this is inherent for any function that has an embedded XOR.
3.3.1 Preliminaries
Let f be a single-output, boolean function with an embedded XOR; that is, a func-
tion for which there exist inputs x0, x1, y0, y1 such that f(xi, yj) = i ⊕ j. Let Π be an
r(κ)-round protocol that securely computes f with complete fairness. Here we denote
the two parties executing the protocol by A and B. We present some basic conventions
below, as well as the specification of a series of fail-stop adversaries that we will use in
our proof.
Notation and conventions: We assume that A sends the first message in protocol Π, and
B sends the last message. A round of Π consists of a message from A followed by a
message from B. If A aborts before sending its ith-round message (but after sending the
first i− 1 messages), then we denote by bi−1 the value output by B (so B outputs b0 if A
sends nothing). If B aborts before sending its ith-round message (but after sending the
first i − 1 messages), then we denote by ai the value output by A (so A outputs a1 if B
sends nothing). If neither party aborts, then B outputs br and A outputs ar+1.
Proof overview. We consider executions of Π in which each party begins with input
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distributed uniformly in {x0, x1} or {y0, y1}, respectively. We describe a series of 4r fail-
stop adversaries {Ai1, Ai0, Bi1, Bi0}ri=1 where, intuitively, the aim of adversary Aib is to
guess B’s input while simultaneously biasing B’s output toward the bit b. (The aim of
adversary Bib is exactly analogous.) We show that if r = O(log κ), then one of these
adversaries succeeds with “high” probability even though, as explained next, this is not
possible in the ideal world.
In the ideal world evaluation of f (when B chooses its input at random in {y0, y1}),
it is certainly possible for an adversary corrupting A to learn B’s input with certainty
(this follows from the fact that f contains an embedded XOR), and it may be possible,
depending on f , to bias B’s output with certainty. It is not possible, however, to do both
simultaneously with high probability. (We formally state and prove this below.) This
gives us our desired contradiction whenever r = O(log κ), and shows that no protocol
with this many rounds can be completely fair.
Descriptions of the adversaries. Before giving the formal specification of the adversaries,
we provide an intuitive description of adversary Ai1. (The other adversaries rely on the
same intuition.) Ai1 chooses a random input x ∈ {x0, x1} and runs the protocol honestly
for i− 1 rounds. It then computes the value it would output if B aborted the protocol at
the current point, i.e., it computes ai. If ai = 1, then Ai1 continues the protocol for one
more round (hoping that this will cause B to output 1 also) and halts. If ai = 0, then
Ai1 halts immediately (hoping that B’s output does not yet “match” Ai1’s, and that B
will still output 1). In addition to this behavior during the protocol, Ai1 also guesses B’s
input, in the natural way, based on its own input value x and the value of ai it computed.
In particular, if x = xσ then Ai1 guesses that B’s input is yai⊕σ (since f(xσ, yai⊕σ) = ai).
Say B’s input is y. Intuitively, because the protocol is completely fair, if the output
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that Ai1 computes in round i is biased toward the correct value of f(x, y), it must be that
the last message sent by Ai1 has relatively limited relevance (i.e., that B would output
the same bit whether Ai1 sends its ith round message or not). In particular, in the case of
Ar1, the computed output must be equal to f(x, y) (with all but negligible probability),
and therefore the last message of the protocol is, in some sense, unnecessary. Using
induction (for a logarithmic number of steps) we will demonstrate that the same holds
for each of the prior rounds, and conclude that a protocol running inO(log κ) rounds can
be transformed into an empty protocol in which neither party sends anything. This is, of
course, impossible; therefore, no such protocol exists.
We now formally describe the adversaries.
Adversary Ai1:
1. Choose x ∈R {x0, x1}.
2. Run the honest A for the first i− 1 rounds (using input x) and compute ai:
(a) If ai = 1 and x = x0, then output guess(y = y1), send the ith round message,
and halt.
(b) If ai = 1 and x = x1, then output guess(y = y0), send the ith round message,
and halt.
(c) If ai = 0 and x = x0, then output guess(y = y0) and halt immediately.
(d) If ai = 0 and x = x1, then output guess(y = y1) and halt immediately.
Adversary Ai0:
1. Choose x ∈R {x0, x1}.
2. Run the honest A for the first i− 1 rounds (using input x) and compute ai:
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(a) If ai = 0 and x = x0, then output guess(y = y0), send the ith round message
and halt.
(b) If ai = 0 and x = x1, then output guess(y = y1), send the ith round message
and halt.
(c) If ai = 1 and x = x0, then output guess(y = y1) and halt immediately.
(d) If ai = 1 and x = x1, then output guess(y = y0) and halt immediately.
Adversary Bi1:
1. Choose y ∈R {y0, y1}.
2. Run the honest B for the first i − 1 rounds (using input y), receive A’s ith round
message, and compute bi:
(a) If bi = 1 and y = y0, then output guess(x = x1), send the ith round message,
and halt.
(b) If bi = 1 and y = y1, then output guess(x = x0), send the ith round message,
and halt.
(c) If bi = 0 and y = y0, then output guess(x = x0) and halt immediately.
(d) If bi = 0 and y = y1, then output guess(x = x1) and halt immediately.
Adversary Bi0:
1. Choose y ∈R {y0, y1}.
2. Run the honest B for the first i − 1 rounds (using input y), receive A’s ith round
message, and compute bi:
(a) If bi = 0 and y = y0, then output guess(x = x0), send the ith round message,
and halt.
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(b) If bi = 0 and y = y1, then output guess(x = x1), send the ith round message,
and halt.
(c) If bi = 1 and y = y0, then output guess(x = x1) and halt immediately.
(d) If bi = 1 and y = y1, then output guess(X = x0) and halt immediately.
Success probability for Ai1: As preparation for the proof that follows, we calculate the
probability that Ai1 succeeds in simultaneously guessing B’s input y correctly, and having
B output 1. By construction, if (say) Ai1 uses x = x0 as input and obtains ai = 0, then
it guesses correctly iff y = y0. Furthermore, since it received ai = 0 it does not send its
ith round message; thus, by our notation, B outputs 1 if bi−1 = 1. There are three other
possible ways for this to occur as well:
Pr[Ai1 guesses y ∧B outputs 1]
= Pr[x = x0 ∧ y = y0 ∧ ai = 0 ∧ bi−1 = 1] + Pr[x = x0 ∧ y = y1 ∧ ai = 1 ∧ bi = 1]
+ Pr[x = x1 ∧ y = y1 ∧ ai = 0 ∧ bi−1 = 1] + Pr[x = x1 ∧ y = y0 ∧ ai = 1 ∧ bi = 1].
The calculations are similar for Ai0, Bi1, and Bi0 so we present them with no further
explanation.
Success probability for Ai0:
Pr[Ai0 guesses y ∧B outputs 0]
= Pr[x = x0 ∧ y = y0 ∧ ai = 0 ∧ bi = 0] + Pr[x = x0 ∧ y = y1 ∧ ai = 1 ∧ bi−1 = 0]
+ Pr[x = x1 ∧ y = y1 ∧ ai = 0 ∧ bi = 0] + Pr[x = x1 ∧ y = y0 ∧ ai = 1 ∧ bi−1 = 0].
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Success probability for Bi1:
Pr[Bi1 guesses x ∧A outputs 1]
= Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x0 ∧ bi = 0 ∧ ai = 1] + Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai+1 = 1]
+ Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 0 ∧ ai = 1] + Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x0 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai+1 = 1].
Success probability for Bi0:
Pr[Bi0 guesses x ∧A outputs 0]
= Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x0 ∧ bi = 0 ∧ ai+1 = 0] + Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai = 0]
+ Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 0 ∧ ai+1 = 0] + Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x0 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai = 0].
3.3.2 The Proof
We begin by showing that, in the ideal model, it is impossible for an adversary
to bias the output of the honest party while simultaneously guessing the honest party’s
input, with probability greater than 1/2. Note that an adversary can certainly do one or
the other. For example, if the honestB uses input y ∈R {y0, y1} and an adversarialA uses
input x0, then A learns the input of B (by observing if the output is 0 or 1). Furthermore,
if there exists a value x′ for which f(x′, y0) = f(x′, y1) = 1 then A can completely bias the
output of B to be 1.4 In the first case, however, B’s output is a random bit; in the second
case, A learns no information about B’s input. The following claim proves that these two
extremes represent, in some sense, the best possible strategies:
Claim 3.3.1 Consider an ideal-world evaluation of f (with complete fairness), where the honest
4We stress that this is different from the case of boolean XOR, where it is impossible to bias the honest
party’s output at all in the ideal model (when the honest party uses a random input).
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party B chooses its input y uniformly from {y0, y1} and the corrupted A∗ outputs a guess for y
following its interaction with the trusted party. For any A∗ and any σ ∈ {0, 1}, it holds that
Pr[A∗ guesses y ∧B outputs σ] ≤ 1
2
.
An analogous claim holds for the case when A is honest.
Proof: We consider the case of an honest B. Let X0
def
= {x | f(x, y0) = f(x, y1) = 0}, and
likewise X1
def
= {x | f(x, y0) = f(x, y1) = 1}. Let X⊕ = {x | f(x, y0) 6= f(x, y1)}. Note
that X0, X1, and X⊕ partition the set of all inputs for A∗. In the following, when we say
“A∗ sends x” we mean that it sends x to the trusted party in the ideal model. For any
σ ∈ {0, 1}we have:
Pr[A∗ guesses y ∧B outputs σ]
= Pr[A∗ guesses y ∧B outputs σ ∧A∗ sends x ∈ Xσ̄]
+ Pr[A∗ guesses y ∧B outputs σ ∧A∗ sends x ∈ Xσ]
+ Pr[A∗ guesses y ∧B outputs σ ∧A∗ sends x ∈ X⊕]
= Pr[A∗ guesses y ∧B outputs σ | A∗ sends x ∈ Xσ̄] · Pr[A∗ sends x ∈ Xσ̄]
+ Pr[A∗ guesses y ∧B outputs σ | A∗ sends x ∈ Xσ] · Pr[A∗ sends x ∈ Xσ]
+ Pr[A∗ guesses y ∧B outputs σ | A∗ sends x ∈ X⊕] · Pr[A∗ sends x ∈ X⊕].
Clearly Pr[A∗ guesses y ∧ B outputs σ | A∗ sends x ∈ Xσ̄] = 0 since B always outputs σ̄
when A∗ sends x ∈ Xσ̄. Also,





where the first equality is because party B always outputs σ when A∗ sends x ∈ Xσ,
and the second equality is because A learns no information about B’s input (which was
chosen uniformly from {y0, y1}). Finally,




because B’s input is chosen uniformly from {y0, y1}. Combining the above proves the
claim.
The above claim, along with the assumed security of Π (with complete fairness),
implies that for every inverse polynomial µ = 1/poly we have
















for sufficiently-large κ and all 1 ≤ i ≤ r(κ).
We now prove a claim that states, informally, that if both parties can compute the
correct output with high probability after running i rounds of Π, then they can also com-
pute the correct output with high probability even when B does not send its ith-round
message.
Claim 3.3.2 Fix a function µ and a value of κ for which Equations (3.20)–(3.23) hold for
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1 ≤ i ≤ r(κ), and let µ = µ(κ). For any 1 ≤ i ≤ r(κ), if the following inequalities hold:
∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai+1 = 1]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ (3.24)∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x0 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai+1 = 1]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ (3.25)∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x0 ∧ bi = 0 ∧ ai+1 = 0]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ (3.26)∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 0 ∧ ai+1 = 0]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ (3.27)
when x is chosen uniformly from {x0, x1} and y is chosen uniformly from {y0, y1}, then:
∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai = 1]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4µ (3.28)∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x0 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai = 1]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4µ (3.29)∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x0 ∧ bi = 0 ∧ ai = 0]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4µ (3.30)∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 0 ∧ ai = 0]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4µ (3.31)
when x and y are chosen in the same way.
The first four equations represent the probability with which both parties receive
correct output after executing the first i rounds of Π (i.e., after B sends its message in
round i), for all possible choices of their inputs. The last four equations consider the
same event, but when B does not send its message in round i. The claim asserts that the
fact that B does not send its message in round i has a limited effect on the probability
with which the parties obtain correct outputs.
Proof: We first prove Equation (3.28). That Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai = 1] ≤
1
4 + 4µ is immediate, since Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x1] =
1
4 . We must therefore prove the
corresponding lower bound. Combining Equations (3.20), (3.26), and (3.27), and using
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our earlier calculation for the success probability for Bi0, we obtain
1
2
+ µ ≥ Pr[Bi0 guesses x ∧A outputs 0]
= Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x0 ∧ bi = 0 ∧ ai+1 = 0] + Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai = 0]
+ Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 0 ∧ ai+1 = 0] + Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x0 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai = 0]
≥ 1
4




− µ+ Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x0 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai = 0]






Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai = 0] ≤ 3µ . (3.32)
We also have
Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai = 0] + Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai = 1]
= Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 1]




using Equation (3.24) for the final inequality. Combined with (3.32), we conclude that






Using a symmetric argument, we can similarly prove Equation (3.29). Using an
exactly analogous argument, but with adversary Bi1 in place of Bi0, we can prove Equa-
tions (3.30) and (3.31).
The proof of the following claim exactly parallels the proof of the preceding claim,
but using adversaries Ai0 and Ai1 instead of adversaries Bi0 and Bi1.
Claim 3.3.3 Fix a function µ and a value of κ for which Equations (3.20)–(3.23) hold for 1 ≤
i ≤ r(κ), and let µ = µ(κ). For any 1 ≤ i ≤ r(κ), if the following inequalities hold:
∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai = 1]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x0 ∧ bi = 1 ∧ ai = 1]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x0 ∧ bi = 0 ∧ ai = 0]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi = 0 ∧ ai = 0]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ
when x is chosen uniformly from {x0, x1} and y is chosen uniformly from {y0, y1}, then:
∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi−1 = 1 ∧ ai = 1]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4µ∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x0 ∧ bi−1 = 1 ∧ ai = 1]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4µ∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x0 ∧ bi−1 = 0 ∧ ai = 0]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4µ∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x1 ∧ bi−1 = 0 ∧ ai = 0]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4µ
when x and y are chosen in the same way.
We now prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3.4 Let f be a two-party function containing an embedded XOR. Then any protocol
securely computing f with complete fairness (assuming one exists) requires ω(log κ) rounds.
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Proof: Let Π be a protocol computing f with complete fairness using r = r(κ) rounds.
Set µ = 1/poly(κ) for some polynomial to be fixed later. By correctness of Π, we have that
for κ sufficiently large
∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x1 ∧ br = 1 ∧ ar+1 = 1]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ(κ)∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x0 ∧ br = 1 ∧ ar+1 = 1]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ(κ)∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x0 ∧ br = 0 ∧ ar+1 = 0]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ(κ)∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x1 ∧ br = 0 ∧ ar+1 = 0]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ(κ)
when x and y are chosen uniformly from {x0, x1} and {y0, y1}, respectively. Taking κ
large enough so that Equations (3.20)–(3.23) also hold for 1 ≤ i ≤ r(κ), we see that
Claim 3.3.2 may be applied with i = r. Since the conclusion of Claim 3.3.2 is the as-
sumption of Claim 3.3.3 and vice versa, the claims can be repeatedly applied r times,
yielding:
∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x1 ∧ b0 = 1 ∧ a1 = 1]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 42r(κ) · µ(κ)∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x0 ∧ b0 = 1 ∧ a1 = 1]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 42r(κ) · µ(κ)∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y0 ∧ x = x0 ∧ b0 = 0 ∧ a1 = 0]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 42r(κ) · µ(κ)∣∣∣∣Pr[y = y1 ∧ x = x1 ∧ b0 = 0 ∧ a1 = 0]− 14
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 42r(κ) · µ(κ) .
If r = O(log κ), then p(n) def= 42r(κ) is polynomial. Taking µ(κ) = 1/16p(κ) implies that,
for κ sufficiently large,A andB can both correctly compute (with probability at least 3/4)
the value f(x, y), for all x ∈ {x0, x1} and y ∈ {y0, y1}, without any interaction at all. This is
impossible, and so we conclude that r = ω(log κ).
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Chapter 4
Complete Fairness in Secure Multi-Party Computation
4.1 Fair Computation of Majority for Three Players
In this section we describe a completely-fair protocol for computing the majority
function, maj, over boolean inputs, for the case of n = 3 parties. The high-level struc-
ture of our protocol follows the protocols of the prior chapters. However, we need to
make some natural changes to the protocols to extend them to the multi-party setting.
In particular, ShareGen has to be modified to output secret shares of 3 sequences of bits.
Notationally, then, instead of values ai and bi representing outputs in round i, we de-




3 . Note, though, b
(i)
j does not represent the output of Pj if
the other players abort. Rather, it will denote the outputs of both players Pj−1 and Pj+1
(where addition is done mod 3) in case player Pj aborts in round i. The reason for this
notational switch relates to the need for two honest players to agree on a single output
when the third player aborts; this concern was not an issue in the two-party case. As
before, the output of ShareGen is sequences of secret shares of these b(i)j values, but now
the secret shares are random three-way shares; any b(i)j can only be reconstructed given




j|3. The values b
(i)
j are computed probabilistically,
in the same manner as they were in Section 3.2 (cf. Figure 3.3). That is, a round i∗ is first
chosen according to a geometric distribution with parameter α = 1/5. (As before, we
will set the round complexity m such that i∗ ≤ m with all but negligible probability.)
Then, for i < i∗ the value of b(i)j is computed using the true inputs of Pj−1 and Pj+1 but
a random input for Pj ; for i ≥ i∗ the value b(i)j is set equal to the correct output (i.e., it is
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ShareGen
Inputs: Let the inputs to ShareGen be x1, x2, x3 ∈ {0, 1}. (If one of the received inputs is
not in the correct domain, then a default value of 1 is used for that player.)
Computation:








3 , . . . , b
(m)
3 in the following way:
• Choose i∗ ≥ 1 according to a geometric distribution with parameter α = 1/5
(see text).
• For i = 0 to i∗ − 1 and j ∈ {1, 2, 3} do:
– Choose x̂j ← {0, 1} at random.
– Set b(i)j = maj(xj−1, x̂j , xj+1).
• For i = i∗ to m and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, set b(i)j = maj(x1, x2, x3).




j|3 as random three-way


































. Additionally, for each j ∈ {1, 2, 3} par-
ties Pj−1 and Pj+1 receive the value b
(0)
j|j .
Figure 4.1: Functionality ShareGen.
computed using the true inputs of all parties). Note that even an adversary who knows
all the parties’ inputs and learns, sequentially, the values (say) b(1)1 , b
(2)
1 , . . . cannot deter-
mine definitively when round i∗ occurs. We choose the protocol π computing ShareGen
to be secure-with-designated-abort for P1, according to Definition 2.6.1
The second phase of the protocol proceeds in a sequence ofm = ω(log n) iterations.
(See Figure 4.2.) In each iteration i, each party Pj broadcasts its share of b
(i)
j . (We stress
that we allow rushing, and do not assume synchronous broadcast.) Observe that, after
this is done, parties Pj−1 and Pj+1 jointly have enough information to reconstruct b
(i)
j ,
but neither party has any information about b(i)j on its own. If all parties behave honestly
until the end of the protocol, then in the final iteration all parties reconstruct b(m)1 and
output this value. If a single party Pj aborts in some iteration i, then the remaining
117
players Pj−1 and Pj+1 jointly reconstruct the value b
(i−1)
j and output this value. (Recall
that these two parties jointly have enough information to do this.) If two parties abort
in some iteration i (whether at the same time, or one after the other) then the remaining
party simply outputs its own input.
One other technical difference in this protocol as compared to the general protocol
given in Section 2.8 is that we have to switch from using information theoretic MACs to
digital signatures. This is because we now have to worry about collusion. Suppose, for
example, that Pj+1 holds a key that allows him to verify the value b
(i)
j sent by Pj . If they
are both corrupt, Pj+1 can simply give this key to Pj and allow him to forge MACs on
incorrect values. Instead, we use digital signatures, which separate the ability to verify
from the ability to sign (see Figure 4.1).
We refer to Figures 4.1 and 4.2 for the formal specification of the protocol. We now
prove that this protocol securely computes maj with complete fairness.
Theorem 4.1.1 Assume that (Gen,Sign,Vrfy) is a secure signature scheme, that π securely com-
putes ShareGen with designated abort, and that πOR securely computes OR with complete fair-
ness.1 Then the protocol in Figure 4.2 securely computes maj with complete fairness.
Proof: Let Πmaj denote the protocol of Figure 4.2. Observe that Πmaj yields the correct
output with all but negligible probability when all players are honest. This is because,
with all but negligible probability, i∗ ≤ m, and then b(m)j = maj(x1, x2, x3). We thus focus
on security of Πmaj.
We note that when no parties are corrupt, the proof of security is straightforward,
since we assume the existence of a private broadcast channel. We therefore consider
separately the cases when a single party is corrupted and when two parties are corrupted.
1It is shown in Chapter 3 that such a protocol exists under standard assumptions.
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Πmaj
Inputs: Party Pi has input xi ∈ {0, 1}.
The protocol:
1. Preliminary phase:
(a) Parties P1, P2 and P3 run a protocol π for computing ShareGen. Each player
uses their respective inputs, x1, x2 and x3, and security parameter κ.
(b) If P2 and P3 receive ⊥ from this execution, then P2 and P3 run a two-party
protocol πOR to compute the logical-or of their inputs.
Otherwise, continue to the next stage.
In what follows, parties always verify signatures; invalid signatures are treated as
an abort.
2. For i = 1, . . . ,m− 1 do:
Broadcast shares:





(b) If (only) Pj aborts:









ii. If one of Pj−1, Pj+1 aborts in the previous step, the remaining player









j|3 . (Recall that if i = 1, parties Pj−1 and
Pj+1 received b
(0)
j|j as output from π.)
(c) If two parties abort, the remaining player outputs its own input value.
3. In round i = m do:











1|3 . If (only)
Pj aborts, then Pj−1 and Pj+1 proceed as in step 2b. If two players abort, the
remaining player outputs its own input value as in step 2c.
Figure 4.2: A protocol for computing majority.
Since the entire protocol is symmetric except for the fact that P1 may choose to abort π,
without loss of generality we may analyze the case when the adversary corrupts P1 and
the case when the adversary corrupts {P1, P2}. In each case, we prove security of Πmaj
in a hybrid world where there is an ideal functionality computing ShareGen (with abort)
as well as an ideal functionality computing OR (with complete fairness). Applying the
composition theorem of [15] then gives the desired result.
Claim 4.1.2 For every non-uniform, poly-time adversary A corrupting P1 and running Πmaj
in a hybrid model with access to ideal functionalities computing ShareGen (with abort) and OR
119
(with complete fairness), there exists a non-uniform, poly-time adversary S corrupting P1 and
running in the ideal world with access to an ideal functionality computing maj (with complete
fairness), such that
{









Fix some polynomial-time adversary A corrupting P1. We now describe a simula-
tor S that also corrupts P1 and runs A as a black box.
1. S invokes A on the input x1, the auxiliary input z, and the security parameter κ.
2. S receives input x′1 ∈ {0, 1} on behalf of P1 as input to ShareGen.














(along with their appropriate signatures) chosen uni-
formly at random.
4. If A aborts execution of ShareGen, then S sends 1 to the trusted party computing
maj, outputs whateverA outputs, and halts. Otherwise, S picks a value i∗ according
to a geometric distribution with parameter α = 15 .
For simplicity in what follows, we ignore the presence of signatures and leave the
following implicit from now on: (1) S always computes an appropriate signature
when sending any value to A; (2) S treats an incorrect signature as an abort; and
(3) if S ever receives a valid signature on a previously unsigned message, then S
outputs fail and halts.
5. S now simulates the rounds of the protocol one-by-one: for i = 1 to m − 1, the
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simulator chooses random b(i)2|2 and b
(i)
3|3 and sends these to A. During this step, an
abort by A (on behalf of P1) is treated as follows:
(a) If P1 aborts in round i ≤ i∗, then S chooses a random value x̂1 and sends it to
the trusted party computing maj.
(b) If P1 aborts in round i > i∗, then S submits x′1 to the trusted party comput-
ing maj.
In either case, S then outputs whatever A outputs and halts.
6. If P1 has not yet aborted, S then simulates the final round of the protocol. S sends
x′1 to the trusted party, receives bout = maj(x
′









1|1 = bout. S then gives these values to A, outputs
whatever A outputs, and halts.
Due to the security of the underlying signature scheme, the probability that S out-
puts fail is negligible in κ. Note that the view of P1 is otherwise statistically close in both
worlds. Indeed, until round m the view of P1 is independent of the inputs of the other
parties in both the real and ideal worlds. In round m itself, P1 learns the (correct) output
bout in the ideal world and learns this value with all but negligible probability in the real
world.
We therefore only have to argue that outputs of the two honest parties in the real
and ideal worlds are statistically close. Clearly this is true if P1 never aborts. As for the
case when P1 aborts at some point during the protocol, we divide our analysis into the
following cases:
• If P1 aborts the execution of ShareGen in step 4, then S submits ‘1’ on behalf of P1
to the trusted party computing maj. Thus, in the ideal world, the outputs of P2 and
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P3 will be maj(1, x2, x3). In the real world, if P1 aborts computation of ShareGen, the
honest parties output OR(x2, x3). Since maj(1, x2, x3) = OR(x2, x3), their outputs
are the same.
• If P1 aborts in round i of the protocol (cf. step 5), then in both the real and ideal
worlds the following holds:
– If i ≤ i∗, then P2 and P3 output maj(x̂1, x2, x3) where x̂1 is chosen uniformly at
random.
– If i > i∗, then P2 and P3 output maj(x′1, x2, x3)
Since i∗ is identically distributed in both worlds, the outputs of P2 and P3 in this
case are identically distributed as well.
• If P1 aborts in round m (cf. step 6), then in the ideal world the honest parties will
output maj(x′1, x2, x3). In the real world the honest parties output maj(x
′
1, x2, x3) as
long as i∗ ≤ m− 1, which occurs with all but negligible probability.
This completes the proof.
Claim 4.1.3 For every non-uniform, poly-time adversary A corrupting P1 and P2 and running
Πmaj in a hybrid model with access to ideal functionalities computing ShareGen (with abort) and
OR (with completes fairness), there exists a non-uniform, poly-time adversary S corrupting P1
and P2 and running in the ideal world with access to an ideal functionality computing maj (with
complete fairness), such that
{










Proof: This case is significantly more complex than the case when only a single party is
corrupted, since here A learns b(i)3 in each iteration i of the second phase. As in Section
3.2.1, we must deal with the fact that A might abort exactly in iteration i∗, after learning
the correct output but before P3 has enough information to compute the correct output.
We now describe a simulator S who corrupts P1 and P2 and runs A as a black-box.
For ease of exposition in what follows, we sometimes refer to the actions of P1 and P2
when more formally we mean the action of A on behalf of those parties.
1. S invokes A on the inputs x1 and x2, the auxiliary input z, and the security param-
eter κ.
2. S receives x′1 and x′2 from P1 and P2, respectively, as input to ShareGen. If x′1 /∈ {0, 1}
(resp., x′2 /∈ {0, 1}), then S sets x′1 = 1 (resp., x′2 = 1).














































with their appropriate signatures), and the value b(0)3|3 as the outputs of P1 and P2
from ShareGen.
4. If P1 aborts execution of ShareGen, then S extracts x′′2 from P2 as its input to OR. It
then sends (1, x′′2) to the trusted party computing maj, outputs whateverA outputs,
and halts.
5. Otherwise, if P1 does not abort, then S picks a value i∗ according to a geometric
distribution with parameter α = 15 .
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In what follows, for ease of description, we will use x1 and x2 in place of x′1 and x
′
2,
keeping in mind that that A could of course have used substituted inputs. We also
ignore the presence of signatures from now on, and leave the following implicit in
what follows: (1) S always computes an appropriate signature when sending any
value to A; (2) S treats an incorrect signature as an abort; and (3) if S ever receives
a valid signature on a previously unsigned message (i.e., a forgery), then S outputs
fail and halts.
Also, from here on we will say that S sends b to A in round i if S sends a value b(i)3|3







6. For round i = 1, . . . , i∗−1, the simulator S computes and then sends b(i)3 as follows:
(a) Select x̂3 ← {0, 1} at random.
(b) b(i)3 = maj(x1, x2, x̂3).
7. If P1 aborts in round i < i∗, then S sets x̂2 = x2 and assigns a value to x̂1 according
to the following rules that depend on the values of (x1, x2) and on the value of b
(i)
3 :
(a) If x1 = x2, then S sets x̂1 = x1 with probability 38 (and sets x̂1 = x̄1 otherwise).
(b) If x1 6= x2 and b(i)3 = x1, then S sets x̂1 = x1 with probability 14 (and sets
x̂1 = x̄1 otherwise).
(c) If x1 6= x2 and b(i)3 = x2, then S sets x̂1 = x1 with probability 12 (and sets
x̂1 = x̄1 otherwise).
S then finishes the simulation as follows:
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(a) If x̂1 6= x̂2, then S submits (x̂1, x̂2) to the trusted party computing maj. Denote
the output it receives from the trusted party by bout. Then S sets b(i−1)1 = bout,






1|2 , sends b
(i−1)
1|3 to P2 (on behalf of P3),
outputs whatever A outputs, and halts.









and sends b(i−1)1|3 to P2 (on behalf of P3). (We stress that this is done before
sending anything to the trusted party computing maj.) If P2 aborts, then S
sends (0, 1) to the trusted party computing maj. Otherwise, it sends (x̂1, x̂2) to
the trusted party computing maj. In both cases it outputs whateverA outputs,
and then halts.
If P2 aborts in round i < i∗, then S acts analogously but swapping the roles of P1
and P2 as well as x1 and x2.
If both parties abort simultaneously in round i < i∗, then S sends (0, 1) to the
trusted party computing maj, outputs whatever A outputs, and halts.
8. In round i∗:
(a) If x1 6= x2, then S submits (x1, x2) to the trusted party. Let bout = maj(x1, x2, x3)
denote the output.
(b) If x1 = x2, then S simply sets bout = x1 = x2 without querying the trusted party
and continues. (Note that in this case, bout = maj(x1, x2, x3) even though S did
not query the trusted party.)
9. In rounds i∗, . . . ,m− 1, the simulator S sends bout to A.
If A aborts P1 and P2 simultaneously, then S submits (1, 0) to the trusted party (if
he hasn’t already done so in step 8a), outputs whatever A outputs, and halts.
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1|2 , and sends b
(i−1)
1|3 to P2 (on behalf of P3). Then:
Case 1: x1 6= x2. Here S has already sent (x1, x2) to the trusted party. So S simply
outputs whatever A outputs and ends the simulation.
Case 2: x1 = x2. If P2 does not abort, then S sends (x1, x2) to the trusted party. If
P2 aborts, then S sends (0, 1) to the trusted party. In both cases S then outputs
whatever A outputs and halts.
If A aborts P2 (only), then S acts as above but swapping the roles of P1, P2 and
x1, x2. If A does not abort anyone through round m, then S sends (x1, x2) to the
trusted party (if he hasn’t already done so), outputs what A outputs, and halts.
We first note that the probability S outputs fail is negligible, due to the security of
the underling signature scheme. We state the following claim:
Claim 4.1.4 If P1 and P2 both abort, then S always sends (0, 1) or (1, 0) to the trusted party.
We leave verification to the reader. We must prove that for any set of inputs, the joint
distribution over the possible views of A and the output of P3 is equal in the ideal and
hybrid worlds:
(VIEWhyb(x1, x2, x3), OUThyb(x1, x2, x3)) ≡ (VIEWideal(x1, x2, x3), OUTideal(x1, x2, x3)) (4.1)
We begin by noting that this is trivially true when no players ever abort. It is also easy
to verify that this is true when P1 aborts during the execution of ShareGen. From here
forward, we therefore assume that A aborts player P1 at some point after the execution
of ShareGen. We consider what happens when A aborts P2 as well, but for simplicity
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we will only analyze the cases where P1 is aborted first, and when they are aborted at
the same time. The analysis when A aborts only P2, or when he aborts P1 after P2 is
symmetric and is not dealt with here. We will break up the view of A into two parts: the
view before P1 aborts, where a particular instance of this view is denoted by ~ai, and the
single message intended for P2 that A receives after P1 aborts, denoted by b(i−1)1 . Letting
i denote the round in which P1 aborts, and bout the value output by P3, we wish to prove:
Pr
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(we drop explicit mention of the inputs to improve readability). Towards proving this,
we first prove the following two claims.



















Proof: We denote by P⊥2 the event that P2 aborts the protocol (either at the same time
as P1, or after P1 aborts, during the exchange of the shares of b
(i−1)
1 ). We also denote the
event
(






by Ehyb, and the event
(







by Eideal in order to shorten notation. We have the following:
Pr
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and the same is true in the ideal world. It follows from the descriptions of the protocol











































The above two equalities hold because the protocol is designed such that any view ~ai
occurs with the same probability in both worlds. Furthermore, given that i > i∗, it holds
that b(i−1)1 = f(x1, x2, x3), independent of ~ai. P2 decides whether to abort based only on




OUThyb = bout | P⊥2
∧








OUTideal = bout | P⊥2
∧











OUThyb = bout | ¬P⊥2
∧








OUTideal = bout | ¬P⊥2
∧







Both equations follow easily again from the protocol and simulator descriptions. To see
Equation 4.2, note that in the hybrid world when both P1 and P2 abort, P3 always outputs
his own input, bout = x3. In the ideal world, recall from claim 4.1.4 that anytime P1 and
P2 both abort, and in particular in round i > i∗, S submits either (0, 1) or (1, 0) to the
trusted party, resulting in bout = x3. For Equation 4.3, note that in the hybrid world when
P1 aborts in round i > i∗, and P2 does not, P3 outputs bout = f(x1, x2, x3). In the ideal
world, this is also true, as S submits (x1, x2) to the trusted party (either in step 8a or in
step 9).
We proceed now to the more difficult claim, in the case when i ≤ i∗:



















Proof: We denote by P⊥2 , as before, the event that P2 aborts the protocol. We now replace
the event
(






by Ehyb, and the event
(







by Eideal to shorten notation. We again have that
Pr
[














































and again, the same probabilistic argument holds in the ideal world. Rewriting the above,
therefore, we equivalently must prove that
Pr
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· Pr [Eideal] .



















Furthermore, by the definition of the protocol, if P2 aborts, P3 outputs bout = x3 (just as
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When P2 does not abort, in both worlds bout = b
(i−1)
1 . So as long as we can prove that
Pr [Ehyb] = Pr [Eideal] (4.4)
it will then follow that
Pr
[










which will complete the proof of our claim. Before proceeding, we make one final sim-
plification of Equation 4.4. Recall that any view ~ai ofA (after the completion of ShareGen)









denote the values received by A in the first i − 1 rounds of the protocol in the hybrid
(resp. ideal) world, and VIEWihyb (resp. VIEW
i
ideal) denote the round i message, along with






















































Furthermore, conditioned i ≤ i∗, we know that VIEWihyb (resp., VIEWiideal) is independent
of VIEWi−1hyb (resp., VIEW
i−1
ideal). Therefore, to prove Equation 4.4, and thus Theorem 4.1.1, it
















1 ) | i ≤ i
∗
]
We proceed now to do this by looking at every possible set of inputs (x1, x2, x3).















i−1)hyb = (x1, x1)
]
= 1.
In both worlds, b(i)3 is always x1. When P1 aborts in the ideal world, in accordance
with step 7a, S chooses x̂1 = x1 = x2 with probability 38 and sends b
(i−1)
1 = x1 to
A. If S chooses x̂1 6= x1, then it submits (x̂1, x2) for x̂1 6= x2 to the trusted party, and
bout = x3 = x1, so again b
(i−1)
1 = x1. The analysis is even simpler in the hybrid world, as
both values are always x1.
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i−1)ideal = (x1, x1)
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(1− α) + α = 3
5
.
The key observation with this last set of inputs is that when x2 = x3, and i < i∗, regardless
of what value S chooses for x̂1, b(i−1)1 = x2 = x3, just as in the hybrid world.
4.2 A Lower Bound on the Round Complexity of Majority
In this section we prove that any fair protocol for three-party majority must have
a round complexity of ω(log κ). In addition to providing evidence that the protocol of
Section 4.1 is optimal, this result also suggests that achieving fairness in the multi-party
setting is qualitatively harder than achieving it in the two-party setting. More formally,
consider a function
f : {0, 1} × · · · × {0, 1} → {0, 1} taking n boolean inputs. For any subset ∅ ⊂ I ⊂ [n],
we can define the partition fI of f to be the two-input function fI : {0, 1}|I| × {0, 1}n−|I|
defined as
fI(y, z) = f(x),
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where x ∈ {0, 1}n is such that xI = y and xĪ = z. It is not hard to see that if there exists
an I for which fI cannot be computed with complete fairness in the two-party setting,
then f cannot be computed with complete fairness in the multi-party setting. Similarly,
the round complexity for computing f with complete fairness in the multi-party case
must be at least the round complexity of fairly computing each fI . But what about the
converse? Note that any partition of the majority function (maj) is just (isomorphic to)
the greater-than-or-equal-to function, where the domain of one input can be viewed as
{0, 1, 2} and the domain of the other input can be viewed as {0, 1} (in each case, rep-
resenting the number of ‘1’ inputs held). We have already demonstrated in Chapter 3
that under suitable cryptographic assumptions, the greater-than-or-equal-to function on
constant-size domains can be securely computed with complete fairness in O(1) rounds.
Since the majority function cannot be computed in constant rounds, it seems our pro-
tocol from Section 3.1 can not be easily extended to the multi-party setting through a
“partition-based” approach.
4.2.1 Proof Overview
We prove our lower bound by arguing that if Πmaj is some protocol for securely
computing maj, then eliminating the last round of Πmaj results in a protocol Π′maj that
still computes maj correctly “with high probability”. Specifically, if the error probability
in Πmaj is at most µ (that we will eventually set to some negligible function of κ), then
the error probability in Π′maj is at most c · µ for some constant c. If the original protocol
Πmaj has m = O(log κ) rounds, then applying this argument inductively m times gives
a protocol that computes maj correctly on all inputs with probability significantly better
than guessing without any interaction at all. This gives the desired contradiction.
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To prove that eliminating the last round of Πmaj cannot affect correctness “too
much”, we consider a constraint that holds for the ideal-world evaluation of maj. (Re-
call, we are working in the ideal world where complete fairness holds.) Consider an
adversary who corrupts two parties, and let the input of the honest party P be chosen
uniformly at random. The adversary can learn P ’s input by submitting (0, 1) or (1, 0) to
the trusted party. The adversary can also try to bias the output of maj to be the opposite
of P ’s choice by submitting (0, 0) or (1, 1); this will succeed in biasing the result half the
time. But the adversary cannot both learn P ’s input and simultaneously bias the result. (If
the adversary submits (0, 1) or (1, 0), the output of maj is always equal to P ’s input; if the
adversary submits (0, 0) or (1, 1) then the output of maj reveals nothing about P ’s input.)
Concretely, for any ideal-world adversary the sum of the probability that the adversary
guesses P ’s input and the probability that the output of maj is not equal to P ’s input is
at most 1. In our proof, we show that if correctness holds with significantly lower proba-
bility when the last round of Πmaj is eliminated, then there exists a real-world adversary
violating this constraint.
4.2.2 Proof Details
We number the parties P1, P2, P3, and work modulo 3 in the subscript. The input of
Pj is denoted by xj . The following claim formalizes the ideal-world constraint described
informally above.
Claim 4.2.1 For all j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and any adversary A corrupting Pj−1 and Pj+1 in an ideal-
world computation of maj, we have
Pr [A correctly guesses xj ] + Pr [OUTj 6= xj ] ≤ 1,
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where the probabilities are taken over the random coins of A and random choice of xj ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof: Consider an execution in the ideal world, where Pj ’s input xj is chosen uniformly
at random. Let EQUAL be the event that A submits two equal inputs (i.e., xj−1 = xj+1)
to the trusted party. In this case, A learns nothing about Pj ’s input and so can guess xj
with probability at most 1/2. It follows that:
Pr [A correctly guesses xj ] ≤
1
2
Pr [EQUAL] + Pr [EQUAL] .
Moreover, Pr [OUTj 6= xj ] = 12 Pr [EQUAL] since OUTj 6= xj occurs only if A submits
xj−1 = xj+1 = x̄j to the trusted party. Therefore:
Pr [A correctly guesses xj ] + Pr [OUTj 6= xj ]
≤ 1
2




= Pr [EQUAL] + Pr [EQUAL] = 1,
proving the claim.
Let Πmaj be a protocol that securely computes maj using m = m(κ) rounds. Con-
sider an execution of Πmaj in which all parties run the protocol honestly except for possi-
bly aborting in some round. We denote by b(i)j the value that Pj−1 and Pj+1 both
2 output
if Pj aborts the protocol after sending its round-i message (and then Pj−1 and Pj+1 hon-
estly run the protocol to completion). Similarly, we denote by b(i)j−1 (resp., b
(i)
j+1) the value
output by Pj and Pj+1 (resp., Pj and Pj−1) when Pj−1 (resp., Pj+1) aborts after sending
its round-i message. Note that an adversary who corrupts, e.g., both Pj−1 and Pj+1 can
2Security of Πmaj implies that the outputs of Pj−1 and Pj+1 in this case must be equal with all but neg-
ligible probability. For simplicity we assume this to hold with probability 1 but our proof can be modified
easily to remove this assumption.
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compute b(i)j immediately after receiving the round-i message of Pj .
Since Πmaj securely computes maj with complete fairness, the ideal-world con-
straint from the previous claim implies that for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, any inverse polynomial
µ(κ), and any poly-time adversary A controlling players Pj−1 and Pj+1, we have:
Pr
xj←{0,1}
[A correctly guesses xj ] + Pr
xj←{0,1}
[OUTj 6= xj ] ≤ 1 + µ(κ) (4.5)
for κ sufficiently large. Security of Πmaj also guarantees that if the inputs of the honest
parties agree, then with all but negligible probability their output must be their common
input regardless of when a malicious Pj aborts. That is, for κ large enough we have




j = xj+1 = xj−1
]
≥ 1− µ(κ) (4.6)
for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and all i ∈ {0, . . . ,m(κ)}.
The following claim represents the key step in our lower bound.
Claim 4.2.2 Fix a protocol Πmaj, a function µ, and a value κ such that Equations (4.5) and (4.6)
hold, and let µ = µ(κ). Say there exists an i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ m(κ), such that for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}





j = maj(c1, c2, c3) | (x1, x2, x3) = (c1, c2, c3)
]
≥ 1− µ. (4.7)





j = maj(c1, c2, c3) | (x1, x2, x3) = (c1, c2, c3)
]
≥ 1− 5µ. (4.8)
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Proof: When j = 1 and c2 = c3, the desired result follows from Equation (4.6); this is
similarly true for j = 2, c1 = c3 as well as j = 3, c1 = c2.
Consider the real-world adversary A that corrupts P1 and P3 and sets x1 = 0 and
x3 = 1. Then:
• A runs the protocol honestly until it receives the round-i message from P2.
• A then locally computes the value of b(i)2 .
– If b(i)2 = 0, then A aborts P1 without sending its round-i message and runs the
protocol (honestly) on behalf of P3 until the end. By definition, the output of
P2 will be b
(i−1)
1 .
– If b(i)2 = 1, then A aborts P3 without sending its round-i message and runs the
protocol (honestly) on behalf of P1 until the end. By definition, the output of
P2 will be b
(i−1)
3 .
• After completion of the protocol, A outputs b(i)2 as its guess for the input of P2.
Consider an experiment in which the input x2 of P2 is chosen uniformly at random,
and then A runs protocol Πmaj with P2. Using Equation (4.7), we have:










2 = f(0, x2, 1)
]
≥ 1− µ . (4.9)
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We also have:
Pr [OUT2 6= x2] =
1
2













1 = 1 ∧ b
(i)






3 = 1 ∧ b
(i)






3 = 0 ∧ b
(i)






1 = 0 ∧ b
(i)
2 = 0 | (x1, x2, x3) = (0, 1, 1)
])
.
From Equation (4.5), we know that the sum of Equations (4.9) and (4.10) is upper-bounded
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where the last inequality is due to the assumption of the claim. Combined with Equa-





1 = 0 | (x1, x2, x3) = (0, 0, 1)
]
≥ 1− 5µ.






3 = 1 | (x1, x2, x3) = (0, 1, 1)
]
≥ 1− 5µ.
Repeating the entire argument, but modifying the adversary to consider all possible pairs
of corrupted parties and all possible settings of their inputs, completes the proof of the
claim.
Theorem 4.2.3 Any protocol Πmaj that securely computes maj with complete fairness requires
ω(log κ) rounds.
Proof: Assume there exists a protocol Πmaj that securely computes maj with complete
fairness using m = O(log κ) rounds. Let µ(κ) = 1
4·5m(κ) , and note that µ is noticeable.
By the assumed security of Πmaj, the conditions of Claim 4.2.2 hold for κ large enough;
Equation (4.7), in particular, holds for i = m(κ). Fixing this κ and applying the claim
iteratively m(κ) times, we conclude that Pj−1 and Pj+1 can correctly compute the value
of the function, on all inputs, with probability at least 3/4 without interacting with Pj at all.
This is clearly impossible.
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4.3 Fair Computation of OR for n Players
In this section, we demonstrate the completely-fair computation of a non-trivial
function for an arbitrary number of parties n, any t < n of whom are corrupted. Specif-
ically, we show how to compute boolean OR with complete fairness. The idea in the
protocol is to have the parties repeatedly try to compute OR on committed inputs, using a
protocol that is secure-with-designated-abort (i.e., where only the lowest-indexed party
can force an abort. See Definition 2.6.1.) The key observation is that, in case of an abort,
the dishonest players only learn something about the inputs of the honest players if all
the malicious parties use input 0. (If any of the malicious players holds input 1, then the
output is always 1 regardless of the inputs of the honest parties.) So, if the lowest-indexed
party is corrupt and aborts the computation of the committed OR, then the remaining par-
ties simply recompute the committed OR using ‘0’ as the effective input for any parties
that have already been eliminated. They repeatedly proceed in this fashion, eliminating
dishonest parties at each iteration. Eventually, when the lowest-indexed player is honest,
the process terminates and all honest players receive (correct) output.
The actual protocol follows the above intuition, but is a bit more involved. A formal
description of the protocol is given in Figure 4.3, and the “committed OR” functionality
is defined in Figure 4.4.
Theorem 4.3.1 Assume Com is a computationally-hiding, statistically-binding commitment scheme,
and that πP securely computes CommittedORP (with abort). Then the protocol of Figure 4.3 com-
putes OR with complete fairness.
Proof: Let Π denote the protocol of Figure 4.3. For simplicity we assume Com is per-
fectly binding, though statistical binding suffices. For any non-uniform, polynomial time
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ΠOR
Inputs: Each party Pi holds input xi ∈ {0, 1}, and the security parameter is k.
Computation:
1. Let P = {P1, . . . , Pn} be the set of all players.
2. Each player Pi chooses random coins ri and broadcasts ci = Com(1κ, xi, ri), where
Com denotes a computationally-hiding, statistically-binding commitment scheme.
If any party Pi does not broadcast anything (or otherwise broadcasts an invalid
value), then all honest players output 1. Otherwise, let c = (c1, . . . , cn).
3. All players Pi ∈ P run a protocol πP for computing CommittedORP , with party Pi
using (xi, ri, cP) as its input where cP
def
= (ci)i:Pi∈P .
4. If players receive ⊥ from the execution of CommittedORP , they set P = P \ {P ∗},
where P ∗ ∈ P is the lowest-indexed player in P , and return to step 3.
5. If players receive a set D ⊂ P from the execution of CommittedORP , they set P =
P \ D and return to step 3.
6. If players receive a binary output from the execution of CommittedORP , they output
this value and end the protocol.
Figure 4.3: A protocol computing OR for n players.
CommittedORP
Inputs: The functionality is run by parties in P . Let the input of player Pi ∈ P be
(xi, ri, c
i) where ci = (cij)j:Pj∈P . The security parameter is k.
For each party Pi ∈ P , determine its output as follows:
1. Say Pj disagrees with Pi if either (1) cj 6= ci or (2) Com(1κ, xj , rj) 6= cij . (Note that
disagreement is not a symmetric relation.)
2. Let Di be the set of parties who disagree with Pi.
3. If there exist any parties that disagree with each other, return Di as output to Pi.
Otherwise, return
∨
j:Pj∈P xj to all parties.
Figure 4.4: Functionality CommittedORP , parameterized by a set P
adversary A in the hybrid world, we demonstrate a non-uniform polynomial-time ad-
versary S corrupting the same parties asA and running in the ideal world with access to
an ideal functionality computing OR (with complete fairness), such that
{









Applying the composition theorem of [15] then proves the theorem.
We note that when no players are corrupt, the proof of security is easy, due to the
assumed existence of a private broadcast channel. We now describe the execution of S:
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1. Let C 6= ∅ be the corrupted players, and let H = {P1, . . . Pn} \ C denote the honest
players. Initialize I = C. Looking ahead, I denotes the set of corrupted parties who
have not yet been eliminated from the protocol.
2. S invokes A on the inputs {xi}i:Pi∈C , the auxiliary input z, and the security param-
eter k.
3. For Pi ∈ H, the simulator S gives to A a commitment ci = Com(1κ, xi, ri) to xi = 0
using randomness ri. S then records the commitment ci that is broadcast by A on
behalf of each party Pi ∈ C. If any corrupted player fails to broadcast a value ci,
then S submits 1’s to the trusted party on behalf of all corrupted parties, outputs
whatever A outputs, and halts.
4. If I = ∅, S submits (on behalf of all the corrupted parties) 0’s to the trusted party
computing OR (unless it has already done so). It then outputs whateverA outputs,
and halts. If I 6= ∅, continue to the next step.
5. S sets P = H ∪ I and obtains inputs {(ri, xi, ci)}i:Pi∈I for the computation of
CommittedORP . For each Pi ∈ P , the simulator S computes the list of players Di
that disagree with Pi (as in Figure 4.4), using as the inputs of the honest parties the
commitments defined in Step 3, and assuming that honest parties provide correct
decommitments. Observe that if Pi, Pj ∈ H then Di = Dj ⊆ I. Let DH ⊆ I be the
set of parties that disagree with the honest parties.
Let P ∗ be the lowest-indexed player in P . If no parties disagree with each other, go
to step 6. Otherwise:
(a) If P ∗ ∈ I, thenA is given {Di}i:Pi∈I . If P ∗ aborts, then S sets I = I \{P ∗} and
goes to step 4. If P ∗ does not abort, then S sets I = I \ DH and goes to step 4.
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(b) If P ∗ /∈ I, then A is given {Di}i:Pi∈I . Then S sets I = I \ DH and goes to
step 4.
6. S computes the value b =
∨
Pi∈I xi .
(a) If b = 0, and S has not yet queried the trusted party computing OR, then S
submits 0’s (on behalf of all the corrupted parties) to the trusted party and
stores the output of the trusted party as bout. S gives bout to A (either as just
received from the trusted party, or as stored in a previous execution of this
step).
(b) If b = 1, then S gives the value 1 to A without querying the trusted party.
S now continues as follows:
(a) If P ∗ ∈ I and P ∗ aborts, then S sets I = I \ {P ∗} and goes to step 4.
(b) If P ∗ /∈ I, or if P ∗ does not abort, then S submits 1’s to the trusted party if it
has not yet submitted 0’s. It outputs whatever A outputs, and halts.
We first demonstrate that the view of A in the hybrid world is computationally
indistinguishable from its view in the ideal world. In step 3, the commitments by the
simulator are all commitments to 0 values rather than to the actual inputs of the honest
players. However, it is easy to see that if A could distinguish between the two worlds
in this step, he could violate the security of the underlying commitment scheme. We
now show that, except for Step 3 of the simulation, the ideal world view generated by
the simulator and the hybrid world view are identically distributed. Recall that at the
start of Step 5 of the simulation, we let P = I ∪ H denote the set of remaining players.
We first note that when the outputs of CommittedORP(ri, xi, ci)i:Pi∈I∪H are disagreement
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lists (rather than the OR of the remaining inputs), then in Step 5, S is capable both of
correctly detecting this, and of computing the disagreement lists, independently of the
honest input values. In this step, then, the view of A will be identical to his view in
the hybrid world. If all remaining players are consistent, in which case the output of
CommittedORP is the binary OR of the remaining inputs, there are two possibilities. If
the input xi for some Pi ∈ I is 1, then the adversarial view created by S in Step 6b is
exactly as in the hybrid world; the output of CommittedORI∪H in the hybrid world is
always 1 in this case, regardless of the honest players’ inputs. When all input values xi
for Pi ∈ I are 0, then the hybrid world output of CommittedORI∪H will depend on the
inputs of the honest players, and S must query the trusted party to determine this value.
Note, however, that in this case the output of CommittedORI∪H in all subsequent calls in
the hybrid world will remain unchanged, regardless of which players are later excluded,
and thus the view generated by S in Step 6a is correct every time.
We next consider the joint distribution of the honest players’ outputs with the view




for Pi that are never eliminated, where for honest parties, these are simply their original
input values, and for malicious parties these are the values they first committed to (either
in Step 3 in the ideal world, or in Step 2 in the hybrid world). In the hybrid world, this
claim follows trivially from the protocol description. In the ideal world, there are two
possible submissions that S can make to the trusted party: S can submit all 0’s or all 1’s.
S submits 0’s to the trusted party when all (remaining) inputs xi for Pi ∈ I are 0 (in Step









for any I ′ ⊆ I. Therefore, regardless of which players from I are eliminated in the fu-
ture, the output of the honest parties is equal to the OR of the inputs of the non-eliminated
players, as claimed. The only time S submits 1’s to the trusted party is in Step 6b, after
it has verified that no more parties will abort, and that (at least) one of the remaining
inputs is a 1. Here too, then, the output of the honest players is consistent with the inputs
of the non-eliminated players. Finally, notice that the set of players still participating at
the end of the protocol depends only on the view of A. Since we have already argued
that the distributions on A’s views in the two worlds are computationally indistinguish-
able, it follows that the distribution on possible sets of non-eliminated players, I ∪H are
computationally indistinguishable as well. This completes the proof sketch.
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Chapter 5
Partial Fairness in Secure Two-Party Computation
In Chapter 1 we discussed extensively the various approaches that have been sug-
gested for achieving partial fairness. For the most part, they have come in two (similar)
flavors: those that make it easier in each round to compute the output through brute-
force, and those that have given the players increasing statistical confidence in the output
in each round. In this Chapter we introduce our own definition of partial fairness, given
below, and we explore the feasibility of achieving this definition. This work originally
appeared in Eurocrypt 2010 [45].
As discussed, the most desirable (but, in the two-party setting, typically unachiev-
able) definition of security requires computational indistinguishability between the real
world and a “true” ideal world where parties receive output simultaneously. The usual
relaxation of security-with-abort [35] leaves unchanged the requirement of computa-
tional indistinguishability, but weakens the ideal world so that fairness is no longer guar-
anteed at all. Motivated by [51], we suggest an alternate relaxation: keep the ideal world
unchanged, but relax the notion of simulation and require instead that the real and ideal
worlds be distinguishable with probability at most 1p + negl, where p is some specified
polynomial1 (see Definition 5.0.2). We refer to a protocol satisfying this definition as be-
ing “1p -secure”. Cleve [20] and Moran et al. [64] show
1
p -secure protocols for two-party
1Katz [51] proposed a related notion of “ 1
p
-security-with-abort”; that definition, however, continues to
compare the real world with the relaxed ideal world and so again guarantees no fairness at all. A similar
relaxation, formalized differently and with different motivation (and again giving no fairness), is also used
in [3]. Our definition of 1
p
-security is also similar in spirit to (but weaker than) the notion of ε-zero knowl-
edge [25] and is analogous to some definitions of password-based key exchange [37] (although there p is
fixed by the size of the password dictionary).
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coin tossing (where parties have no inputs), but we are not aware of any other results
satisfying our definition. In particular, none of the prior approaches for achieving partial
fairness yield protocols that are 1p -secure.
We propose the notion of 1p -security as a new way to approach the problem of
partial fairness, and view this as an independent contribution. We also demonstrate
protocols that achieve this definition for a broad class of functionalities. Specifically, let
fκ : Xκ × Yκ → Z1κ × Z2κ be a (randomized) functionality where player 1 (resp., player 2)
provides input x ∈ Xκ (resp., y ∈ Yκ) and receives output z1 ∈ Z1κ (resp., z2 ∈ Z2κ).
For arbitrary polynomial p, we show 1p -secure protocols for computing fκ as long as at
least one of Xκ, Yκ, Z1κ, Z2κ is polynomial size (in κ). Our protocols are always private, and
when either Xκ or Yκ is polynomial-size we also achieve the usual notion of security-
with-abort. We assume only the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations or, more
generally, oblivious transfer.
We also prove that our feasibility results are, in general, optimal. First, we demon-
strate a deterministic, boolean function fκ : Xκ×Yκ → {0, 1}, whereXκ and Yκ both have
super-polynomial size, for which no protocol computing fκ can simultaneously achieve
both security-with-abort and 1p -security (for p > 4). We also show a deterministic func-
tion fκ : Xκ × Yκ → Zκ, with each of Xκ, Yκ, Zκ super-polynomial in size, such that fκ
cannot be 1p -securely computed for p > 2.
Preliminaries: For a fixed function p, the ensembles X = {X(a, κ)}a∈Dκ, κ∈N and
Y = {Y (a, κ)}a∈Dκ, κ∈N are computationally 1p -indistinguishable, denoted X
1/p
≈ Y , if for
every non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm D there exists a negligible function µ(·)
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such that for every κ and every a ∈ Dκ
∣∣Pr[D(X(a, κ)) = 1]− Pr[D(Y (a, κ)) = 1]∣∣ ≤ 1
p(κ)
+ µ(κ).
This gives the following definition:
Definition 5.0.2 Protocol π is said to 1p -securely compute F if for every non-uniform proba-
bilistic polynomial-time adversary A in the real model, there exists a non-uniform probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary S in the ideal model such that
{












-Secure Computation of General Functionalities
We begin with an informal description of our feasibility results. Let x denote the
input of P1, let y denote the input of P2, and let f : X × Y → Z denote the function they
are trying to compute. (For simplicity, here we omit the dependence of X,Y , and Z on κ,
and focus on the case where each party receives the same output.) As in previous chap-
ters, our protocols will be composed of two stages, where in the first stage the players
execute a ShareGen protocol, and in the second stage they exchange shares of outputs in
a sequence of m = m(κ) iterations. Here, instead of choosing i∗ from a geometric distri-
bution, as we did in previous chapters, we choose i∗ uniformly from {1, . . . ,m}. When
X and Y (the domains of f ) have size polynomial in κ, the second stage follows that
of ΠEXOR from Chapter 3: we set ai = f(x, ŷ) for ŷ chosen uniformly from Y , and set
bi = f(x̂, y) for x̂ chosen uniformly (and independently) from X . Note that ai (resp., bi)
is independent of y (resp., x), as desired.
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Intuitively, this is partially fair because fairness is violated only if P1 aborts exactly
in iteration i∗. (If P1 aborts before iteration i∗ then neither party learns the “correct”
value z = f(x, y), while if he aborts after iteration i∗ then both parties learn the correct
value. An abort by P2 in iteration i∗ does not violate fairness, since by then P1 has already
learned the output.) We show that even if P1 knows the value of z (which it may, depending
on partial information P1 has about y), it cannot determine with certainty when iteration
i∗ occurs. Specifically, we prove a general result (see Lemma 5.1.1) implying (roughly)
that as long as Pr[ai = z] ≥ α for all i < i∗, then P1 cannot abort in iteration i∗ except with
probability at most 1/αm (recall that m is the number of iterations in the second phase).
Since Pr[ai = f(x, y)] = Prŷ∈Y [f(x, ŷ) = f(x, y)] ≥ Prŷ∈Y [ŷ = y] = 1/|Y | for any x, y, we
conclude that setting m = p · |Y |, so that 1/αm = 1/p, suffices to achieve 1p -security. We
thus get a protocol with polynomially many rounds as long as Y is polynomial size.
The above does not work directly when Y has super-polynomial size. To fix this,
we must ensure that for every possible z ∈ Z (the range of f ) we have that Pr[ai = z]
is noticeable. We do this by changing the distribution of ai (for i < i∗) as follows: with
probability 1 − 1/q choose ai as above, but with probability 1/q choose ai uniformly
fromZ. Now, for any x, y, we have Pr[ai = f(x, y)] ≥ 1q ·Prai∈Z [ai = f(x, y)] ≥ 1/q|Z| and
so setting m = pq|Z| ensures that P1 cannot abort in iteration i∗ except with probability
at most 1/p.
Changing the distribution of ai, however, introduces a new problem: if P2 aborts
prior to iteration i∗, the output of the honest P1 in the real world cannot necessarily
be simulated in the ideal world. We show, however, that it can be simulated to within
statistical difference O(1/q). Taking q = p (along with m = pq|Z|) thus gives a 1p -secure
protocol with polynomially many rounds.
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We begin in Section 5.1.1 by stating a lemma that forms an essential piece of our
analysis in the two sections that follow. In Section 5.1.2 we demonstrate a private and 1p -
secure protocol for functionalities defined on polynomial-size domains. A slight modifi-
cation of this protocol is also simultaneously secure-with-abort. To keep the exposition as
simple as possible, we restrict our attention there to single-output functionalities (though
the techniques extend easily to the general case). In Section 5.1.3 we show how to adapt
the protocol for functionalities defined over domains of super-polynomial size (but poly-
nomial range), and also generalize to functionalities generating different outputs for each
party.
5.1.1 A Useful Lemma
We analyze an abstract game Γ between a challenger and an (unbounded) adver-
sary A. The game is parameterized by a value α ∈ (0, 1] and an integer m ≥ 1. Fix
arbitrary distributions D1, D2 such that for every z it holds that
Pra←D1 [a = z] ≥ α · Pra←D2 [a = z]. (5.1)
The game Γ(α,m) proceeds as follows:
1. The challenger chooses i∗ uniformly from {1, . . . ,m}, and then chooses a1, . . . , am
as follows:
• For i < i∗, it chooses ai ← D1.
• For i ≥ i∗, it chooses ai ← D2.
2. The challenger and A then interact in a sequence of at most m iterations. In itera-
tion i:
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• The challenger gives ai to the adversary.
• The adversary can either abort or continue. In the former case, the game stops.
In the latter case, the game continues to the next iteration.
3. A wins if it aborts the game in iteration i∗.
Let Win(α,m) denote the maximum probability with which Awins the above game.
Lemma 5.1.1 For any D1, D2 satisfying Equation (5.1), it holds that Win(α,m) ≤ 1/αm.
Proof: FixD1, D2 satisfying (5.1). We prove the lemma by induction onm. Whenm = 1
the lemma is trivially true; for completeness, we also directly analyze the case m = 2.
Since A is unbounded we may assume it is deterministic. So without loss of generality,
we may assume the adversary’s strategy is determined by a set S in the support of D2
such that A aborts in the first iteration iff a1 ∈ S, and otherwise aborts in the second
iteration (no matter what). We have




























(1− α) · Pra←D2 [a ∈ S]
)
≤ 1− α/2,
where the first inequality is due to Equation (5.1). One can easily verify that 1 − α/2 ≤
1/2α when α > 0. We have thus proved Win(α, 2) ≤ 1/2α.
Assume Win(α,m) ≤ 1/αm, and we now bound Win(α,m + 1). As above, let S
denote a set in the support of D2 such that A aborts in the first iteration iff a1 ∈ S. If
A does not abort in the first iteration, and the game does not end, then the conditional
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ShareGenm
Inputs: Let the inputs to ShareGenm be x ∈ Xκ and y ∈ Yκ. (If one of the received inputs
is not in the correct domain, a default input is substituted.)
Computation:
1. Define values a1, . . . , am and b1, . . . , bm in the following way:
• Choose i∗ uniformly at random from {1, . . . ,m}.
• For i = 1 to i∗ − 1 do:
– Choose ŷ ← Yκ and set ai = fκ(x, ŷ).
– Choose x̂← Xκ and set bi = fκ(x̂, y).
• Compute z = fκ(x, y). For i = i∗ to m, set ai = bi = z.
2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, choose (a(1)i , a
(2)




i ) as random secret sharings of ai and
bi, respectively. (I.e., a
(1)





3. Compute ka, kb ← Gen(1κ). For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let tai = Macka(i‖a
(2)







1. Send to P1 the values a
(1)






1), . . . , (b
(1)
m , tbm), and the MAC-key ka.




1), . . . , (a
(2)
m , tam) and b
(2)
1 , . . . , b
(2)
m , and the MAC-key kb.
Figure 5.1: Functionality ShareGenm.
distribution of i∗ is uniform in {2, . . . ,m + 1} and the game Γ(α,m + 1) from this point
forward is exactly equivalent to the game Γ(α,m). In particular, conditioned on the game
Γ(α,m+ 1) not ending after the first iteration, the best strategy for A is to play whatever
is the best strategy in game Γ(α,m). We thus have






























-Security for Functionalities with Polynomial-Size Domain
In this section, we describe a protocol that works for functionalities where at least
one of the domains is polynomial-size. (We stress that the protocol works directly for ran-
domized functionalities; the standard reduction from randomized to deterministic func-
tionalities [35] would not apply here since, in general, it makes the domain too large.)
Although a small modification of the protocol works even when the parties receive dif-
ferent outputs, for simplicity we assume here that the parties compute a single-output
function. We return to the more general setting in the following section.
Theorem 5.1.2 Let F = {fκ : Xκ × Yκ → Zκ} be a (randomized) functionality where |Yκ| =
poly(κ). Assuming the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations, for any polynomial p there
is an O (p · |Yκ|)-round protocol computing F that is private and 1p -secure.
Proof: As described earlier, our protocol Π consists of two stages. Let p be a polynomial,
and set m = p(κ) · |Yκ|. We implement the first stage of Π using a sub-protocol π for
computing a randomized functionality ShareGenm (parameterized by a polynomial m)
that is defined in Figure 5.1. This functionality returns shares to each party, authenticated
using an information-theoretically secure m-time MAC (Gen,Mac,Vrfy). In the second
stage of Π the parties exchange these shares in a sequence of m iterations as described in
Figure 5.2.
We analyze our protocol in a hybrid model where there is a trusted party comput-
ing
ShareGenm according to the ideal model described in Definition 2.4.1, where a malicious
P1 can abort the trusted party before it sends output to the honest party. We prove pri-
vacy and 1p -security of Π in this hybrid model; it follows as in [15] that if we use a sub-
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Protocol 1
Inputs: Party P1 has input x and party P2 has input y. Let m = p · |Yκ|.
The protocol:
1. Preliminary phase:
(a) P1 chooses ŷ ∈ Yκ uniformly at random, and sets a0 = fκ(x, ŷ). Similarly, P2
chooses x̂ ∈ Xκ uniformly at random, and sets b0 = fκ(x̂, y).
(b) Parties P1 and P2 run a protocol π to compute ShareGenm, using their inputs
x and y.
(c) If P2 receives ⊥ from the above computation, it outputs b0 and halts. Other-
wise, the parties proceed to the next step.
(d) Denote the output of P1 from π by a
(1)






1), . . . , (b
(1)
m , tbm), and
ka.




1), . . . , (a
(2)
m , tam), b
(2)




2. For i = 1, . . . , r do:
P2 sends the next share to P1:




i ) to P1.








i ) = 0 (or if P1 received an









i (and continues running
the protocol).
P1 sends the next share to P2:




i ) to P2.








i ) = 0 (or if P2 received an









i (and continues running the
protocol).
3. If all m iterations have been run, party P1 outputs am and party P2 outputs bm.
Figure 5.2: Generic protocol for computing a functionality fκ.
protocol for computing ShareGenm that is secure-with-abort, then the real-world protocol
Π is private and 1p -secure.
We first consider the case of a malicious P1. Intuition for the following claim was
given in Section 5.1. The formal statement and proof follow.
Claim 5.1.3 Let Πhy denote an execution of Π in a hybrid model with access to an ideal func-
tionality computing ShareGenm (with abort). For every non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary
A corrupting P1 and running Πhy, there exists a non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary S cor-
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rupting P1 and running in the ideal world with access to an ideal functionality computing F
(with complete fairness), such that 1p -security holds, i.e.,
{










and privacy holds, i.e.,
{









Proof: We construct a simulator S that is given black-box access to A. For readability
in what follows, we ignore the MAC-tags and keys. That is, we do not mention the fact that
S computes MAC-tags for messages it sends to A, nor do we mention the fact that S
must verify the MAC-tags on the messages sent by A. When we say that A “aborts”, we
include in this the event that A sends an invalid message, or a message whose tag does
not pass verification. We also drop the subscript n from our notation and write X,Y in
place of Xκ, Yκ.
1. S invokesA on the input2 x′, the auxiliary input, and the security parameter n. The
simulator also chooses x̂ ∈ X uniformly at random (it will send x̂ to the trusted
party, if needed).
2. S receives the input x of A to the computation of the functionality ShareGenm. (If
x 6∈ X a default input is substituted.)





1 , . . . , b
(1)
m . Then, S gives these shares to A as its output from the computation
2We reserve x for the value input by A to the computation of ShareGenm.
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of ShareGenm.
4. If A sends abort to the trusted party computing ShareGenm, then S sends x̂ to the
trusted party computing f , outputs whateverA outputs, and halts. Otherwise (i.e.,
if A sends continue), S proceeds as below.
5. Choose i∗ uniformly from {1, . . . ,m}
6. For i = 1 to i∗ − 1:
(a) S chooses ŷ ∈ Y uniformly at random, computes ai = f(x, ŷ), and sets a(2)i =
a
(1)
i ⊕ ai. It gives a
(2)
i to A. (A fresh ŷ is chosen in every iteration.)
(b) If A aborts, then S sends x̂ to the trusted party, outputs whatever A outputs,
and halts.
7. For i = i∗ to m:
(a) If i = i∗ then S sends x to the trusted party computing f and receives z =
f(x, y).
(b) S sets a(2)i = a
(1)
i ⊕ z and gives a
(2)
i to A.
(c) If A aborts, then S then outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. If A does not
abort, then S proceeds.
8. If A never aborted (and all m iterations are done), S outputs what A outputs and
halts.
It is immediate that the view ofA in the simulation above is distributed identically
to its view in Πhy; privacy follows. We now prove 1p -security.
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Ignoring the possibility of a MAC forgery, we claim that the statistical difference
between an execution ofA, running Π in a hybrid world with access to an ideal function-
ality computing ShareGenm, and an execution of S, running in an ideal world with access
to an ideal functionality computing f , is at most 1/p. (Thus, taking into account the pos-
sibility of a MAC forgery makes the statistical difference at most 1/p + µ(κ) for some
negligible function µ.) To see this, let y denote the input of the honest P2 and consider
three cases depending on when the adversary aborts:
1. A aborts in round i < i∗. Conditioned on this event, the view ofA is identically dis-
tributed in the two worlds (and is independent of y), and the output of the honest
party is f(x̂, y) for x̂ chosen uniformly in X .
2. A aborts in round i > i∗ (or never). Conditioned on this, the view of A is again
distributed identically in the two worlds, and in both worlds the output of the
honest party is f(x, y).
3. A aborts in round i = i∗: here, although the view of A is still identical in both
worlds, the output of the honest party is not: in the hybrid world the honest party
will output f(x̂, y), for x̂ chosen uniformly inX , while in the ideal world the honest
party will output f(x, y).
However, Lemma 5.1.1 implies that this event occurs with probability at most 1/p.
To see this, let D1 denote the distribution of ai for i < i∗ (i.e., this is the distribution
defined by the output of f(x, ŷ), for ŷ chosen uniformly from Y ), and let D2 denote
the distribution of ai∗ (i.e., the distribution defined by the output of f(x, y)). For
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any z ∈ Z we have
Pra←D1 [a = z]
def
= Prŷ←Y [f(x, ŷ) = z]
≥ 1
|Y |
· Pr[f(x, y) = z] = 1
|Y |
· Pra←D2 [a = z].
Taking α = 1/|Y | and applying Lemma 5.1.1, we see that A aborts in iteration i∗
with probability at most 1/αm = |Y |/|Y |p = 1/p.
This completes the proof of the claim.
Next we consider the case of a malicious P2. A proof of the following is almost
identical to that of Claim 5.1.3; in fact, the proof is simpler and we can prove a stronger
notion of security (namely, where complete fairness holds) since P1 always “gets the
output first” in every iteration of Π. For these reasons, a proof is omitted.
Claim 5.1.4 Let Πhy denote an execution of Π in a hybrid model with access to an ideal func-
tionality computing ShareGenm (with abort). For every non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary
A corrupting P2 and running Πhy, there exists a non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary S cor-
rupting P2 and running in the ideal world with access to an ideal functionality computing F
(with complete fairness), such that 1p -security holds, i.e.,
{










and privacy holds, i.e.,
{










The results of [15], along with the fact that a secure-with-abort protocol for ShareGenm
is implied by the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations, complete the proof of
Theorem 5.1.2.
Achieving security-with-abort. As written, the protocol is not secure-with-abort. How-
ever, the protocol can be modified easily so that it is (without affecting 1p -security): simply
have ShareGenm choose i∗ uniformly from {2, . . . ,m + 1} and set bi∗−1 =⊥, where ⊥ is
some distinguished value outside the range of f . Although this allows a malicious P2 to
identify exactly when iteration i∗ occurs, this does not affect security since by that time
P1 has already received the correct output.
5.1.3 1
p
-Security for Functionalities with Polynomial-Size Range
The protocol from the previous section does not apply to functions on domains
of super-polynomial size, since the round complexity is linear in the size of the smaller
domain. Here we show how to extend the protocol to handle arbitrary domains if the
range of the function (for at least one of the parties) is polynomial size. We now also
explicitly take into account the case when parties obtain different outputs. Intuition for
the changes we introduce is given in Section 5.1.
Theorem 5.1.5 Let F = {fκ : Xκ × Yκ → Z1κ × Z2κ} be a (randomized) functionality, where
|Z1κ| = poly(κ). Assuming the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations, for any polynomial




-round protocol computing F that is private and 1p -secure.
Proof: Our protocol Π is, once again, composed of two stages. The second stage is iden-
tical to the second stage of the previous protocol (see Figure 5.2), except that the number
of iterations m is now set to m = p2 · |Z1κ|. The first stage generates shares using a sub-
routine π computing a different functionality ShareGenp,m, parameterized by both p and
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ShareGenp,m
Inputs: Let the inputs to ShareGenp,m be x ∈ Xκ and y ∈ Yκ. (If one of the received inputs
is not in the correct domain, a default input is substituted.)
Computation:
1. Define values a1, . . . , am and b1, . . . , bm in the following way:
• Choose i∗ uniformly at random from {1, . . . ,m}.
• For i = 1 to i∗ − 1 do:
– Choose x̂← Xκ and set bi = f2κ(x̂, y).
– With probability 1p , choose z ← Z
1
κ and set ai = z. With the remaining
probability 1− 1p , choose ŷ ← Y and set ai = f
1
κ(x, ŷ).
• Compute z1 = f1κ(x, y) and z2 = f2κ(x, y) (if fκ = (f1κ , f2κ) is randomized,
these values are computed using the same random tape). For i = i∗ to m, set
ai = z1 and bi = z2.
2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, choose (a(1)i , a
(2)




i ) as random secret sharings of ai and
bi, respectively. (E.g., a
(1)





3. Compute ka, kb ← Gen(1κ). For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let tai = Macka(i‖a
(2)







1. Send to P1 the values a
(1)






1), . . . , (b
(1)
m , tbm), and the MAC-key ka.
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m , and the MAC-key kb.
Figure 5.3: Functionality ShareGenp,m.
m and described in Figure 5.3.
We again analyze our protocol in a hybrid model, where there is now a trusted
party computing ShareGenp,m. (Once again, P1 can abort the computation of ShareGenp,m
in the ideal world.) We prove privacy and 1p -security of Π in this hybrid model, imply-
ing [15] that if the parties use a secure-with-abort protocol for computing ShareGenp,m,
then the real-world protocol Π is private and 1p -secure. We first consider the case of a
malicious P1.
Claim 5.1.6 Let Πhy denote an execution of Π in a hybrid model with access to an ideal function-
ality computing ShareGenp,m (with abort). For every non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary
A corrupting P1 and running Πhy, there exists a non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary S cor-
rupting P1 and running in the ideal world with access to an ideal functionality computing F
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(with complete fairness), such that 1p -security holds, i.e.,
{










and privacy holds, i.e.,
{









Proof: The simulator used to prove this claim is essentially the same as the simulator
used in the proof of Claim 5.1.3, except that in step 6(a) the distribution on ai (for i < i∗) is
changed to the one used by ShareGenp,m. The analysis is similar, too, except for bounding
the probability that A aborts in iteration i∗. To bound this probability we will again rely
on Lemma 5.1.1, but now distributionD1 (i.e., the distribution of ai for i < i∗) is different.
Let y denote the input of P2. Note that, by construction of ShareGenp,m, for any z ∈ Z1κ
we have Pra←D1 [a = z] ≥ 1p ·
1
|Z1κ|
. Regardless of f1 and y, it therefore holds for all z ∈ Z1κ
that
Pra←D1 [a = z] ≥
1
p · |Z1κ|
· Pra←D2 [a = z].











This completes the proof of the claim.
We next consider the case of a malicious P2. Note that, in contrast to Claim 5.1.4,
here we claim only 1p -security (and privacy).
Claim 5.1.7 Let Πhy denote an execution of Π in a hybrid model with access to an ideal function-
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ality computing ShareGenp,m (with abort). For every non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary
A corrupting P2 and running Πhy, there exists a non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary S cor-
rupting P2 and running in the ideal world with access to an ideal functionality computing F
(with complete fairness), such that 1p -security holds, i.e.,
{










and privacy holds, i.e.,
{









Proof: The simulator S in this case is fairly obvious, but we include it for completeness.
Once again, for readability we ignore the presence of the MAC-tags and keys.
1. S invokes A on the input y′, the auxiliary input, and the security parameter n. The
simulator also chooses ŷ ∈ Y uniformly at random (it will send ŷ to the trusted
party, if needed).
2. S receives the input y of A to the computation of the functionality ShareGenp,m. (If
y 6∈ Y a default input is substituted.)





1 , . . . , b
(1)
m . Then, S gives these shares to A as its output from the computation
of ShareGenp,m.
4. Choose i∗ uniformly from {1, . . . ,m}
5. For i = 1 to i∗ − 1:
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(a) S chooses x̂ ∈ X uniformly at random, computes bi = f2(x̂, y), and sets b(1)i =
b
(2)
i ⊕ bi. It gives b
(1)
i to A. (Note that a fresh x̂ is chosen in every iteration.)
(b) If A aborts, then S sends ŷ to the trusted party, outputs whatever A outputs,
and halts.
6. For i = i∗ to m:
(a) If i = i∗ then S sends y to the trusted party computing f and receives z =
f2(x, y).
(b) S sets b(1)i = b
(2)
i ⊕ z and gives b
(1)
i to A.
(c) If A aborts, then S then outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. If A does not
abort, then S proceeds.
7. If A has never aborted (and all m iterations are done), then S outputs whatever A
outputs and halts.
Privacy is immediate, and so we focus on 1p -security. Ignoring the possibility of a
MAC forgery, we claim that the statistical difference between an execution of A, running
Π in a hybrid world with access to an ideal functionality computing ShareGenp,m, and an
execution of S, running in an ideal world with access to an ideal functionality comput-
ing F , is at most 1/p. (Thus, taking into account the possibility of a MAC forgery makes
the statistical difference at most 1/p + µ(κ) for some negligible function µ.) The view of
A is identical in the two worlds; the only issue is the output of the honest P1 holding
input x. Specifically, if A aborts in any iteration prior to i∗ then, in the ideal-world in-
teraction with S, party P1 outputs f1(x, ŷ) for a uniformly-chosen ŷ ∈ Y . In the hybrid
world, however, the output of P1 is given by the distribution of ai (for i < i∗) as deter-
mined by ShareGenp,m. However, these two distributions are within statistical difference
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(at most) 1/p. The claim follows.
The results of [15], along with the fact that a secure-with-abort protocol for ShareGenp,m
is implied by the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations, complete the proof of
Theorem 5.1.5.
5.2 Optimality of Our Results
We show that the results of the previous section are optimal as far as generic feasi-
bility is concerned.
5.2.1 Impossibility of 1
p
-Security and Security-with-Abort Simultaneously
In Section 5.1.2 (cf. the remark at the end of that section) we showed a protocol
achieving 1p -security and security-with-abort simultaneously for functionalities where at
least one of the domains is polynomial-size. We show that if both domains are super-
polynomial in size then, in general, it is impossible to achieve both these criteria at once.
Theorem 5.2.1 LetF =
{
EQκ : {0, 1}`(κ) × {0, 1}`(κ) → {0, 1}
}
, where EQκ denotes the equal-
ity function on strings and `(κ) = ω(log κ). Let Π be any protocol computing F . If Π is secure-
with-abort, then Π does not 1p -securely compute F for any p ≥ 4 +
1
poly(κ) .
Proof: Let Π be a protocol that computes F and is secure-with-abort. Assume without
loss of generality that P2 sends the first message in Π and that P1 sends the last message.
Say Π has m = m(κ) iterations for some polynomial m, where an iteration consists of a
message sent by P2 followed by a message sent by P1. Let a0 denote the value that P1
outputs if P2 sends nothing, and let ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, denote the value that P1 outputs
if P2 aborts after sending its iteration-i message. Similarly, let b0 denote the value that P2
outputs if P1 sends nothing, and let bi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, denote the value that P2 outputs if
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P1 aborts after sending its iteration-imessage. We may assume without loss of generality
that, for all i, we have ai ∈ {0, 1} and bi ∈ {0, 1,⊥}.
We will consider two experiments involving an execution of Π. In the first, x and
y are chosen uniformly and independently from {0, 1}`(κ); the parties are given inputs x
and y, respectively; and the parties then run protocol Π honestly. We denote the prob-
ability of events in this experiment by Prrand[·]. In the second experiment, x is chosen
uniformly from {0, 1}`(κ) and y is set equal to x; these inputs are given to the parties
and they run the protocol honestly as before. We denote the probability of events in this
probability space by Preq[·].
Claim 5.2.2 Prrand[a0 = 1 ∨ · · · ∨ am = 1] and Prrand[b0 = 1 ∨ · · · ∨ bm = 1] are negligible.
Proof: This follows from the fact that Π is secure-with-abort. If, say, it were the case that
Prrand[a0 = 1∨· · ·∨am = 1] is not negligible, then we could consider an adversarialP2 that
runs the protocol honestly but aborts at a random round. This would cause the honest P1
to output 1 with non-negligible probability in the real world, whereas P1 outputs 1 with
only negligible probability in the ideal world (since the parties are given independent,
random inputs).
Assume for simplicity that Π has perfect correctness, i.e., that am = bm = EQ(x, y)
when the two parties run the protocol honestly holding initial inputs x and y. (This
assumption is not necessary, but allows us to avoid having to deal with annoying techni-
calities.) Then
Preq[a0 = 1 ∨ · · · ∨ am = 1] = Preq[b0 = 1 ∨ · · · ∨ bm = 1] = 1
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since, in particular, Preq[am = 1] = Preq[bm = 1] = 1. In a given execution, let i∗ denote
the lowest index for which ai∗ = 1, and let j∗ denote the lowest index for which bj∗ = 1.
Since
Preq[i
∗ ≤ j∗] + Preq[i∗ > j∗] = 1,
at least one of the terms on the left-hand side is at least 1/2. We assume that
Preq[i
∗ ≤ j∗] ≥ 1/2, but the same argument (swapping the roles of the parties) applies if
Preq[i
∗ > j∗] ≥ 1/2.
Consider now a third experiment that is a mixture of the previous two. Specifically,
in this experiment a random bit b is chosen; if b = 0 then the parties are given inputs x and
y as in the first experiment (i.e., chosen uniformly and independently at random), while if
b = 1 then the parties are given (random) x = y as in the second experiment. The parties
then run protocol Π honestly. We denote the probability of events in this probability space
by Prreal3 [·]. We use the superscript real to distinguish this from an ideal-world version
of this experiment where the bit b is chosen uniformly and the parties are given x and y
generated accordingly, but now the parties interact with an ideal party computing EQ
without abort (i.e., in the first ideal model). We denote the probability of events in this
experiment by Prideal3 [·].
Consider an execution of the third experiment (in either the real or ideal worlds),
in the case when P1 is malicious. Let guess denote the event that P1 correctly guesses the
value of the bit b, and let out2 denote the output of P2. It is not hard to show that





(Note that out2 ∈ {0, 1} in the first ideal world.) Now take the following real-world
adversary A corrupting P1: upon receiving input x, adversary A runs Π honestly but
computes ai after receiving each iteration-i message from P2. Then:
• If, at some point, ai = 1 then A aborts the protocol (before sending the iteration-i
message on behalf of P1) and outputs the guess “b = 1”.
• If ai = 0 for all i, then A simply runs the protocol to the end (including the final
message of the protocol) and outputs the guess “b = 0”.
We have:




· Prrand[guess ∧ out2 6= 1] +
1
2
· Preq[guess ∧ out2 6= 1]
≥ 1
2
· Prrand[a1 = 0 ∧ · · · ∧ am = 0 ∧ bm = 0] +
1
2
· Preq[i∗ ≤ j∗]
≥ 1
2






using Claim 5.2.2 for the second inequality. Equations (5.2) and (5.3) show that Π cannot
also be 1p -secure for any p ≥ 4 +
1
poly(κ) .
5.2.2 Impossibility of 1
p
-Security for General Functions
Our results show that 1p -security is achievable for any functionality f : Xκ × Yκ →
Z1κ × Z2κ if at least one of Xκ, Yκ, Z1κ, Z2κ has polynomial size. Here, we demonstrate that
this limitation is inherent.
Define a deterministic, single-output function F = {Swapκ}with
Swapκ : {0, 1}ω(log κ) × {0, 1}ω(log κ) → {0, 1}ω(log κ)
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as follows: Fix some `(κ) = ω(log κ). Let (Gen,Mac,Vrfy) denote an information-theoretic,









(x1, x2) if Vrfyk1(x1, t1) = Vrfyk2(x2, t2) = 1
⊥ otherwise
.
(Note that both parties receive the same output (x1, x2) in the first case.)
Theorem 5.2.3 Function F cannot be 1p -securely computed for any p ≥ 2 +
1
poly(κ) .
Proof: Consider an ideal-world computation of Swap where:
• x1, x2 are chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}2`(κ).
• k1, k′1, k2, k′2 are output by Gen(1κ) (i.e., they are random MAC-keys).
• t1 = Mack1(x1), t′1 = Mack′1(x1), t2 = Mack2(x2), and t
′
2 = Mack′2(x2).
• P1 is given input (x1, t1, k2) and auxiliary information (k′2, t′2)
• P2 is given input (x2, t2, k1) and auxiliary information (k′1, t′1).
Define a win for P1 as the event that P1 outputs x2 while P2 fails to output x1. (A win
for P2 is defined analogously.) It is easy to see that, e.g., a malicious P1 cannot win in the
ideal world, where complete fairness is guaranteed, except with negligible probability.
This is because x2 is a uniform 2`(κ)-bit value, while the only information P1 has about
x2 initially is the `(κ)-bit tag t′2. Thus, the only way for P1 to learn x2 is to submit to the
trusted party some input (x̂1, t̂1, k̂2) for which Vrfyk1(x̂1, t̂1) = 1; unless x̂1 = x1, however,
this condition holds with negligible probability.
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In any real-world computation of Swap, however, there must be one party who
“gets its output first” with probability at least 1/2, and can identify exactly when this oc-
curs using its auxiliary information. More formally, say we have an m-iteration protocol
Π computing Swap where P2 sends the first message and P1 sends the last message. Let ai,
for i = 0, . . . ,m, denote the second component of the value P1 would output if P2 aborts
the protocol after sending its iteration-i message, and let bi denote the first component
of the value that P2 would output if P1 aborts the protocol after sending its iteration-i
message. Each value ai and bi can be computed in polynomial time after receiving the
other party’s iteration-i message. We can therefore define an adversary P ∗1 that acts as
follows:
Run the protocol honestly until the first round where Vrfyk′2(ai, t
′
2) = 1; then
output ai and abort.
An adversary P ∗2 can be defined analogously. Note that if, e.g., Vrfyk′2(ai, t
′
2) = 1 then
ai = x2 except with negligible probability; this follows from the information-theoretic
security of the MAC along with the fact that the execution of Π is independent of k′2, t
′
2.
Let i denote the first round in which Vrfyk′2(ai, t
′
2) = 1, and let j denote the first
round in which Vrfyk′1(bj , t
′
1) = 1. Assuming for simplicity that Π has perfect correctness,
we have
Pr[i ≤ j] + Pr[j > i] = 1.
Further, since
∣∣Pr[P ∗1 wins]− Pr[i ≤ j]∣∣ and ∣∣Pr[P ∗2 wins]− Pr[i > j]∣∣ are both negligible,
we see that either P ∗1 or P
∗
2 wins in the real world with probability at least 1/2− negl(κ).
Since an adversary wins in the ideal world with negligible probability, this rules out 1p -
security for p > 2.
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Chapter 6
Fairness When Players are Rational
Because we cannot generally achieve complete fairness, our work in Chapter 5 in-
troduced a new way of relaxing the definition of fairness. In this chapter we instead con-
sider relaxing our assumptions about the adversary. Most research in cryptography con-
siders arbitrary malicious behavior, and with good reason: for most applications, and un-
der reasonable assumptions, we can achieve security even under such conditions. Since
this is not the case with respect to fair computation, it is reasonable to consider weaker
adversaries in this setting. Motivated by the work of Halpern and Teague [46] we con-
sider here a particular application where we desire fair protocols, and we demonstrate
feasibility under the assumption that all players act rationally. That is, in the traditional
game theoretic sense, we assume the players all behave in a way that maximizes their
own utility. Of course, if we allowed for arbitrary utility functions, we would again be
facing adversaries with arbitrary behavior. Instead, we restrict the utility functions, with
the aim of still achieving some meaningful notion of security, while also enabling fair-
ness.
The problem we consider (as Halpern and Teague before us [46]) is called rational
secret sharing. The classical problem of t-out-of-n secret sharing [73, 10] (c.f. Section 2.2.3)
involves a “dealer” D who wishes to entrust a secret s to a group of n players P1, . . . , Pn
so that (1) any group of t or more players can reconstruct the secret without further inter-
vention of the dealer, yet (2) any group of fewer than t players has no information about
the secret. As an example, consider the scheme due to Shamir [73]: assume the secret s
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lies in a finite field F , with |F| > n. The dealer chooses a random polynomial f(x) of
degree at most t−1 subject to the constraint f(0) = s, and gives the “share” f(i) to player
Pi (for i = 1, . . . , n). Any set of t players can recover f(x) (and hence s) by broadcasting
their shares and interpolating the polynomial; furthermore, no set of fewer than t players
can deduce any information about s.
A secret sharing scheme, such as Shamir’s above, involves two distinct protocols:
Share(t, n, s), which is run by the dealer to generate the shares of s, and Rec(s1, . . . , sn),
which is run by some subset of the players in order to reconstruct s. The goal in rational
secret sharing is to find a fair reconstruction protocol. In other words, we wish to make
sure that while running Rec(s1, . . . , sn), no player receives s before any other player. As
mentioned before, we assume the players are acting to maximize particular utility func-
tions. Specifically, we assume each player prefers first and foremost any outcome where
they recover the secret. Then, that being equal, they prefer an outcome where the fewest
other players recover the secret. Formally, let µi(o) denote the utility of player Pi for
the outcome o. For a particular outcome o of the protocol, we let δi(o) be a bit denoting
whether or not Pi learns the secret, and let num(o) =
∑
i δi(o); i.e., num(o) is simply the
number of players who learn the secret. Following [46], we make the following assump-
tions about the utility functions of the players:
• δi(o) > δi(o′)⇒ µi(o) > µi(o′).
• If δi(o) = δi(o′), then num(o) < num(o′)⇒ µi(o) > µi(o′).
When fairness is not a concern, the only necessary interaction required in the re-
construction protocol is to have each player broadcast their share to all other players.
However, with the above utility functions, no player has any incentive to do this! Con-
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sider P1: if strictly fewer than t − 1 other players broadcast their shares to the rest of the
group, then no one learns the secret regardless of whether P1 reveals his share or not.
If more than t − 1 players reveal their shares, then everyone learns the secret and P1’s
actions again have no effect. On the other hand, if exactly t− 1 other players reveal their
shares, then P1 learns the secret (using his share), and he can prevent other players from
learning the secret by not publicly revealing his share.
Let t, n be as above, and let t∗ ≥ t denote the number of players present when the
secret is to be reconstructed. Given the above discussion, we can conclude the follow-
ing about the game-theoretic equilibria of “standard” Shamir secret sharing in the above
situation (definitions of Nash equilibria and weakly dominating strategies are given in
Section 6.1):
• For any t, n, t∗, it is a Nash equilibrium for no one to reveal their share.
• If t∗ > t, it is a Nash equilibrium for all t∗ participating players to reveal their
shares. However, as discussed above, it is a weakly dominating strategy for each
player not to reveal his share; thus, the Nash equilibrium likely to be reached is the
one mentioned earlier in which no one reveals their share.
• If t∗ = t, then having all t∗ participating players reveal their shares is not even
a Nash equilibrium, since each player can profitably deviate by not revealing his
share.
Related work: Halpern and Teague [46] introduced the question of rational secret shar-
ing. They proved that no protocol that has a fixed number of rounds can have a Nash
equilibrium that results in reconstruction. They demonstrate a probabilistic protocol for
t, n ≥ 3, and claim impossibility for n = 2. In contrast, our protocol extends even to
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t, n ≥ 2, is much simpler than their protocol, and removes some undesirable equilibria
that arise in their protocol. Izmalkov, et al. [50] consider computation in which the play-
ers are colocated. This allows them to use certain physical assumptions, such as secure
envelopes and ballot boxes, in addition to standard communication channels. In this
environment, they demonstrate a protocol Π for securely implementing any mediated
game Γ such that (informally) any equilibrium in Γ corresponds to an equilibrium in Π,
and vice versa. Since rational secret sharing can be implemented as a mediated game,
the work of [50] gives a solution to the problem we are considering here. Their work is
in fact much more general, implying a protocol for any functionality, for arbitrary player
utilities and even in the presence of coalitions. Concurrently with the work presented
here, Abraham, et al. [1] defined a notion of resistance to coalitions of rational players and
show a coalition-resistant protocol. Also concurrently, Lysyanskaya and Triandopoulos
[61] examine the case of “mixed” security when both arbitrarily malicious and rational
players might be present. Subsequent to our work, Kol and Naor [57] suggest using an
alternative, stronger solution concept than the one we present below, called strict Nash
equilibrium. They show how to achieve this using secret shares that are unbounded in
size (though constant size in expectation), and demonstrate that this restriction is neces-
sary. This work and a second result by the same authors [56] were the first two works to
remove the need for simultaneous broadcast channels (also discussed in Section 6.3). Ong
et al. [65] consider the case where some players are guaranteed to be honest, while the rest
are rational. They demonstrate a fair protocol for secret sharing in this setting, removing
the simultaneous broadcast channel, and achieving a stronger solution concept than in
prior work. Asharov and Lindell [2] consider the question of whether protocols for ratio-
nal secret sharing can be independent of the players’ utility functions, and demonstrate
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a negative result. They also consider whether it is possible to construct a protocol that
does not require simultaneous broadcast, under the assumption that players might gain
utility by forcing others to output incorrect values. They again demonstrate a negative
result, though they do give the first protocol that achieves security when the utility for
forcing bad output is known. Finally, the most recent work on the topic is by Fuchsbauer
et al. [30] who use verifiable random functions to provide a much more efficient protocol
than in prior work, by removing the need for general secure computation in the recon-
struction phase. They also introduce two new solution concepts that address some of the
issues we discuss in Section 6.3.
6.1 Definitions from Game Theory
A game consists of multiple players interacting according to chosen strategies. In
our setting, strategies are simply probabilistic, polynomial-time interactive turing ma-
chines. We let σi denote the strategy employed by player Pi, and let ~σ = (σ1, . . . , σn)
denote the vector of players’ strategies. Following standard game-theoretic notation, we
let (σ′i, ~σ−i)
def
= (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ
′
i, σi+1, . . . , σn); that is, (σ
′
i, ~σ−i) denotes the strategy vector
~σ with Pi’s strategy changed to σ′i.
Definition 6.1.1 A vector of probabilistic, polynomial-time strategies ~σ is a computational
Nash equilibrium if the following holds for all i: for any σ′i 6= σi, we have Ui(σ′i, ~σ−i) ≤
Ui(~σ) + negl(κ).
That is, given that all other players are following ~σ−i, Pi cannot gain more than some
negligible advantage by deviating and choosing some (efficient) strategy other than σi.
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In general, multiple Nash equilibria may exist. An inherently “unstable” Nash
equilibrium (i.e., one unlikely to be reached) is one in which any of the players’ strategies
are weakly dominated by other strategies. Informally, a strategy σi of player Pi is weakly
dominated by another strategy σ′i if (1) Pi is sometimes better off playing σ
′
i than playing
σi, and (2) Pi is never worse off playing σ′i than playing σi. Recalling the example from
the introduction, say a secret is shared using a t-out-of-n secret sharing (with t < n) and
consider the strategy vector in which all n players reveal their shares. This is a Nash
equilibrium: the secret is reconstructed even if any single player deviates. On the other
hand, for each player Pi, revealing the share is weakly dominated by not revealing the
share: if fewer than t−1 other players or more than t−1 other players reveal their shares,
then nothing changes; if exactly t − 1 other player reveal their shares then Pi learns the
secret but no one else does. Formal definitions follow.
Definition 6.1.2 Let Si denote a set of strategies for Pi, and let S−i
def
= S1 × · · · × Si−1 ×
Si+1 · · · × Sn. A strategy σi ∈ Si is weakly dominated by a strategy σ′i ∈ Si with respect to
S−i if (1) there exists a ~σ−i ∈ S−i such that Ui(σi, ~σ−i) < Ui(σ′i, ~σ−i) and (2) for all ~σ−i ∈ S−i,
it holds that Ui(σi, ~σ−i) ≤ Ui(σ′i, ~σ−i).
Strategy σi is weakly dominated with respect to S−i if there exists a σ′i ∈ Si such that
σi is weakly dominated by σ′i with respect to S−i.
Definition 6.1.3 Let DOMi(S1 × · · · × Sn) denote the set of strategies in Si that are weakly
dominated with respect to S−i. Let S0i denote the initial set of allowable strategies of Pi. For all
k ≥ 1, define Ski inductively as Ski
def
= Sk−1i \ DOMi(S
k−1
1 × · · · × Sk−1n ). Let S∞i
def
= ∩kSki .
We say σi survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies if σi ∈ S∞i .
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6.2 A Protocol for Rational Secret Sharing
We present our protocol under the assumption that the players have access to a si-
multaneous broadcast channel. In Section 6.3 we discuss subsequent work that removed
this assumption [56, 57, 65, 2, 30]. We consider the case of arbitrary t, n, and we assume
the dealer holds a secret s which lies in a strict subset S of a finite field F (if s lies in some
field F ′, this is easy to achieve by taking a larger field F containing F ′ as a subfield). We
assume players know S. Furthermore, we will assume that the shares of s are elements
of F , as in Shamir’s (classical) secret sharing scheme.
The intuition behind the protocol is to use the threat that nobody will learn the
secret in order to coerce cooperation and enable everybody to learn it. For the sake of
presenting the intuition, assume the dealer is present during the reconstruction phase. (In
our actual protocol, he is removed in the usual way through an execution of ShareGen.)
At the beginning of each iteration, with probability α the dealer generates a random t-
out-of-n Shamir sharing of s, and with probability 1 − α the dealer generates a random
t-out-of-n Shamir sharing of an arbitrary element ŝ ∈ F \S; we describe how α is chosen
below. These shares are distributed to the players. Note that no player can tell from
their share whether the players were given a share of ŝ or the true secret s. Then they
all broadcast their shares simultaneously: if they recover some value s ∈ S, they know
they have recovered the secret; they simply output s and terminate. If they recover some
ŝ ∈ F \ S, they return to the dealer to receive new shares and repeat the process. If a
player ever fails to broadcast, all players abort the protocol. As described previously, if
a player tries to hold back, hoping to reconstruct the secret alone, they run the risk of
aborting in a round when nothing is learned, forcing the protocol to terminate before
they can recover the secret. By choosing α appropriately, we can prove that they have
178
ShareGen
Inputs: Let the inputs to ShareGen be ((pk1, s1, σ1), . . . , (pkn, sn, σn)) . The security pa-
rameter is κ. If any of the following statements are true, output ⊥ and terminate:
• If for some j it holds that sj /∈ F .
• If for some i, j it holds that pki 6= pkj .
• If for some j it holds that Vrfypkj (sj , σj) = 0.
Computation:
For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, define values s(i)1 , . . . , s
(i)
n in the following way:
• Choose i∗ according to a geometric distribution with parameter α (see text).
• For i = 1 to i∗ − 1 do:
– Choose ŝ ∈ F \ S and set (s(i)1 , . . . , s
(i)
n ) = Share(t, n, ŝ).
• For i = i∗ to m, set (s(i)1 , . . . , s
(i)
n ) = Share(t, n, s).
Output:
1. Send to Pj the values (s
(1)
j , . . . , s
(m)
j )
Figure 6.1: Functionality ShareGen for rational secret sharing.
higher expected utility when they cooperate.
Theorem 6.2.1 Given an ideal execution of ShareGen, and for appropriate choice of α, the above
protocol constitutes a Nash equilibrium for t-out-of-n secret sharing that survives iterated deletion
of weakly dominated strategies.
Proof: We first consider the case of t = n = 2, and then discuss how to generalize the
proof for arbitrary t, n. It is not hard to see that the protocol is a Nash equilibrium for
appropriate choice of α: Say P2 acts according to the protocol and consider whether P1
has any incentive to deviate. Without loss of generality, consider a deviation in the first
iteration. The only possible deviation is for P1 to refuse to broadcast his share. In this
case, he learns the secret (while P2 does not) with probability α, but with probability 1−α
he will never learn the secret.
Say P1’s utility is U+ if he learns the secret but P2 does not; U if both players
learn the secret; and U− if neither player learns the secret, where U+ > U > U−. If
P1 follows the protocol, his expected utility is U . If P1 deviates, his expected utility is
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Protocol for Rational Secret Sharing
Sharing Protocol:
Inputs: The dealer has input s ∈ S. The security parameter is κ.
Let (Share,Rec) be some classical secret sharing scheme, and (Gen,Sign,Vrfy) be a digital
signature scheme.
1. The dealer computes (s1, . . . , sn) = Share(t, n, s), and (sk, pk) = Gen(1κ).
2. The dealer gives (pk,Signsk(si)) to Pi.
Reconstruction Protocol:
Inputs: Party Pj has input (pk, sj , σj).
The protocol:
1. Preliminary phase:
(a) The parties run a protocol π for computing ShareGen. Each player Pj uses
their respective input, sj and security parameter κ.
(b) Any player that receives ⊥ from this execution aborts the protocol. Other-
wise, denote Pj ’s output by (s
(1)
j , . . . , s
(κ)
j ) and continue to the next stage.
2. For i = 1, . . . , κ do:
Broadcast shares:
(a) Each Pj simultaneously broadcasts s
(i)
j .
(b) If anyone fails to broadcast, or broadcasts an invalid share, all players abort.




j+1, . . . , s
(i)
n ) denote the val-
ues received by Pj .
i. If Rec(s(i)1 , . . . , s
(i)
j−1, sj , s
(i)
j+1, . . . , s
(i)
n ) ∈ S, Pj outputs s and terminates
the protocol.
ii. If Rec(s(i)1 , . . . , s
(i)
j−1, sj , s
(i)
j+1, . . . , s
(i)
n ) ∈ F \ S, Pj proceeds to the next
round.
3. Repeat the reconstruction protocol:
With all but negligible probability, the protocol will have ended before now. If it
has not, the players restart the reconstruction using the same inputs.
Figure 6.2: A protocol for rational secret sharing.
α · U+ + (1− α) · U−. So as long as
U > α · U+ + (1− α) · U− ,
it is in P1’s best interest to follow the protocol. For appropriate α ∈ (0, 1), then, the
strategy profile in which both parties follow the protocol is a Nash equilibrium.1 It is
1We intentionally designed the protocol such that it can run forever, though with overwhelming prob-
ability in κ it will end in the first κ rounds. Without this specification, the protocol would not technically
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immediate that the same analysis holds for general t, n, regardless of the number of par-
ticipating players t∗.
We next prove that our protocol survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated
strategies. It is easy to see that when a player learns the real secret, not aborting after-
wards is weakly dominated by aborting. The first round of iterated deletion thus leaves
only strategies in which players always abort after learning the secret.
We show that no other deterministic strategies are weakly dominated (and hence
no randomized strategies are weakly dominated either). We again begin with the case
t = n = 2. We show that for all deterministic strategies σ, σ′ of P1, there exist strategies
τ, τ ′ of P2 such that U1(σ, τ) > U1(σ′, τ) but U1(σ, τ ′) < U1(σ′, τ ′). This proves that all
deterministic strategies of P1 are incomparable, and so none are ever deleted.
Let hi(σ, τ ; r) denote the history of actions (by both players) through iteration i
given the indicated strategies σ and τ and assuming the dealer uses coins r (we view
r as an infinite string encoding the dealer’s random choices in all iterations). h0(σ, τ ; r)
denotes the empty (starting) history. Let Ai(σ, τ ; r) denote the action taken by P1 in iter-
ation i, again for the indicated strategies and random coins. We say a player cooperates in
some iteration if they reveal their share, and defects if they do not.
Now take arbitrary deterministic strategies σ 6= σ′ for P1. Let τ0 be a strategy of
P2, i ≥ 1 be an integer, and r be a set of coins such that
hi−1(σ, τ
0; r) = hi−1(σ
′, τ0; r) (6.1)
survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. Even though it occurs negligibly often, the players
will have no incentive to broadcast when they reach the last round. Then, through inductive reasoning, it




0; r) 6= Ai(σ′, τ0; r); (6.2)
i.e., iteration i is the first iteration in which the actions of P1 differ when we compare
strategies σ and σ′ as played against τ0. (Note that some such τ0, i, r must exist or else
σ = σ′. Also, it is implicit that neither player has reconstructed the real secret in any
prior iteration, since otherwise the protocol would never reach iteration i.) Without loss
of generality, assumeAi(σ, τ0; r) is to defect andAi(σ′, τ0; r) is to cooperate. Note that the
actions in iteration i cannot depend on whether or not the dealer shared the real secret or
the fake secret in that iteration.
Consider the following strategy τ of P2: (1) act identically to τ0 through iteration
i− 1; (2) in iteration i, defect; (3) in all subsequent iterations: if P1 defected in iteration i,
then cooperate; if P1 cooperated in iteration i, defect. For any r satisfying Equations (1)
and (2), P1 is clearly better off playing σ than σ′ against strategy τ .
Next consider the following strategy τ ′ of P2: (1) act identically to τ0 through it-
eration i − 1; (2) in iteration i, cooperate; (3) in all subsequent iterations: if P1 defected
in iteration i, then defect; if P1 cooperated in iteration i, cooperate. Exactly as when we
argued earlier that our protocol was a Nash equilibrium, we have U1(σ, τ ′) < U1(σ′, τ ′).
(Here, P1 is not better off playing σ′ than σ for all r satisfying Equations (1) and (2);
however, P1 is better off playing σ′ in expectation.)
The same argument extends to the case of general t, n, regardless of the number of
participating players t∗. We simply replace τ0 with a strategy profile of n − 1 strategies
such that Equations (6.1) and (6.2) above are still valid, and then define τ and τ ′ as above,
but modifying the strategies of all other players.
We remark that when t∗ = t our protocol has no additional Nash equilibrium which
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is preferred, by any player, to the prescribed equilibrium.
6.3 Discussion
Solution concepts: The work of Kol and Naor [56] later demonstrated a further subtlety
that arises when using the notion of iterated deletion as a solution concept. Recall that
in Theorem 6.2.1, we assumed an ideal execution of ShareGen. If we replace this with a
secure computation, where the execution makes use of cryptographic keys of size κ (for
oblivious transfer), then if the protocol ever reaches the 2κth iteration, a player that has
been trying to break the security of these schemes is guaranteed to succeed by that time,
and might fully recover their opponent’s shares. Even though this happens with negli-
gible probability, logically, if it does happen, there is no reason for anyone to broadcast
at that point, since their opponents may have already recovered the secret and are not
going to broadcast their own shares. Now, the protocol is susceptible to backwards in-
duction: if one player knows that the others will not send their share in round 2κ, then
logically, they should refuse to broadcast in round 2κ − 1, and so forth. Following the
logic to its conclusion, nobody will choose to broadcast even in the first round! The point
is, while finding the secret keys used in the secure computation may be computationally
infeasible, the players are not bounded in their inductive reasoning.
Kol and Naor offer solutions to the problem by introducing techniques that are se-
cure in an information theoretic sense up until the round in which the secret is revealed
[56, 57]. However, perhaps the more important point to take from their work is that
the standard game theoretic definitions do not necessarily translate nicely to the setting
where players are computationally bounded. In this particular case, it seems that the
problem lies more in the solution concept rather than in the protocol. One possible solu-
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tion might be to introduce a discount factor in the utility function, decreasing the payoff
for any benefit that occurs far in the future, and ensuring that the advantage to aborting
in round 2κ is negligible anyway.
There is a separate problem with the solution concept used in Section 6.2. We ar-
gued there that because the prescribed strategies are not weakly dominated, the preferred
equilibrium is more likely to occur. However, we proved that (essentially) no strategies
are weakly dominated, which certainly waters down the argument that our preferred
strategy is the most likely outcome. Even worse is that we used an empty threat to prove
the theorem, by considering a strategy that cooperates forever if the other player defects!
As opposed to the concern that was addressed by Kol and Noar, the problem here is not
unique to the computational setting; the problem lies in the very definition of the solu-
tion concept, which predates the study of game theory in cryptography. However, if we
try adopting some of the stronger solution concepts from the literature instead, we run
into difficulties in the computational setting. For example, we might prefer to require
that our prescribed strategy is sub-game perfect, which states that the prescribed strategy
must be a Nash equilibrium at every possible state in the game tree, even those that are
never reached when the strategy is correctly followed. Indeed, this definition is designed
to remove empty threats such as the one described above. Unfortunately, in the compu-
tational setting, this requires us to consider even the histories in which players happen to
guess a cryptographic key. As a result, natural protocol descriptions are unlikely to meet
the definition as is.
A final point on our solution concept was mentioned in a personal conversation
with Amos Beimel. Technically, our proof in Section 6.2 only considers strategies that
take the action-histories of the other players as input. But a strategy could also consider
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the particular message strings sent by the other players (including the signatures on their
secret shares). For example, although it is intuitively irrational, a strategy could dictate
that a player aborts if the third bit of the signature received from player j in the prior
round is 0. When we consider such strategies, it is no longer clear that the prescribed
strategy survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. However, Beimel
demonstrated that it is not very difficult to modify our theorem to prove that all envelope
strategies survive iterated deletion, where these are the strategies that we considered, but
never defined, in which the only input to the strategy is the action-histories.
Simultaneous broadcast: We assumed here that the players have access to a simultane-
ous broadcast channel. This is not always a realistic assumption, especially if protocols
are executed over the Internet, and it is best if it can be avoided. The works of Kol
and Naor were the first to remove this assumption [56, 57], followed by Ong et al. [65],
Asharov and Lindell [2], and finally Fuchsbauer et al. [30]. With the exception of Ong
et al. (who rely on the assumption that some of the players are fully honest, rather than
rational), all of these works use the same fundamental idea (though most of them implic-
itly). If the parties do not know enough about the secret that they can recognize it when
they see it, then we can safely instruct them take turns revealing their shares. One player
will learn the secret first, but they will not know that they have learned it until after they
have responded with their own share, enabling the other party to learn the secret as well.
Then, only in the following round are the players informed that the value they previously
learned is the correct secret.
General secure computation: All of the above work deals exclusively with secret shar-
ing. A natural next question is whether we can extend this work to enable fairness in
general secure computation among rational parties. The naive approach would be to
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have the players compute an unfair secure computation that results in a secret sharing
of the outputs, and then to apply the fair reconstruction protocol from any of the above
works. Unfortunately, without simultaneous broadcast, some complications arise. First
is the issue described above regarding prior knowledge of the output. For certain ap-
plications of secret sharing, it might be reasonable to assume that the secret is chosen
uniformly from the domain of all secrets. However, for general secure computation, we
do not want to be constrained to assuming that the inputs are uniformly chosen. Fur-
thermore, even if we do make this assumption, for more general computations, the input
itself may give too much information for us to assume that he output will be unrecog-
nized. For example, consider the case of signature exchange where the player is given
his opponents verification key as part of his input. As soon as one player reconstructs a
secret that verifies, he can abort the protocol and ruin fairness.
We might hope that the naive solution above will work if we are given a simulta-
neous broadcast channel, but another subtlety still needs to be addressed. Suppose two
players are computing the XOR function on inputs b1 and b2. If player one is rational
(with the utility functions described earlier), he will switch his input value to b̄1, causing
player two to output the wrong value; he can then still output the correct value by flip-
ping his own output bit from the computation! This is considered a legal action in the
standard definition of security (among malicious players): we always allow the adver-
sary to change inputs before submitting values the the trusted party. But in the rational
setting we still have no way to model this.
In summary, while our work helped to introduce the question of rational compu-
tation (along with [46, 61, 1]), it brings with it some key definitional questions. Many of
these questions are still open today. We refer the reader to a more detailed discussion in
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a survey by Katz [52] for futher information.
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Chapter 7
Fair Primitives for Secure Computation
In this paper we address a very natural question. What is the minimum amount of
help required to be able to compute all functions fairly? We think of this helper as a naive
black box, or a primitive, with no knowledge of the function being computed. It is charged
with a fixed task: it takes inputs from each player, and then simultaneously outputs some
fixed function of the inputs to all players. Clearly we can compute any function fairly if
this primitive is sufficiently complex: we can simply define its input to be a description
of the function being computed, along with the inputs to that function. (Indeed, this
was demonstrated by Fitzi et al. [29], as discussed below.) However, our interest is in
reducing the complexity of the primitives. In particular, we study the minimum input
size to such primitives that will enable the fair computation of any function.
Interestingly, there has been extensive research on very similar questions in the
context of unfair secure computation. When there is no honest majority among the play-
ers, it is known that oblivious transfer is both necessary and sufficient for computational
security (without fairness) [78, 39, 55, 49]. There is a long line of research identifying
the minimum primitives that enable information theoretic security in this setting [19, ?].
Surprisingly, very little work has addressed the parallel questions with respect to fair-
ness. One exception is the work of Lepinski, Micali, Peikert, and shelat [58], where the
authors devised a protocol for completely fair multi-party computation with any num-
ber of malicious parties by relying on “envelope” primitives: communication primitives
with special physical properties. The goal of their work was to design a fair protocol
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that makes use of easily realizable primitives, rather than to explore the bounds on the
complexity of these primitives or the number of required interactions with the primitive,
as we do below.
7.1 A Complete Primitive for Fair Two-Party Computation
In this section we demonstrate a primitive that is complete for two-party fairness.
(In the original paper [43] we also provide a similar primitive for the multi-party set-
ting, but we do not present it here.) In order to compute some function F(x, y) =
{f1κ(x, y), f2κ(x, y)} fairly, the parties will first unfairly compute a related functionF ′(x, y)
that provides player i with an encryption of f iκ(x, y), along with a secret share of the cor-
responding decryption key (generated using a 2-out-of-2 non-malleable secret-sharing
scheme, defined below). This reduces the problem of fairness to a simple exchange of the
secret shares. Of course, if the players exchanged these on their own, one player might
abort just at the point of exchange, recovering the decryption key (and thus his output)
all alone. Instead, the ideal functionality FairRec (described next) takes the shares from
each player and performs the reconstruction fairly; the non-malleability property of the
secret-sharing scheme enables the functionality to verify thzat both players have pro-
vided correct shares. The details follow. To simplify the notation, we drop the security
parameter when it is not important to the discussion.




(s, s) if Rec(x, y) = (s, 0)
(⊥,⊥) otherwise
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where Rec is the reconstruction protocol from a non-malleable secret sharing scheme.
Intuitively, the FairRec functionality is just a fair implementation of Rec: it takes a non-
malleable secret share from each player, and outputs the result of Rec to both players if
and only if the secret was successfully reconstructed. We will prove that it is complete
for fairness in Section 7.1. Interestingly, it will also play a key role in our proofs of impos-
sibility in Section 7.2.
Theorem 7.1.2 Assuming one-way functions exist, any two-party functionality F can be fairly
computed in the OT-hybrid model by using a single call to FairRecO(κ).
Proof: We begin by defining a function F ′ related to F in the way described above.
Specifically, let (Enc,Dec) be the encryption and decryption functions for a semantically
secure encryption scheme. Then we define:




















where (s1, s2) = Share(kEnc; r), r is chosen uniformly at random, and |kEnc| = κ.
From standard results in cryptography, we can build a (2, 2)-NMSS scheme un-
conditionally. Furthermore, by the results of [54], any two-party functionality can be
computed securely with abort given black box access to OT. In particular, the following
lemma follows from previous work:
Lemma 7.1.3 Assuming the existence of oblivious transfer, for any function F(x, y), there exists
a two-party protocol Π′(x, y) that securely computes F ′(x, y) with abort.
The size of the input to FairRec is the size of the share of one decryption key. Fair
computation of F(x, y) follows easily:
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1. Execute a secure-with-abort protocol to compute F ′(x, y). The existence of such a
protocol follows from Lemma 7.1.3.
2. Player i ∈ {1, 2} parses the output f ′iκ (x, y) as




κ(x, y)), Share(kEnc, r)i
)
and submits zFairRec to the ideal function FairRec.
3. Let ki denote the output that player i receives from FairRec. If ki = ⊥, output ⊥.
Otherwise, output Decki(zEnc).
To demonstrate that the resulting computation is secure, we prove security in the hybrid
world where we are given a semantically-secure symmetric encryption scheme (Enc,Dec),
an ideal functionality for computing FairRec with perfect fairness, and an ideal function-
ality for computing F ′(x, y) with abort. Let κ also denote the security parameter for the
NMSS and encryption schemes (i.e., no polynomial-time adversary has advantage more
than ε = negl(κ) in the semantic-security game).
Note that if we allow the input size to FairRec to depend on the output size ofF , we
do not need to use encryption at all: F ′ can directly output shares of F and FairRec can
be used to exchange these shares. In this case, the proof of security is also much simpler
and uses a straight-line simulator. The ideal-world simulator in this proof is a little more
complex and uses its ability to rewind the adversary:
The simulator in the ideal world has access to an ideal functionality for computing
F(x, y) with perfect fairness, and simulates FairRec and F ′ for the real-world adversary.
The simulator works as follows (we assume without loss of generality that the adversary
has corrupted player 1):
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1. S receives input x from player 1 intended for F ′. He simulates F ′ as follows:
(a) S generates a random encryption key kEnc.
(b) S computes a secret sharing of kEnc by randomly choosing r and running
(s1, s2)← Share(kEnc, r).
(c) S computes ξ = EnckEnc(f1κ(x, 0)).
(d) S sends (ξ, s1) to player 1.
2. S receives input s′ from player 1 intended for FairRec. If player 1 sends any value
s′ 6= s1 (including s′ = ⊥), we refer to this as an abort.
3. If player 1 aborted in the previous step, S returns⊥ on behalf of FairRec, submits⊥
to F , outputs the view of player 1, and terminates the simulation.
4. Otherwise, S will try to estimate the probability that player 1 does not abort in step
2. (This is done exactly as in Goldreich et al. [36].) We denote the true probability
of this event by q, where the probability is taken over the randomness used in gen-
erating kEnc (Step 1a), and in generating the encryption (Step 1c). We denote S’s
estimate of q by q̃.
(a) S fixes some number t = poly(κ) ≥ κ. (Its value is described more precisely
below.)
(b) S rewinds player 1 and executes steps 1 and 2 repeatedly, using fresh random-
ness each time, until player 1 has not aborted in t of the repetitions.
(c) S estimates q as q̃ = t/(# of repetitions). The polynomial defining t is chosen
to be large enough that Pr[12 ≤
q
q̃ ≤ 2] > 1− 2
−κ.
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5. The simulator sends x to the ideal functionality for F and receives f1κ(x, y). S then
repeats the following procedure at most min( tq̃ , 2
κ) times.
(a) Using fresh randomness, he rewinds player 1 and repeats Steps 1 and 2, using
ξ = EnckEnc(f
1
κ(x, y)), in place of ξ = EnckEnc(f
1
κ(x, 0)).
(b) If player 1 does not abort, S simulates the output of FairRec by sending kEnc
to player 1. He outputs the transcript that successfully completed, and termi-
nates the simulation.
6. If S has not yet terminated, it outputs fail and aborts the simulation.
It is easy to observe that when the simulator does not output fail, the hybrid world
and the ideal world are identical. We next bound the probability that the simulator out-
puts fail, and afterward we will prove that the simulator runs in expected polynomial
time.
Claim 7.1.4 The simulator outputs fail with probability that is negligible in κ.
Proof: Note that S outputs fail only if a) the adversary did not abort at step 2, and b) the
simulator made t/q̃ attempts in step 5 and did not succeed in producing a transcript. Let
p be the probability that player 1 does not abort in step 2 given ξ = EnckEnc(f
1
κ(x, y)) (as
opposed to q which is the probability that he does not abort given ξ = EnckEnc(f
1
κ(x, 0))).
The following analysis is taken from [36]:


























≤ q(1− p)t/2q + negl(κ) (7.1)
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We wish to prove that the last equation is negligible in κ. Let’s suppose first that p ≥ q/2.
It follows then that
(1− p)t/2q ≤ (1− q
2
)t/2q < e−t/4
On the other hand, if p < q/2 and Equation (7.1) is non-negligible, i.e, for some polyno-
mial g and infinitely many values κ:
q(1− p)t/2q + negl(κ) > 1/g(κ),
then it follows that q > 1/g′(κ) for some polynomial g′. Finally, we have |q − p| > q/2 >
1/(2g′(κ)), violating the semantic security of the encryption scheme.
Claim 7.1.5 The simulator’s expected running time is polynomial in κ.
Proof: First, note that if the adversary fails at step 2, the simulation ends immediately;
this occurs with probability 1 − q (the probability is over the random coins used by the
simulator).
With probability q, the simulator runs the estimation process of Step 4, followed by
the iterations of Step 5. The iterations in either step are polynomial time, so we will de-
note an upper-bound on their runtime by g(κ). In the estimation process, the probability
that it succeeds in any one iteration is q, and it runs this process until it has succeeded
t = poly(κ) times. The expected number of iterations is therefore t/q. In the iteration
process, the number of iterations is bounded by min( tq̃ , 2
κ). With probability greater than
1− 2−κ, we have t/q̃ < 2t/q, and with the remaining probability, the runtime is bounded
at 2κ. Hence the total expected run time is bounded by





) = 3tg(κ) = poly(κ)
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7.2 A Lower Bound on the Size of Complete Primitives
In this section we show that there does not exist a finite (i.e. “short”) primitive that
is complete for fairness. More specifically, we prove that the FairRecκ function cannot
be fairly computed even if the players are given parallel access to a primitive of size
O(log κ). There are two main ideas behind the proof. For simplicity, imagine for now that
the entire protocol consisted of a single call to this short primitive. Our first observation
is that because the primitive is short, the adversary can locally simulate it, computing
its output for each possible input of the other party. This will play a crucial role in our
proof, but it does not itself suffice: so far the adversary has no way of knowing which of
these outputs are correct. However, because the primitive is supposed to be complete
for fairness, it allows us to compute the FairRec functionality, which has a very useful
property: its output is verifiable. That is, when two parties are given inputs generated
by Share, then the correct output of FairRec is (s, 0), where the flag 0 indicates that s is
the correct output. Furthermore, for incorrect inputs, with overwhelming probability
the output of FairRec is (⊥,⊥). The adversary simply computes the primitive for every
possible input of the other player, and outputs s when he recovers it.
When we consider a protocol with many calls to the primitive (including parallel
calls), we combine the above ideas using a standard hybrid argument. If the adversary
aborts before any invocations of the primitive, he cannot learn anything about the output
s. On the other hand, if he behaves honestly in all invocations, he should always recover
s. We prove below that there is some specific invocation for which the adversary can gain
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a non-negligible advantage over the honest party by aborting and simulating the input
to that invocation as described above. Finally, he can guess which invocation will allow
this advantage with significant probability. Formally, we define:
Definition 7.2.1 (Parallel Primitives) For a primitive g, we denote park(g) the primitive that
consists of k independent copies of g with enforced parallelism. The parallelism is enforced in
that none of the copies of g in park(g) send output to any party until all k copies have received
input from all parties. We use Πgp to denote that protocol Π has access to park(g).
Note that for any k ≥ 1, park(g) is a more powerful primitive than g (i.e., if the
fairness of F reduces to g then the fairness of F also reduces to park(g)). We are proving
an impossibility, so starting with a more powerful primitive strengthens our results. Our
proof will hold even if we restrict the adversarial behavior to aborting early.
Theorem 7.2.2 Let g be an O(log κ)-bit primitive. Then for any polynomial p, parp(κ)(g) is not
complete for fairness.
Proof: Suppose there exists such a primitive g and polynomial p. Consider the r = r(κ)
round protocol Π~gp that fairly computes FairRecκ(x, y) while making a call to parp(κ)(g) in
each round. We can think of this call as p(κ) parallel calls to g. Without loss of generality,
we assume that these calls to g constitute the only communication between the players1.
Let q = p · r be the total number of calls to g. For each round i ∈ r, we define some
arbitrary ordering σi on the parallel calls to g that occur in that round. This induces a
natural ordering over all q calls to g, where for i < j, calls in round i are ordered before
calls in round j. We let gk denote the kth call to g according to this ordering.
1This is without loss of generality because we can always modify g to do message transmission, in addi-
tion to its original functionality. Note also that if less than p(κ) calls are needed in a particular round, the
players can make extra calls with random inputs, ignoring the outputs, to make the total number of calls
p(κ).
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Consider an execution of Π~gp in which the players’ inputs are generated by running
Share(s, r) = (s0, s1) for random s and r, and player j gets the share sj . We let the
value ai denote the output of player 0 when player 1 acts honestly for the first i calls to
g (according to the ordering previously described) and then aborts. We define bi in the
symmetric way. Note that by correctness of Π~gp, and the definition of FairRecκ, for all i
Pr[ai 6= s ∧ ai 6= ⊥] = negl(κ) = Pr[bi 6= s ∧ bi 6= ⊥]
and
Pr[aq = s] = Pr[bq = s] = 1− negl(κ).
where the probability is over the random tapes of the players. Furthermore, by the defi-
nition of FairRec and the properties of a NMSS scheme,
Pr[a0 6= ⊥] = negl(κ) = Pr[b0 6= ⊥].
It follows that for every large enough κ, there exists a polynomial p′(κ) and a round i
such that either









Without loss of generality, we will assume the former, and we demonstrate an adversary
A that breaks the security of Π~gp with probability at least 1/(q · p′(κ)).
A begins by choosing a random value i∗ ∈ [1, . . . , q], and plays honestly for the
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first i∗ − 1 calls to g (i.e., submits correct values to g) and then aborts. Note that the
resulting output of player 1 is bi∗−1. The adversary now attempts to compute the value
of ai∗ by simulating the side of player 1. Note, however, that by definition, the value of
ai∗ depends on honest input to gi∗ from both players, and A may not know (anything)
about player 1’s input to gi∗ . Here we use the fact that g has short inputs, and that FairRec
is verifiable. A goes through all possible inputs β ∈ {0, 1}O(log κ) that player 1 might have
sent to gi∗ , and for each such value he simulates g internally, using as input his own
(honest) value that he would have sent if he had not aborted, and β. He computes ai∗
from his view in the (real) interaction with player 1, and the simulated output of gi∗ .
Since one of these values of β is the value used by player 1 in the actual execution, it
follows that the correct value of ai∗ is among this set of outputs. Furthermore, if some
simulated ai∗ = s′ 6= ⊥ then s′ = s with overwhelming probability. A outputs s′ 6= ⊥
if this occurs, and ⊥ otherwise. By our assumption, there exists an i such that Pr[ai =
s∧ bi−1 = ⊥] ≥ 1p′(κ) . Hence,A recovers s without the honest party receiving output with
probability 1/(q · p′(κ)), contradicting the fairness of protocol.
Corollary 7.2.3 Simultaneous broadcast is not complete for fairness.
Proof: The fact that short simultaneous broadcast is not complete for fairness follows
from Theorem 7.2.2. We prove now that long simultaneous broadcast can be simulated
given parallel access to a short simultaneous broadcast protocol; it follows that if long-SB
is complete, short-SB must also complete, contradicting Theorem 7.2.2.
Let g denote the k-bit SB primitive. Then for any p ∈ N, there exists a protocol
Π~gp that implements kp-bit SB with perfect security, given p parallel copies to g. The
protocol is the (trivial) one round protocol in which both parties split their inputs into
p blocks of size k, submit block i to instance gi, and output the concatenation of the p
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outputs (maintaining the order). The proof of the lemma is straightforward, so we omit
a formal exposition. We simply note that the decision of an adversary to change its input
to any instance(s) of g (including the decision to abort in some instance(s)) is entirely
independent of the actions or input of the honest party. The simulator simply recovers
the p values that the adversary intended for g (recall that an abort is treated as input 0k),
concatenates them, and forwards them to the trusted party. After receiving output, the
simulator rewinds the adversary, parses the output into blocks, and sends block i to the
adversary as though it were the honest player’s input to gi.
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